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Abstract 
Issues related to food security have long been closely tied to the dynamics of the 
global political economy. The latest price peak experienced in the commodities 
market (2007-2008) greatly affected agricultural commodities, creating significant 
imbalances in production and consumption. This research develops an 
interdisciplinary approach that links together issues of natural resource governance, 
development, and transformations in the global political economy to explore the ways 
in which countries of South America govern commodity booms. In other words, this 
thesis examines how these global dynamics affect the ways in which food-producing 
states manage the wealth produced during commodity booms and how this is wealth 
is subsequently distributed among different sectors of society.  
In South America, the recent commodity boom has led to an expansion of primary 
production oriented towards export markets, creating imbalances in their domestic 
productive structures. This thesis focuses on the production and trade of soybean in 
three countries of the Southern Cone: Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. Following the 
boom, soybean production has come to dominate the agricultural sectors and overall 
exports of these countries, with some authors going as far as to dub this rapidly 
expanding industry the ‘Soybean Republic’. This research engages with cutting edge 
debates in International Political Economy, with a conceptual focus that draws from 
human geography and brings in space as both contingent and constituted by the 
changing productive and trade dynamics. By looking at the development of fixed 
infrastructure and dynamics of capital mobility, this research explores the patterns of 
uneven development that emerge from the expansion of the soybean complex, as well 
as the capacity of the Argentine, Brazilian, and Paraguayan states to govern the 
distribution of the profits emanating from it.  
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1. Introduction 
  
In 2008, then President of Argentina, Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, 
commented that soybean is just ‘a weed that grows on the side of the road’ (La 
Nacion, 2008). That same year, this ‘weed’ provided Kirchner’s government 
with over US$ 9 billion in fiscal contribution, almost 9% of the total tax revenue 
(Cohan, 2012: 79). Although treated dismissively by the President, soybean 
had become a crucial component of the Argentine economy, and of other 
economies in the region. In Brazil, the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff in 
September 2016 led to her replacement by vice-president Michel Temer, who 
appointed Blairo Maggi, known as the ‘Soybean King’, as Minister of 
Agriculture, Livestock and Provision. Maggi is a former governor of the state 
of Mato Grosso, and one of the founders and main shareholders of Grupo 
Amaggi, which is amongst the largest agribusiness companies in Brazil and 
dedicated mainly to the production and trade of soybean. These examples hint 
at the central role of soybean in the political struggles in this region, linked to 
the significant revenues generated by this agricultural commodity. This thesis 
seeks to explore this issue by developing a spatial political economy approach 
to the governance of commodity booms.   
In addition to its importance for South America, soybean has emerged 
globally as one of the fastest growing sectors in agricultural trade, with export 
values reaching almost US$ 100 billion in 2013 (FAOSTAT, 2017). As a rapidly 
expanding crop with volatile and relatively high international prices, soybean 
has become a very attractive investment for global capital. This global surge in 
soybean production and trade is not an isolated phenomenon, but one that is 
intimately connected to transformations in the global food system. An increase 
in demand pushed up commodity prices in 2001-2002 and reached a peak in 
2007-2008. During this commodity boom, soybean emerged as one of the most 
important assets, as its price rose even higher than wheat and maize – the 
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other cereals that experienced significant price peaks in this period (IMF 
Commodity Prices, 2017). As shown in Figure 1.1, between 2004 and 2008, the 
price of soybean increased by almost 65%, following the movements of the All 
Commodity Price Index.    
What is considered as a source of growth for soybean producers and traders 
can also be a source of distress for food buyers. The peak in the price of 
soybean and other cereals experienced in 2007-2008 triggered a global food 
crisis that affected millions of people (Clapp and Helleiner, 2012). Yet soybean 
is also a globally significant commodity beyond its relevance for issues of food 
Figure 1.1 Primary Commodity Prices, 1992-2017 
 
Source: IMF Commodity Prices, 2017  
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security, for two key reasons. Firstly, the fact that soybean is a flex crop – that 
is, a crop that has multiple uses and can be switched from one supply chain to 
another with relative ease – makes it an asset of increasing importance for 
diverse economic sectors. While its main use is still for human consumption 
and as animal feed for the poultry and cattle industries, soybean oil has been 
systematically incorporated into biofuel mixes, hence becoming a growing 
component of the energy sector. Moreover, recent research has increased the 
possibilities for the use of soybean as an input in industrial processes to 
produce rubber, for example. Linked to these different uses, soybean has also 
become increasingly attractive as a profitable financial asset. For instance, 
Zurich Private Capital declares on its website that ‘for the next few years the 
soybean market shows positive signs of outperforming oil and other more 
well-known commodities returns beginning from 12% comfortably’ (2017), 
and in June 2017, the Financial Times described soybean as the ‘crop of the 
century’ (Meyer, Schipani and Hancock, 2017). Hence, soybean has expanded 
beyond its use for direct food consumption and penetrated a variety of 
industries and value chains, both physical and financial.  
Secondly, and as a consequence of the oilseed’s presence in financial 
markets, the boom in soy prices should not be understood as an incidental or 
one-off phenomenon. Rather, as Blyth (2008) suggests, cycles of boom and 
bust in the global economy are interlinked processes that reflect capital’s 
search for profitability. The ‘unholy marriage of unlimited liquidity and limited 
asset classes’ (2008: 388) creates price bubbles and consequently the 
expansion of economies associated to these assets, which inevitably decline or 
burst. In this sense, the expansion of soybean as part of the commodity boom 
is inextricably linked to the dynamics of the global political economy and to 
current – and future – cycles of booms and busts. From the trading of soybean 
derivatives on financial markets to the tax structures created to govern the 
revenues generated, this ‘weed’ is at the heart of a billion dollar economy and 
thus has enormous impacts across a variety of sectors and scales.    
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Debates in International Political Economy (IPE) have generally focused on 
individual booms – equities, housing, and commodities – and analysed the 
specific features of the processes of capital accumulation associated with each 
of these assets (Blyth, 2008). In the case of commodity booms, literature on 
natural resource endowment has usually pointed out how states are capable – 
or not – of managing the disruptive dynamics created by the inflow of large 
volumes of capital that follow a commodity price peak. Emphasis is largely 
placed on state management of these developments after they occur, that is, 
once the global boom has begun to impact upon the national economy. 
Resource curse literature in particular has, to a great extent, explored the 
different mechanisms through which this resource abundance has a negative 
impact upon national economies and domestic political systems, thus 
privileging this national territory as the main scale of analysis (see Ross, 1999; 
Rosser, 2006).  
Such perspectives have a number of shortcomings. These analyses consider 
the state as a passive actor that is affected by global processes of capital 
movement, instead of understanding state-market relations as constitutive of 
such processes. Through the construction of physical and institutional 
infrastructure, or the design of macroeconomic policy, the state not only reacts 
to commodity booms but facilitates them and propels their expansion. States 
and markets, in this sense, interact and co-constitute one another in the 
context of commodity booms (see Underhill, 2000). Moreover, these 
approaches are underpinned by a privileging of the nation-state as the 
dominant territorial unit of politico-economic organisation. However, the 
permeating capacity of capital to forge dynamics at the local, regional, national 
and global level leads us to question this unidimensional focus. In other words, 
if we analyse these phenomena from a purely national perspective, we run the 
risk of overlooking the multiplicity of scales at which the dynamic processes of 
commodity booms take place.  
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Analyses of regionalism have attempted to bridge this national versus global 
fetishism. Authors have, on the one hand, examined how formal 
intergovernmental regional arrangements have proliferated as new 
frameworks for the organisation of economy activity (Jessop, 2003; Fawcett 
and Hurrell, 1995; Macleod, 2001). From the longstanding – and faltering – 
Mercosur project, to new arrangements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership, 
regional agreements have emerged as attempts to further integrate economic 
activities and promote trade and investment among nation-states. On the 
other hand, and more specific to South American processes, some authors have 
claimed that the dynamics created by soybean expansion in the Southern Cone 
have given birth to a cross-border region devoted to soybean production. 
From the ‘Soybean Republic’ (Turzi, 2011) to ‘Soylandia’ (Pearce, 2012) to the 
‘United Republic of Soybean’ (Rulli, 2007), these labels aim to highlight the 
complex networks of production, processing and distribution that have 
developed across the borders of South America (Turzi, 2011: 61). These 
informal processes have been studied not only by academics, but by private 
sector actors too – from civil society to businesses. Examples of this are the 
‘Group of Producing Countries from the South’ – Grupo de Paises Productores 
del Sur (GPS) – an initiative that gathers think tanks and producer’s 
associations from Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay; and, as shown in 
Figure 1.2, the use by agribusiness company Syngenta of the term ‘United 
Republic of Soybean’ to refer to the area covered by Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay, Uruguay and Bolivia. 
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While these regional studies appear to frame in innovative ways the 
increasing expansion of the soybean complex, they do not go far enough in 
broadening the spatial horizon of political economy analysis. In place of 
national- or global-centric analyses, these approaches simply insert the 
regional as additional scale of activity, without fully embracing the concept of 
multi-scalarity. One of the original contributions of this thesis is to escape this 
limited spatial methodology by conceptualising scales not as natural, rigid 
levels of politico-economic activity, but as social and relative spaces that are 
continually produced and reproduced by political economy processes. In 
addition, this thesis intends to understand how multi-scalar dynamics of 
capital accumulation emerge while at the same time are limited by national 
borders and state strategies. Capital in turn makes these borders more 
permeable and adapts to particular national dynamics. In this manner, this 
thesis both relativises the pre-eminence of the state while also challenging its 
supposed disappearance. This thesis will thus make a case for a spatial political 
economy of commodity booms that brings in the national state as a 
constitutive element of and active participant in these processes.  
Figure 1.2 Advertisement Syngenta: ‘United Republic of Soybean’ 
 
Source: Advertisement published in Argentine newspapers La Nacion and Clarin 
in 2003, reproduced by Grain, 2003. 
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With these puzzles and considerations in mind, the main research question 
of this thesis is:  
How do states govern the creation and distribution of wealth during 
commodity booms? 
This is further explored through the following set of sub-questions: 
- What are the spatial dynamics involved in the creation of wealth during 
commodity booms?  
- How does capital create geographies for the production of wealth beyond 
the national economic space?  
- How – and to what extent - do national states design policies to effectively 
distribute wealth created through commodity booms? 
To answer these questions this thesis will analyse the case of soybean in 
Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay. In order to understand the spatial dynamics 
and the geographies of capitalism created during commodity booms, this case 
is studied through the theoretical lens provided by the concept of uneven 
development. This concept, largely developed by Neil Smith (2010), brings 
together geography and political economy to understand the changing 
geographies of capitalism and the spatial arrangements that emerge from 
capitalist relations (2010: 4). The approach developed by Smith looks at 
patterns of uneven development and the restructuring of geographical space 
not as ‘natural’ or ‘given’ results of external forces, but as expressions of the 
inherent contradictions of capitalism. Looking at the expansion of soybean in 
the aforementioned countries through the framework of uneven development 
offers a unique insight into how the geographical transformations in the region 
are linked to multi-scalar processes of political economy.  
By employing this framework, this thesis utilises a dual conception of 
commodity. On the one hand, this work engages with the notion of ‘commodity’ 
1. Introduction 
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in the broad sense, as an exchangeable good – as for example in debates about 
commodity booms, commodity chains, primary commodities, etc. On the other 
hand, Smith’s framework understands the commodity as the embodiment of a 
specific set of social relations, namely capitalist relations. This latter 
conceptualisation seeks to de-naturalise the unequal and uneven development 
of capitalist geography, in a similar fashion to Marx’s attempt to de-fetishise 
the commodity (Albritton, 2012). 
The next section will further explain the case selection and the methodology 
employed to conduct this research. Next, this introduction will outline the 
main argument elaborated in this thesis and its original contribution. Finally, I 
will present and describe the structure of this thesis. 
Cases and methodological approach 
Case selection and context 
The significance of the soybean economy globally, and more specifically its 
role in the transformations of South American geography and political 
economy, make this an extremely relevant case to understand the governance 
of commodity booms. Originally an Asian crop, soybean was introduced to the 
Americas at the beginning of the 20th century (USDA ERS, 2017; Dros 2004: 
9). As a rich source of vegetable protein, soybean has many uses. Soybean can 
be destined for human consumption, but most of the produced oilseed is 
fractioned and separated into oil and meal protein (also referred to as soybean 
cake). The oil fraction of soy is processed into vegetable oil used both for 
human consumption and for biodiesel, while the meal is used for livestock 
feedstuff and other flours or protein concentrates. Only in the 1990s did the 
crop begin to expand and gain prominence as an export commodity (2004: 9). 
Between 1990 and 2014 there was a three-fold increase in the global 
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production of soybean (see Figure 1.3), which translated into a growth in value 
from US$ 26 billion1 to over US$ 67.5 billion (FAOSTAT, 2017).  
Production of soybean is highly concentrated in the American continent. 
Global production is dominated by the US, Brazil and Argentina, which 
produce more than 75% of the world’s output. India, Paraguay and China 
follow in production volumes, resulting in a concentration of 90% of global 
production in these six countries. According to the OECD-FAO (2013), 
production of oilseeds2 was expected to increase by 26% from 2013 to 2022, 
through a combination of re-distribution of land use in favour of these 
commodities and increased yield. This will be driven by demand for biofuels 
                                                          
1 Gross Production Value in constant 2004-2006 million US$. 
2 According to OECD/FAO Glossary, oilseeds include rapeseed (canola), soybean, sunflower 
seed, peanuts and cotton seed. However, none of these crops – except soybean - appear within 
the top twenty most produced commodities, indicating that soybeans dominate oilseeds 
production (OECD/FAO, 2013). 
Figure 1.3 Soybean world production and exports of soybeans, soybean oil and 
soybean cake, in tonnes, 2000-2013 
 
Source: FAOSTAT, 2017 
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and increased purchasing power in developing countries that drives a higher 
demand for meat and thus animal feed (OECD/FAO 2013: 141; Dros 2004: 8). 
This upward trend in demand also fuels a tendency for oilseed prices to 
increase in the medium term, consolidating the profitability of the crop 
(OECD/FAO 2013: 141).  
In terms of value, soybean is one of the most prominent commodities in 
world trade, with more than 100 million tonnes exported at almost US$ 60 
billion in 2013, more than the export value of other common use cereals and 
flex crops like wheat (US$49 billion), maize (US$ 34 billion) and palm oil (US$ 
33 billion) (FAOSTAT, 2017). Exports of the crop are clearly dominated by the 
Americas, as the top six export countries are the US, Brazil, Argentina, 
Paraguay, Canada and Uruguay. This trend is expected to continue, as 
OECD/FAO predict the continent will provide 93% of global exports in oilseeds 
by 2022 (OECD/FAO, 2013: 140). The main soy importers are China and the 
European Union (EU). In 2014, China imported 69 million tons of raw soybean 
and 1.4 million tons in soybean oil, while the EU received over 12 million tons 
of soybean and 19 million tons of soybean meal in the same period (Foreign 
Agricultural Service/USDA, 2014). For that year, the total value of soybean 
trade – including oil, meal and beans – was US$ 109 billion (Chatham House, 
2017). 
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When adverse weather conditions led to a decrease in soybean production 
in the US in 2007, the South American region emerged as the ‘largest 
production pole’ (OAS, 2009: 68).  The ‘soybean heart’ of the region is found 
throughout the borders of Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina, three neighbouring 
countries that share areas with similar climatic and physical conditions (see 
Figure 1.4). Together these three countries surpass the US’ levels of 
production, export quantities and planted surface; and yield levels are even 
higher in Paraguay. Most importantly, the region is seen by some as still having 
potential for further expansion of the agricultural frontier, as well as water 
resources, that make it even more attractive for the production of the oilseed 
(Regúnaga, 2013). Not only are these countries important for the soybean 
sector globally, but soybean is increasingly relevant for these economies, as it 
is steadily becoming an essential part of their GDPs and balance of payments.  
Figure 1.4 Major soybean regions of South America 
 
Source: Fischer, Byerlee and Edmedaes (2014) 
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In just ten years – between 2000 and 2010 – the planted area of soybean 
increased by over 40% in Argentina and Brazil, and a remarkable 95% in 
Paraguay. This now equates to an area about the size of Spain, entirely 
dedicated to the soybean mono-cropping, meaning the continuous production 
of the same crop on the same land, without rotation.3 Expansion in the planted 
surface and increased yield contributed to a 100% growth in production in 
that same decade. This rapid increase in production was possible by both 
expanding the arable land in the region, and by converting land from other 
crops into soybean (Giancola et al. 2009: 32). 
Several elements have contributed to the rapid expansion of soybean 
production. Mariano Turzi (2011) points to the emergence of a ‘technological 
package’ that contributed to the perception of the crop as a safe investment. 
This package is composed by Genetically Modified (GM) seeds, agrochemicals, 
and no-till or direct sowing4 (2011: 61). For soybean the dominant ‘package’ 
has been that offered by transnational agribusiness company Monsanto, which 
sells the soybean variety Round-up Ready (RR), which is resistant to 
glyphosate, a powerful weed killer. Approval of GM crops in these countries 
has been key in initiating the rapid spread of the crop. Argentina was the first 
one to do so in 1996, followed by Brazil in 2002, after a difficult struggle 
between the Ministry of Agriculture on the one side, and social movements and 
the Ministry of Environment on the other (interview GV AGRO, 2014). 
Paraguay licensed GM crops in 2004.5 After all countries had legally accepted 
                                                          
3 Calculation based on conversion of hectares into square kilometers. While soybean 
production occupies 50 million hectares, which translates into 500,000 sq. km., the total 
surface area of Spain is 505,992 sq. km. 
4 No-till farming is a method of agricultural production without or with minimal tilling, in other 
words, without disturbing the soil. It involves covering the soil with stubble (stalks or other 
remainders of previous crops) and its continuous implementation improves soil conditions, 
reducing erosion and improving the water management capacities of the soil (Regúnaga, 2013: 
87)  
5 Even if GM seeds were not officially approved by the Brazilian and Paraguayan government 
until later, GM varieties of soybean had been growing in these countries. This was due to 
contraband of these seeds from Argentina, where the absence of royalty payments made easier 
for farmers to sell what was known as the ‘white bag’, an additional bag of seeds from the 
harvest to be used as seed input for the following season. These were informally known as 
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GM varieties, they spread very quickly and today dominate agricultural 
production in the region.   
Most importantly, soybean became an attractive investment with the 
sustained increase in its international price since 2002, which peaked in 2008. 
The combination of low costs, high yield, and high prices made soybean a safe 
and profitable investment for farmers and agribusiness companies. This 
conjuncture of structural and contextual factors created the conditions for 
transformations in the mode of production in the region as well as the 
characteristics of the actors involved. Many of these transformations were part 
of a long process of consolidation of the industrial agriculture model that 
began to be adopted globally between the 1930s and 1980s (Clapp, 2012: 11). 
The development of technological packages such as the one mentioned above, 
as well as the extensive use of machinery, large-scale production, mono-
cropping and the processing of agricultural goods into industrial inputs are all 
elements that create significant distance between industrial agriculture and 
what Norma Giarracca calls the 'processes of food', referring to more 
traditional forms of agriculture that are based on natural processes and 
organic cycles (Giarracca, 2012: 201).     
The expansion of soybean production in Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay is 
clearly inscribed in this model. A number of institutions, industries, and 
services linked to the crop’s value chain have developed in these countries to 
accompany its growth. These include the emergence of companies and 
government agencies dedicated to research in biotechnology for seed and 
agrochemical developments; industrial and logistical capacity for soybean 
processing and trade; and a number of governmental and civil society 
institutions, including universities, producer’s unions, and market exchanges 
that support and enhance the expansion of this economic activity. As a result, 
these countries have seen the emergence of a ‘soybean complex’, an inter-
                                                          
‘soja Maradona’, in reference to Argentine football player Diego Maradona (Ezquerro-Cañete, 
2016). 
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connected group of actors, institutions, and activities linked to the production, 
processing, and trade of the oilseed.  
Literature on Global Value Chains (GVC) and Global Commodity Chains 
(GCC) provide a framework to analyse the links and coordination existing 
between different stages of a product’s value-added process (Gereffi et al., 
2005). Although this approach is valuable in understanding different actors’ 
strategies in global processes of production, it focuses on intra-firm 
governance, rather than market governance and state-market relations, as this 
thesis intends to study. Moreover, these analyses propose an emphasis on 
privatised wealth in the form of firm profit. This thesis chooses instead to 
follow research that explores different forms of wealth created in global chains 
(see Seabrooke and Wigan, 2017) and the distribution of socialised wealth, for 
example via fiscal policies. An additional distinction between this thesis and 
the value chains literature, is that this thesis focuses on the soybean sector as 
a complex, in order to better reflect on how the contradictory tendencies of 
global capital are expressed spatially in the region and their impact on states’ 
capacity for its governance.   
The consolidation of industrial agriculture in these countries occurred in 
harmony with the expansion of the soybean complex. Perhaps one of the most 
telling expressions of the dominance of this production model is the re-naming 
of the Argentine Ministry of Agriculture, now called ‘Ministry of Agro-industry’ 
(Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, 2015). Nevertheless, while they share certain 
common dynamics and temporal developments, the countries analysed in this 
thesis have experienced the expansion of the soybean complex in different 
ways.   
In Argentina, as was previously mentioned, the early approval of GM seeds 
meant that soybean became a growth vector for the agricultural economy 
earlier than its neighbours. Initially soybean was used in a rotation system, as 
the crop adds nitrogen to the soil. After the crisis in 2001, Argentine 
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agricultural producers – heavily indebted after a decade of uncompetitive 
exports due to the system of parity with the dollar – managed to liquidate their 
debts, thus making them more financially sound. Parallel to this, agribusiness 
had experienced a ‘technological modernisation’ in its production methods, 
namely due to the emergence of the figure of the ‘contractor’, a person offering 
their services for harvest or fumigation (the spread of pesticides or other 
agrochemicals to prevent insects harming crops) (Piñeiro and Villareal, 2005). 
Additionally, deregulation during the 1990s facilitated the increase of short-
term farming through leasing. Flexibility in rent conditions promoted lease 
contracts only for the duration of one productive cycle. This also encouraged 
large-scale farming while the property structure of the country maintained the 
existence of medium-size farms. While the size of properties remained similar, 
producers were able to rent a number of contiguous properties, hence 
effectively producing at a large scale (see Chapter 5). Finally, the high 
profitability of soybean not only incentivised intensive farming and mono-
cropping in the region of the Pampas, the traditional farming and cattle area, 
but also promoted the expansion of the soybean frontier towards the North-
East and North-West. In those areas, deforestation had enabled the 
incorporation of new and cheap arable land. This resulted in larger properties 
and hence a greater concentration of land ownership within agriculture.  
Brazil’s agricultural production has been historically characterised by the 
pre-eminence of coffee and sugar cane, two products that remain very 
important sectors in the economy. Soybean was introduced by Japanese 
migrants who would plant it for their own consumption during the early 20th 
century, but it began to be produced on a greater scale during the 1950s and 
1960s, particularly in the state of Rio Grande do Sul, in the South of the country 
(Schlesinger, 2013; Oliveira and Schneider, 2016). Production soared towards 
the end of the 1990s, mainly through the significant movement of farmers from 
the Southern states – such as Rio Grande do Sul – towards the Centre and 
Centre-West of the country, in the biome known as Cerrado. Southern farmers 
1. Introduction 
 
 
16 
migrated towards this area in search of larger properties. The value of their 
farms would allow them to buy more extensive properties in the states of the 
Centre-West, hence greatly increasing their production. This provoked a 
double transformation in the spatial distribution of soybean, both in terms of 
its geographical location and in the volume of production (Schlesinger and 
Noronha, 2006: 21). This migration process and the expansion of the soybean 
frontier created a structure of soybean production organised in very large 
properties that in turn reflect the emergence of a very powerful soybean 
agribusiness sector. One of the most prominent examples of this is the 
previously mentioned Blairo Maggi, known as ‘the king of soybean’ and current 
Minister of Agriculture of Brazil.   
In Paraguay, the expansion of soybean production has gone hand in hand 
with the increasing presence of foreign farmers, chiefly Brazilian but also 
German and Japanese settlers, during the 1970s (Ortega, 2015). The most 
drastic growth of the oilseed, however, came in the 1990s, triggered by two 
factors: the permeability of the border that allowed the unlicensed entrance of 
GM soy coming from Argentina; and the influx of investors from Brazil in 
search of cheaper lands, motivated by the modernisation of Brazilian 
agriculture (Ezquerro-Cañete, 2016; Ortega, 2015). This provoked a 
movement of soy from West to East, and from the late 1990s throughout 
2000s, the harvested surface of soy advanced rapidly and in large extensions. 
As a result, there was an increase in land concentration in Paraguay, a very 
strong presence of Brazilian farmers – also known as Brasiguayos – and rising 
levels of poverty fuelled by the displacement of peasants and subsistence 
farmers from the countryside to the urban areas (Ezquerro-Cañete, 2016; 
interview, CAF).   
It is worth noting at this point that the three countries studied in this 
research can be situated within different regional spaces: South America, the 
Southern Cone, and the Rio de la Plata basin. The first characterisation is easily 
identified, as it indicates the location of these countries in the sub-continent of 
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South America. This area can be characterised by its shared history and 
intellectual traditions, and to a certain extent by language, as well as by the 
constitution of UNASUR (Union of South American Nations), a regional 
organisation seeking to develop a ‘deeply political badge of identity’ 
(Riggirozzi and Grugel, 2015: 782). The Southern Cone refers to those 
countries on the southern areas of the continent, namely beneath and around 
the Tropic of Capricorn. This includes Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Brazil, 
Paraguay, and sometimes Bolivia. The relevance of this categorisation in 
political economy terms is given mainly by the existence of the Mercosur 
regional bloc, composed by Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay, as well 
as Venezuela. The countries analysed here are thus integrated through this 
trade agreement, and are members of a number of cooperation institutions. 
Finally, the three countries analysed here are located on the Rio de la Plata 
Basin, the most extensive fluvial way in Latin America. The basin is composed 
by the rivers Paraná, Paraguay, Uruguay, and La Plata, covering a territory 
equivalent to a third of the European continent, and is one of the largest water 
reservoirs on Earth (FONPLATA, 2017). The soybean complex has expanded 
over this vast source of natural resources, transforming it into a key pillar of 
its geography.  
The way these three spatial configurations are defined can provide different 
lenses to explore the impacts of the soybean complex. The use of ‘South 
America’ offers a hemispheric perspective on the role of the region within the 
global economy, as well as the context in which regional governance and 
development is being debated (Riggirozzi, 2017). The ‘Southern Cone’ shifts 
our attention to the political economy of trade and economic integration, as 
well as to mechanisms of cooperation between the countries involved. The ‘Rio 
de la Plata Basin’ provides a more ecological lens, highlighting the role of 
nature and its transformation in the process of expansion of the soybean 
complex. 
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Overall, the three cases mentioned share several characteristics. The growth 
and consolidation of soybean occurred at a similar pace, and more 
importantly, the processes underpinning the evolution of this crop cut across 
the region. The advancement of this oilseed transformed the productive and 
property structures in these countries by consolidating a mechanised 
agriculture linked to a GM-based technological package, and by favouring 
increasing concentration of land in larger properties for production. Finally, in 
all three countries the increase in soybean production was the main driver of 
a significant expansion of the commodity frontier, achieved by incorporating 
land, partly through what proponents of the model have termed the ‘de-
vegetation’ of otherwise unused land (interview UGP(b), 2014), which critics 
have described as deforestation practices (Greenpeace, 2006).  
Methods and data collection 
The principal aim of this project is to understand the creation and 
distribution of wealth during commodity booms and states’ capacities to 
govern these dynamics. This thesis develops a qualitative analysis, supported 
by descriptive statistics, of the soybean complex in South America in order to 
unpack the dynamics underpinning the political economy of uneven 
development in industrial agriculture.  
The research design of this thesis aims to reconcile the study of the creation 
of wealth without falling into the ‘territorial trap’ identified by Agnew (1994) 
– which will be discussed in Chapter 3 – while at the same time examining the 
role of the state in its distribution. In other words, this thesis strives to, on one 
hand, unpack the complex multi-scalar and cross-border dynamics 
characterising this commodity boom; and, on the other, analyse the strategies 
pursued by the different states involved in governing this economic complex. 
To resolve this dilemma, this thesis uses a mixed-methods approach. The 
first part of this thesis, which largely explores wealth creation in the soybean 
complex, will consider the spatio-temporal matrix of the soybean complex; 
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that is, not as a comparative study of how this productive sector developed 
within the borders of each country, but rather as a cross-border phenomenon 
that has rapidly expanded over the last two decades. The role of the state is 
analysed, but as another actor in the complex mesh of interactions that have 
enabled the expansion of soybean in the region. In this sense, as case studies 
do, the first part of the thesis aims to understand in more depth the 
complexities of the soybean spatial and political economic structure that have 
transformed it into one of the most profitable sectors in the global political 
economy. 
In order to do so, this thesis focuses on two variables, namely the 
development of fixed capital and the simultaneous mobility of capital. As will 
be developed in Chapter 3, at the centre of the process of uneven development 
is capitalism’s contradiction between fixity and mobility, namely the 
simultaneous need for a built environment to facilitate production, circulation, 
and consumption, and the need for capital to have the capacity to move quickly 
from one place or asset to another in search of higher profit rates. These 
processes are studied through an analysis of physical infrastructure for 
transport in the soybean complex (Chapter 4), and the financialisation of 
production and trade in industrial agriculture (Chapter 5).  
The second part of this thesis develops a comparative approach. As the focus 
of the analysis is centred on the state, this part of the thesis aims to understand 
the different strategies deployed by the states of Argentina, Brazil, and 
Paraguay to govern the soybean sector, either through limiting or enhancing 
the movement of capital. While understanding the patterns and processes of 
soybean production and trade as a case study is useful to comprehend the 
cross-border dynamics of capital in this sector, a country-based analysis will 
allow us to investigate individual states in a more sustained manner and then 
compare the variations in strategies to govern the soybean commodity boom. 
In this sense, ‘comparison and case study can constitute mutually reinforcing 
and complementary undertakings’ (Clift, 2014: 300) and more importantly, it 
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allows us to highlight the continuing relevance of the nation-state while also 
avoiding the territorial trap.  
The purpose of this section of the thesis is to explore different state 
capacities and strategies to govern commodity booms, specifically the soybean 
boom, in countries dominated by industrial agriculture. In this sense, while 
there is a comparative dimension to the analysis, it is also important to situate 
each country within its own socio-political and economic context, as well as to 
situate them within the regional soybean complex. States’ governance of the 
soybean boom and their capacity for redistribution is analysed by looking first 
at fiscal policy, and second at the politics of currency management. These two 
factors, taxation and exchange rates, have an impact on the distribution of 
resources across national economies, while also providing an insight into the 
state modalities of insertion in the global political economy. In this sense, this 
research follows a method of concomitant variation (Moses and Knutsen, 
2007: 109), focusing on the variations in the factors mentioned above and 
identifying different varieties of resource governance in the South American 
soybean complex.  
The selection of the four factors mentioned above – physical infrastructure, 
financial mechanisms, fiscal policy, and exchange rate policy – responds to the 
theoretical framework and research question of the thesis, as they highlight 
the importance of spatial awareness and the constitution of new economic 
spaces. As they are analysed together as aspects of an intertwined dynamic, 
their study demonstrates the contradictions inherent to capital accumulation 
in industrial agriculture and the patterns of uneven development resulting 
from them. In debates surrounding industrial agriculture, most academic 
attention is usually devoted to the study of policies linked to trade, land, 
agriculture, and energy. Notwithstanding the importance of these, this thesis 
choses to highlight elements that have been underexplored by the existing 
literature, and which were singled out during interviews by several 
government officials and representatives of different sectors of the agro-
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industry as central to the expansion and consolidation of the soybean complex, 
as well as to its future.  
Data for the analysis was collected from three key sources: semi-structured 
elite interviews, governmental and international statistical data, and 
secondary sources.   
Elite interviews: Between July and December 2014, I conducted 54 
interviews in Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay.6 These were semi-
structured interviews with mainly three groups of actors: former and current 
civil servants and cabinet members from different Ministries in charge of 
policies linked to the agricultural sector, namely the Ministries of Economy, 
and Agriculture and Livestock; members of unions or associations of 
agricultural production and employees or officials from agribusiness 
companies, both domestic and transnational; and specialists, academics, and 
members of think tanks and international organisations. This selection of 
interviewees was useful in building an analysis of the different processes in 
place from the perspective of the private sector, the state, and the 
considerations of the third-sector or civil society, through the lens of 
specialists. A complete and detailed list of interviewees can be found in 
Appendix 1. 
After a few initial contacts, the sample of interviewees was built based on a 
process of snowballing. The interviews were semi-structured, as the aim was 
to let the interviewees speak extensively and freely. While the first interviews 
were more exploratory, the interview questions would be modified 
progressively to access more detail of the processes described. This was 
particularly important to identify the commonalities and specificities of each 
                                                          
6 Soybean production is increasingly expanding in Uruguay, and many actors from 
neighbouring countries, especially from Argentina, have been key to this process. While the 
interviews conducted in Uruguay were helpful in complementing the cross-border and 
continuously changing nature of the soybean complex, given the time and space constraints of 
this project an in-depth analysis of this case was not included in the scope of this thesis. 
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country studied. The data accessed through the interviews was later 
triangulated with statistical and secondary sources.  
Statistical data: This thesis has also drew from statistical information on 
levels of production, trade, and other economic indicators to support the 
description and analysis of the case and triangulate with the data provided by 
interviewees. This was accessed from statistical services from international 
organisations, namely the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation 
(FAO), the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC), UN COMTRADE, World Bank World Development 
Indicators and the OECD, together with national statistical offices. Additional 
data was retrieved from country-based institutions, such as national central 
banks, producers and industrial associations, and national sectorial databases. 
Secondary sources: Additional information was accessed through reports from 
international and local NGOs and international organisations; as well as 
newspaper articles highlighting some of the issues and developments relevant 
to the analysis presented here. Several of these reports and news clips are from 
sources in Spanish and Portuguese, which offer the perspective of local actors 
and go beyond the existing Anglophone scholarship.  
To summarise, this thesis adopts a qualitative analysis combined with 
descriptive statistics to explore the mechanisms of creation and distribution 
of wealth in industrial agriculture by combining a case-study analysis of 
soybean production in the Southern Cone with a comparative study of the 
policies and strategies deployed by Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. This 
analysis had been supported by data collected through elite interviews, 
analysis of statistical data, and secondary sources.  
Argument and original contributions 
The main purpose of this thesis is to provide a spatial analysis of the political 
economy of industrial agriculture in South America, and to unpack the complex 
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spatio-temporal matrix that capital investment in this sector has created. As 
stated before, the key research question that derives from this approach is: 
How do states govern the creation and distribution of wealth during commodity 
booms?  
To answer this question, the thesis will first analyse the conditions for the 
creation of wealth in the soybean complex, and then explore the mechanisms 
put in place for the distribution of profits. This thesis will argue that the 
process of capital accumulation in industrial agriculture is underpinned by 
two dynamics: the development of massive built environments to support the 
production and transport of commodities, and the creation of financial 
instruments and markets that boost liquidity and enhance the profitability of 
these commodities. This results in dynamics of fixity and mobility of capital, 
which creates uneven spatial configurations as capital both transforms the 
physical landscape and has the capacity to flee to more profitable pastures if 
the attractiveness of this particular commodity declines. While these 
processes usually transcend national borders, the state has the capacity to 
reaffirm its authority over them through different strategies, including fiscal 
and macroeconomic policies. This authority can be exercised in an effort to 
ameliorate the contradictory patterns created by capital (for example, by using 
soy export revenue to promote a more diversified economy), or with the 
intention of exacerbating these uneven dynamics and thus further enhancing 
the emerging geography of capital (for example, by channelling tax revenues 
into the expansion of soybean transport infrastructure). Taking these two 
aspects together, this thesis examines how states both constitute and govern 
processes of uneven development.  
While this thesis is situated in the field of IPE, the case study presented here 
also contributes to the area of Latin American Studies.  
The contributions of this thesis to the field of IPE of development can be 
summarised in three points. First, by addressing questions over the state’s 
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capacity to govern the creation and distribution of wealth and the geographies 
of capital that emerge with commodity booms, this research interrogates and 
critiques the development model being deployed in the South American region 
and its limitations. The resurgence of primary commodities production and 
exports has ignited a great deal of debate in South America, and Latin America 
more broadly, over how development should be defined, and by whom. 
Whether the expansion of the primary export sector can contribute to 
improving standards of living of (mainly) urban populations, or if society 
should turn to alternative definitions of development that put the relationship 
with nature at the centre of the organisation of the economy, are burning 
questions amongst scholars writing on Latin American development. The 
analysis presented here shows that these issues rarely have unequivocal 
answers. For example, fostering growth in order to expand provision of social 
goods might simultaneously create problems of environmental sustainability. 
Society is hence confronted with challenges on how to conceive development 
in a context constrained by imperatives of the global economy.    
Second, this thesis addresses an issue that has been insufficiently studied by 
IPE, namely the recent commodity supercycle – a long-time price surge in an 
asset which usually contributes to structural changes in production and trade 
(Margulis, 2017). The analysis presented here highlights the power of the 
commodity boom cycle in penetrating and transforming politics at all levels. 
While on one hand this thesis develops a framework to understand the 
particular geographies that these processes entail, on the other this research 
points to the different capacities of states in constituting and managing these 
dynamics.  
Thirdly, and linked to the point made before, this work offers an analysis of 
South America that highlights the relevance of this area for the field of IPE, not 
as an object of study that should be only addressed by Area Studies or 
Development Studies, but as emerging economies that should be researched 
more assertively in the field of IPE. In this sense, it aims to challenge the 
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‘stubborn empirical focus on the small collection of advanced industrialized 
states, usually with liberal democratic characteristics’ (Phillips, 2005: 83) and 
demonstrate that the study of regions such as Latin America can offer 
insightful perspectives into the transformations in the global political 
economy and the changing role and capacities of the state.  
In terms of Latin American Studies, this analysis offers an insight into the 
different ways in which the commodity boom has shaped the political 
economy of the post-neoliberal state in the region, and can shed light upon the 
link between these trends in the global political economy and the 
transformation of the state in Latin America. While analyses of neo-
extractivism mainly focus on the social and environmental impacts of these 
activities, the multi-scalar nature of this analysis provides a more 
comprehensive approach that can connect global political economic processes 
with their impacts on local livelihoods.  
The analysis of fiscal and exchange rate policies, which have been explored 
in more depth by Latin American Studies, has not been studied to a great extent 
in connection to commodity booms, with a few exceptions (see Grinberg and 
Starosta, 2014). Much less attention, however, has been paid to the links 
between commodity booms and issues of currency and exchange rate. While 
much of the literature on the latest commodity boom, and particularly on 
soybean, has focused on its socio-environmental impacts, for example, this 
thesis considers the state as more than a recipient of global dynamics and 
analyses its capacity to govern the commodity boom through the 
redistribution of the profits created (see Turzi, 2017: 131-135). This research 
will show how, through tax and exchange rate policies, the states of Argentina, 
Brazil, and Paraguay have demonstrated different capacities and forms of 
mediating the process of uneven development.     
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Structure of the thesis 
In order to address the research question, this thesis is organised into three 
parts. Part I will present the conceptual basis on which this research is 
developed; Part II will analyse the creation of profit in the South American 
soybean complex based on capital’s requirement for fixity and mobility; and 
Part III will study states’ mechanisms of wealth distribution associated with 
this sector. The concluding chapter will bring together the findings of each part 
to present how the particular spatio-temporal matrix of soybean production 
and trade in South America has created the conditions for the emergence of 
new patterns of uneven development and the different governance strategies 
implemented in the countries studied here.  
In Part I, Chapter 2 will present a review of the existing literature on the 
political economy of Latin America’s relationship to commodity booms. This 
chapter will argue that Latin America’s intellectual history and the broader 
academic interest in the region has been closely linked to cycles of boom and 
bust in commodities. This is connected to the region’s particular role in the 
global economy as a provider of primary products and the tendency of many 
countries in the region to opt for a growth model based on the export of natural 
resource-based commodities. This chapter will show that analyses of the 
political economy of the region have either been excessively economistic – 
focusing solely on trade patterns or macroeconomic variables without 
exploring the underpinning political issues at play – or focused mainly on the 
political factors, particularly with the swing towards the left of many Latin 
American governments during the 2000s. Both approaches favour a focus on 
the nation state, hence limiting the attention given to cross-border dynamics 
and their impact on the state’s capacity for regulation. While very valuable for 
understanding some of the changes experienced by the region throughout its 
history, these academic and intellectual traditions call for a political economy 
approach that cohesively interconnects the political and economic 
transformations in Latin America, namely the surge of left-wing governments 
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and the resource boom and significant growth experienced by the region since 
early 2000s. This political economy approach methodologically implies 
expanding the scalar focus on the nation state to include cross-border 
dynamics.  
To address the gaps identified in the literature, Chapter 3 presents a 
theoretical framework that addresses these shortcomings by outlining a 
spatial approach. By drawing on concepts from human geography, this chapter 
will first highlight the importance of space in political economy. In this sense, 
this thesis aims to contribute to the ‘spatial turn’ experienced in other social 
sciences by highlighting the relational nature of space, namely, how space and 
political economy dynamics co-constitute each other. With this 
conceptualisation of space, the analysis then focuses on the emergence of the 
soybean complex in South America through the lens of Smith’s theory of 
uneven development (2010). Smith points to the emergence of particular 
geographies of capitalism whose configuration is linked to the contradictory 
dynamics of capitalism: the opposing tendencies of equalisation – the 
propensity for space to be increasingly homogenised through the spread of the 
price mechanism – and differentiation – the emergence of distinct built 
environments associated with specific economic sectors. These tendencies 
oppose each other in space, creating patterns of uneven development as 
capital ‘seesaws’ from areas of low profitability to high profitability, leaving a 
peculiar geography in its wake, evidenced, for example, by the stark contrast 
between the prosperous City of London and the de-industrialised north of 
England. To further understand the extent of these patterns and the different 
levels at which this takes place, it is necessary to study the multi-scalar 
expression of uneven development. The concept of scale broadens the 
analytical lens to political economy dynamics that take place above, below, or 
across the nation-state, without discounting the importance of the national 
political and territorial unit in the organisation of economic processes. This 
dynamic, back and forth motion between the tendency for economic activity 
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to escape the national scale, and the counter-tendency for these processes to 
be re-embedded in the national territory, will be analysed as strategies of de- 
and reterritorialisation. 
The following chapters develop the empirical analysis of the soybean 
production complex in Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, informed by the 
theoretical concepts unpacked in Chapter 3. Part II of this thesis will focus on 
the mechanisms for wealth creation in the soybean sector through an analysis 
of the political economy of space. Namely, it will study how capital’s dual 
capacity for fixity and mobility has created particular spatial configurations 
that are at the same time the result and the condition for the expansion of 
profit in agricultural production. Chapter 4 focuses on capital’s fixity, by 
exploring how infrastructural projects and developments have 
reterritorialised capital and created a very particular geography of soybean in 
the Southern Cone. The development of roads and logistical hubs and the 
improvement of waterways constitute the built environment necessary for the 
acceleration and expansion of capital accumulation in this industry. This has 
transformed the physical landscape and heralded significant changes in social 
and political institutions, meanwhile furthering the Southern Cone’s 
integration into the global market through the promotion of the soybean 
complex. Chapter 5 addresses the most evident form of capital mobility, that 
is, the creation and expansion of financial markets as sources of capital 
accumulation. The financialisation of agriculture is a global phenomenon that 
became most evident during the 2007-2008 food crisis. Financial capital has 
penetrated both the production and trade of agricultural commodities, 
particularly soybean, in different ways. This chapter will unpack the different 
financial mechanisms through which short-term profitability is heightened 
and agriculture activity is increasingly deterritorialised from the national and 
regional economy. Overall, Part II, by focusing on capital’s capacity for the 
development of fixed structures and the creation of a high degree of mobility, 
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analyses the soybean spatial matrix as a multi-scalar construction inherently 
tied to capitalism’s uneven development.  
Part III returns the focus to the nation-state, without losing the emphasis on 
multi-scalarity. Chapters 6 and 7 analyse the state as both mediating and 
constitutive of the processes of uneven development. This means that the state 
in each of the countries is studied as an agent capable of governing to some 
extent the dynamics of capital accumulation and the patterns of uneven 
development created through it. Chapter 6 focuses on the politics of taxation 
and the development of fiscal strategies as mechanisms for the redistribution 
of wealth accumulated through the soybean complex. In particular, it explores 
how issues of administrative organisation, the role of elites, and the underlying 
social contract interact in determining the structure of taxation implemented. 
Building on this, Chapter 7 focuses on macroeconomic policy. This chapter 
analyses how the politics of currency influence and are influenced by the way 
in which different economic sectors benefit from the soybean boom. As a boost 
in exports is generally followed by an in-flow of foreign currency, states 
develop different mechanisms to mitigate the effects that follow. Additionally, 
questions of macroeconomic policy have an impact on other variables, such as 
inflation and external debt, and so this chapter evaluates the consequences of 
soybean expansion on the national economic performance.  
 The final chapter will present the conclusion of the thesis. Firstly, this will 
highlight how the contradictory forces of mobility and fixity (equalisation and 
differentiation of capital) play out in the South American soybean matrix, and 
how they both enhance profitability and create patterns of uneven 
development. Secondly, the chapter will present a synthesis of the different 
governance strategies that Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay have deployed to 
manage the spatial and political-economy configurations pushed forward by 
capital investment in industrial agriculture. 
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In doing so, it provides a comprehensive evaluation of how the dynamics of 
fixity and mobility interact and co-constitute each other, and how these, in 
turn, can shape variations in state capacity. Ultimately, this thesis provides a 
novel insight into broader relations of political economy that are reflected in, 
but not limited to, the case of soybean in South America.   
   
2. Latin America’s political economy: a history of ‘booms 
and busts’ 
‘Our part of the world, known today as Latin America, was precocious: it has specialized 
in losing ever since those remote times when Renaissance Europeans ventured across 
the ocean and buried their teeth in the throats of the Indian civilizations. Centuries 
passed, and Latin America perfected its role. We are no longer in the era of marvels 
when fact surpassed fable and imagination was shamed by the trophies of conquest— 
the lodes of gold, the mountains of silver. But our region still works as a menial. It 
continues to exist at the service of others' needs, as a source and reserve of oil and iron, 
of copper and meat, of fruit and coffee, the raw materials and foods destined for rich 
countries which profit more from consuming them than Latin America does from 
producing them.’ 
Eduardo Galeano, Open Veins of Latin America (1996) 
Introduction 
The arrival of the Spanish to America, and the forceful incorporation of these 
territories into a world market dominated by the imperial metropolis, had 
important implications for the region’s role in the world economy. From gold 
and silver, to copper and tin, to oil and soybean, Latin America became a 
fundamental source of natural resources and primary commodities. It is no 
surprise, then, that debates around development and the political economy of 
the continent have generally focused on the challenges or opportunities that 
such a position offers.  
This dependence on exports of primary commodities has made the region 
particularly vulnerable to cycles of booms and busts in the global economy, as 
a result of their particular place in the international division of labour. As a 
supplier of natural resources, variations in the prices and performance of 
primary commodities have had a significant effect on the economies of Latin 
America. The development of policies to control and contain the region’s 
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vulnerability to these price shifts has largely dominated indigenous debates 
linked to development and political economy.  
The unfolding of these cycles usually entails spatial transformations. This is 
especially relevant in the case of natural resources and primary commodities, 
as the expansion of the production frontier has very explicit physical 
implications for the geographical space. Commodities’ booms and busts have 
thus created spatial phenomena requiring attention, such as ‘commodity-
cities’ (Svampa and Viale, 2014) or ‘commodity-regions’, an example being the 
emergence of the cross-border ‘Soylandia’ (Pearce, 2012).   
To understand how Latin America in particular has experienced and 
conceptualised the effect of commodity markets, this chapter intends to 
explore the region’s intellectual history in political economy as it follows 
trends in this sector. In many ways, Latin American academic literature 
reflects its economic performance, which is inextricably linked to production 
of primary commodities. Therefore, this chapter is organised chronologically, 
as it traces the relationship between the historical development of the region’s 
political economy and the corresponding changes in Latin American 
intellectual traditions. It is argued that academic analyses and political events 
have tended to respond to the performance of commodities in the global 
market. Metaphorically, the intellectual history of Latin America’s political 
economy seems also to follow a pattern of ‘boom and bust’, as it addresses the 
problems arising from fluctuations in terms of trade. 
In the first section, this chapter will review the body of literature that 
emerged in the 1950s. The structuralist approach began with Raúl Prebisch’s 
criticism of the international terms of trade, and was added to by economists 
from the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC). This was followed by a Marxist critique, led by Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, which developed into dependency theory. The 
second section explores what came to be known as ‘the lost decade’ in Latin 
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America, namely the period of low growth in the 1980s and 1990s, during 
which neoliberal orthodoxy, both in economics and politics, dominated 
political and intellectual debates. This section is necessarily brief and more 
historical, for the simple reason that the neoliberal ‘Washington consensus’ 
did not generate a corresponding Latin American intellectual tradition, but 
rather consisted of the export of ‘Chicago School’ notions of economic 
management from the Global North to Latin America. However, it is a crucial 
period to explore so as to make sense of the following social and intellectual 
transformations. The third section explores the concepts of ‘post-
neoliberalism’ and ‘neo-extractivism’; terms developed to capture the political 
economy dynamics of the period beginning in the early 2000s, which saw the 
rise of a new commodity boom and the emergence in Latin America of ‘left of 
centre’ governments. Finally, after reviewing this literature, this chapter will 
demonstrate the limitations of the existing approaches and the need to 
develop a spatial analysis of the political economy of commodity booms in 
Latin America. It will be suggested that the economism of structuralism and 
dependency theory and the problems of the post-neoliberal and neo-
extractivist literature, can be addressed by analysing these phenomena 
through the framework of uneven development, and by focusing on state 
attempts to manage these dynamics at different spatial scales.  
ECLAC’s structuralism and dependency theory 
During the 1950s, a problem-solving and policy-oriented framework 
emerged in Western academia, which understood development to be 
achievable through industrialisation and the incorporation of new technology 
(Randall and Theobald, 1998: 35). Modernisation theory considered Western 
economies, particularly Europe and the US, to be models for developing 
countries – many of them recently independent. For Walt Rostow, one of the 
main exponents of this school, there were five stages of growth to economic 
development, a process which could be driven internally by modernising elites 
(Rostow, 1990). While this approach started to gain influence in Latin 
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America, a more critical view of development emerged among economists in 
the region. These criticisms were organised first around the structuralist 
approach and later with dependency theory – both schools of thought gaining 
recognition in the late 1950s and 1960s (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979: viii). 
These theories pointed to the shortcomings of the modernisation school, 
particularly their lack of consideration of colonial legacies and the limitations 
imposed on development policies by international trade structures, and, 
overall, their bias towards Western and developed countries (Carballo, 2014; 
Kay 1991: 32). Most importantly, the emergence of these perspectives 
reflected the general feeling in Latin America that the region was not ‘catching 
up’ with the developed world, but rather that it continued along a trajectory of 
underdevelopment (Palma, 2009: 244).  
The first response came from a group of economists based at ECLAC, led by 
the organisation’s executive director, Raúl Prebisch. His ideas were 
fundamental to the expansion and consolidation of the structuralist approach 
which, along with the later developed dependency theory, became one of the 
most globally recognised contributions of Latin American thinking. Prebisch’s 
significance to the region and to global political economy extends beyond his 
theoretical insights. As an important actor for regional policy-making and 
institution-building, he greatly influenced the economic policies implemented 
throughout the region and beyond during the 1960s and 1970s, as well as the 
creation of long-lasting international institutions like the UN Conference on 
Trade and Development - UNCTAD (Margulis, 2017).   
The core criticism of the ECLAC analysis was that the international division 
of labour had created a trade structure that was damaging to Latin American 
economies. Drawing on French economic structuralism, this school of thought 
considered the international trade system to be an asymmetric structure in 
which advanced industrial countries would increase their productivity while 
countries in the periphery, relying on a ‘primary export model’, were forced to 
import technologies from the centre. According to Celso Furtado (1970), the 
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efforts made by these economists were fundamental in breaking with 
orthodox conceptualisations of economics, namely, that there was a natural 
international division of labour based on comparative advantages, and in 
understanding the specific nature of international trade for economies relying 
on primary commodities exports (1970: 152). 
The absence of technological transfer between advanced countries and 
primary goods exporters was key to the situation of underdevelopment in 
Latin America. Prebisch – who was the head of Argentina’s Central Bank during 
the Great Depression – argued that the assumption that comparative 
advantages would distribute technological advancements equally, and hence 
help countries producing primary products move up the ladder of 
development, was false (Prebisch 1949: 349). There existed a ‘manifest 
imbalance’ (1949: 349) whereby technological progress did not reach the 
periphery and hence primary production remained the main economic 
activity. This was the core assumption of his approach, which came to be 
known as the ‘centre-periphery paradigm’ (Kay 1991: 35). The international 
division of labour created ‘disarticulated and dualist’ economies in the 
periphery, as these countries were both unable to develop their own 
technological progress, while the gap in productivity levels between primary 
products destined for export markets and other sectors remained wide (Kay 
1991: 36). Ultimately, this reflected the underlying power relationships 
present in the world economy, which divided national economies and their 
respective social classes into the dominant and the dominated (Palma, 2009: 
245).  
The underlying mechanism of the international trade system contributing to 
this asymmetry was the deterioration of the terms of trade. According to 
orthodox economics, an increase in productivity in industrialised countries 
should entail a reduction in costs and consequently in prices. That dynamic 
would in turn mean more favourable terms of exchange for the periphery (i.e. 
cheaper imports), where productivity was rising at a slower pace. However, 
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what Prebisch highlighted was that prices of manufactured products did not 
decline even as productivity rose, thus increasing the disparity between core 
and periphery (See Figure 2.1). For Prebisch, this was mainly due to the fact 
that wages and profits in core countries increased in a larger proportion than 
productivity, creating a rise in prices, possible thanks to the existence of strong 
trade unions and oligopolies in these countries (Prebisch, 1949: 362; Kay 
1991: 37). As a consequence, periphery countries ended up transferring part 
of their surplus to the core countries (Prebisch, 1949: 362-363).  After a period 
of high prices for primary products during the Second World War, external 
terms of trade deteriorated by 20% in 1950s, with a slight increase of 7% in 
the first half of 1960s, which meant that the value of the region’s exports and 
consequently their capacity to acquire imports decreased (Furtado, 1970: 
179). Prebisch’s analysis highlighted how the cyclical process of ‘booms and 
busts’ was affecting countries in the periphery, and the underpinning 
mechanisms that made it difficult for the region to change its unfavourable 
Figure 2.1 Terms of trade for goods, f.o.b., Latin America, 1980-2015 
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trade patterns and decrease its reliance on exports of primary goods (1949: 
362).  
Given the instability and the tendency towards the deterioration of its terms 
of trade, the structuralist approach argued that the key to Latin America’s 
development lay in industrialisation and a reduction in its dependence on 
primary commodities. The main obstacle, however, was found in the external 
conditions – i.e. the international trade system. ECLAC’s vision of a solution to 
this imbalance was a renewed interventionism by the national state (Palma, 
2009: 245). Latin American countries would be able to mitigate the effects of 
dependency through foreign exchange, fiscal or trade policies (Furtado, 1970: 
152). Prebisch suggested imposing taxes on primary exports as well as duties 
on manufacturing imports in order to deviate resources away from the 
primary sector towards manufacturing (Kay 1991: 37). These proposals were 
embodied in structuralism’s most significant policy contribution: Import 
Substitution Industrialisation (ISI), which was implemented as state policy in 
many Latin American countries.  
Since disadvantageous terms of trade prevented the periphery from 
accessing or developing technology that would allow them to industrialise, the 
ISI strategy proposed a protectionist policy that would facilitate the growth of 
domestic industries. This, however, was considered to be a temporary 
situation – a time during which national industry could increase its 
productivity until it could compete in the international market against 
products from centre countries (Kay, 1991: 38).  
ECLAC’s structuralist approach did not consider commodities to be a ‘curse’ 
per se, but rather believed that, given the structural conditions of the 
international trade system, a reliance on exports of primary commodities 
would perpetuate the region’s underdevelopment. As Furtado pointed out, the 
international context in the second half of the twentieth century indicated that 
both the share and value of primary goods was declining, affecting these 
2. Latin America’s Political Economy: a history of ‘booms and busts’ 
 
 
38 
countries’ capacity to develop (1970: 179). To counter these asymmetric 
dynamics, structuralist economists assigned the state the role of altering, 
through fiscal and trade policies, the economic structure and the unfavourable 
position of these countries in the international division of labour.  
Within ECLAC’s structuralist theory, the structure of the international 
market is the root of a problem to which the state is a solution. The nation-
state and the global system are the two main scales at which this tradition’s 
analyses of development and underdevelopment operate. This dualist 
framework results in both a methodological nationalism and a structural 
determinism, which is one of its biggest weaknesses, as pointed out by its 
critics. First, there is an over-reliance on the role of the nation-state in 
achieving development. As Cristobal Kay explains, the structuralist school 
presents an ‘idealized picture of the developmentalist state as a liberating, 
equalizing, and modernizing force in society’ (Kay, 1991: 52). Even their 
conception of the global scale, divided between ‘core and periphery’, reveals a 
nationalist ontology, as this distinction serves as a way of classifying countries, 
rather than identifying regions or areas. Besides the dominant economism in 
this approach, there is also a tendency to simplify the meaning of 
‘development’ in terms of a positive balance of payments. There is no analysis, 
as Gabriel Palma points out, of the relations of production, the nature of the 
state (2009: 247), nor how changes in the productive structure could affect 
employment, or well-being in general. It instead relies on a rather narrow 
economic definition of development. This also leads to another criticism, 
namely the lack of focus on civil society, or class struggle, in the determination 
of development. 
By the mid-1960s the ISI model began to fail, as imports of manufactures 
were replaced by imports of capital goods, and the nascent industries were 
largely established by multinational corporations (Grosfoguel, 2000: 356). 
Even Prebisch and ECLAC were critical of this process, as technological 
progress became concentrated among a small number of capitalist firms and 
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industry failed to increase employment, aggravating inequalities (Kay, 1991: 
39).  
As a counter-critique, dependency theory emerged in the 1960s to address 
the failures of structuralist thought, especially their belief in market forces as 
(potential) drivers of growth (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979: 2). This intellectual 
approach took a more radical stance on the circumstances and possibilities of 
development in Latin America, criticising the structrualist school and the ISI 
policy for transforming ‘industrial dependency’ into a ‘technological 
dependency’ led by the national bourgeoisie (Grosfoguel, 2000: 358).  
Considered to be a combination of ‘the structuralist approach with Marxist 
orthodoxy’ (Carballo, 2014: 9), the emergence of this theory was marked by 
the Cuban Revolution. Raúl Castro’s success was seen as evidence that a 
development model outside of capitalism was possible, and that an alliance 
with domestic bourgeoisies was not necessary in the search for social progress 
(Grosfoguel, 2000: 357). Within this group, there are two main positions that 
can be identified: reformist and radical (Kay 1991: 46). The first group 
intended to readapt ECLAC’s structuralist theory after the exhaustion of the ISI 
regime. Within this position, Palma differentiates between a group that was 
still based at ECLAC, which addressed criticisms by distinguishing between the 
concepts of growth and development and the obstacles to each of these; and a 
second group more interested in dependency as a methodology for 
understanding historical processes of concrete underdevelopment (Palma, 
2009: 250). The second position, which can also be identified as neo-marxist, 
was more focused on questioning the capitalist system itself and the possibility 
of development within it, as dependency was seen to be inevitably linked to 
capitalist underdevelopment (2009: 248).  
In the reformist group we find Fernando Henrique Cardoso, whose work 
with Enzo Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America (1979), 
became one of the key writings of dependency theory. These authors put 
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forward a historical methodology that incorporated the economic and social 
specificities of the development process in each country, for example by 
understanding the diverse paths towards their integration into the capitalist 
system as well as the mechanisms of domination endured (1979: 13).  
Key to their analysis was the focus on both internal and external structural 
components and the ways in which they were linked, which meant exposing 
the asymmetric and exploitative social relations located not only in the 
international trade structure but also in domestic politics (1979: 15; Palma, 
2009: 251). For these authors, external forces were not a sufficient 
explanation of dependence, and underdevelopment could be better 
understood by focusing on domestic politics as well as the interplay between 
both internal and external dynamics. From their perspective, ‘the external is 
also expressed as a particular type of relation between social groups and 
classes within underdeveloped nations’ (1979: 15). This link was expressed as 
the ‘internalization of external interests’, through which ‘the system of 
domination reappears as an internal force’ within the state (1979: xviii). This 
means there was an alliance between local and international elites, which 
explained the continuing close relations between peripheral and core 
countries inherent to underdevelopment. The ‘internalization of external 
interests’ included a socio-political level of dependency overlooked by the 
‘core-periphery’ distinction. Social structures in dependent countries, then, 
expressed this dual content of external and domestic interests and pressures 
(1979: 27).  
One consequence of this analysis was the consideration of the national 
bourgeoisie and its alliance with foreign capitals as an obstacle to development 
in the periphery. ECLAC’s intellectuals failed to address class relations and 
their role in underdevelopment, as well as the imperialist dynamic that still 
prevailed in the international system (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979: viii). For 
dependency intellectuals, attention to class structures was important in 
developing a more comprehensive social analysis, even if it remained 
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secondary to the core-periphery dynamic. Internal domination was then 
explained by this class structure, namely by the presence of a comprador class, 
or ruling bourgeoisie, that engaged in the exploitation of the local population, 
did not take part in productive activities but rather lived off rents, and was 
responsible for importing luxury goods from abroad (Weeks, 2012: 97). It was 
this same elite that modernisation theory had identified as the drivers of 
progress in these countries.  
Interestingly, these authors did not consider development and dependency 
to be mutually exclusive. Rather, countries can achieve a certain degree of 
development while retaining their subordinate position in the international 
system (Kay, 1991: 48; Grosfoguel, 2000: 360). In the words of the authors:  
The present situation of development goes beyond the traditional 
dichotomy between the terms ‘development’ and ‘dependence’, 
because it permits an increase in development while maintaining 
and redefining the links of dependency (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979: 
174).  
As Kay points out, Cardoso and Faletto brought together ECLAC’s 
structuralism with the dependency argument by adding a social and political 
dimension (Kay, 1991: 48). However, their analysis relies on a quite static 
conception of the international political economy, whereby sovereignty 
remains at the core of this understanding. By doing so, it assumes that, while 
certain autonomy is possible for countries in the periphery, there is an 
underlying hierarchical structure inscribed within the global system (Blaney, 
1996). Moreover, the distinction between internal and external forces implies 
a clear-cut distinction between actors and flows of capital found within or 
outside the borders of the national state, re-emphasising a very nationalist 
ontology and limiting the capacity of theory to identify transnational and 
multi-scalar processes.   
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Also relevant for this debate is the work of Celso Furtado, a prominent 
Brazilian economist whose work relates both to structuralist economics and 
dependency theory. For this author, it was clear that Latin America’s role as 
provider of food and primary goods had facilitated the region’s development 
in the nineteenth century. However, it had become a source of dependence in 
relation to industrialised countries (Furtado, 1970: 151). Not only did primary 
goods exporters depended on investments and demand originating in the 
advanced economies, but they were also subject to the instability of raw 
material prices worldwide (Furtado, 1970: 151). In an international market 
where primary commodities were depreciating, dependence on these 
products became a source of underdevelopment. Moreover, the asymmetry of 
the trade system created ‘poles of command’ of financial flows, price 
formation, management of export stocks, etc. (Furtado, 1970: 151). In other 
words, the concentration and centralisation of capital in an asymmetric 
structure created even more deep patterns of unevenness and more polarised 
centres of authority in the international political economy. Furtado considered 
reliance on modern technology to be one of the new forms of external 
dependence, along with the role of international credit agencies in providing 
financial flows to the region (1970). Technological progress in Latin America, 
he argued, was only possible through the setting up of subsidiaries of North 
American companies and hence limiting the control of the local government’s 
over the industry (1970: 171).  
The most radical dependency theorist was André Gunder Frank, who was 
influenced by Lenin’s theory of imperialism and the 1959 Cuban Revolution. 
He developed his theory on the basis of Paul Baran’s work, which explained 
economic and social backwardness in developing countries as resulting from 
their incorporation into the capitalist system (Randall and Theobald, 1998). 
As Frank claims:  
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I believe, with Paul Baran, that it is capitalism, both world and 
national, which produced underdevelopment in the past and which 
still generates underdevelopment in the present (Frank, 1967: vii). 
Frank argued that Europe’s colonial expansion, beginning in the 15th century 
with the conquest of the Americas, resulted in the ‘present development of 
some countries and the present underdevelopment of others’, as all countries 
were drawn into a ‘single stream of world history’ (Randall and Theobald, 
1998: 130). In this arrangement, the new territories incorporated into 
Europe’s economic system entered a monopolistic relationship with the 
metropolis, thus contributing to the construction of a ‘chain of dependency’ 
from the core to the peripheries of the capitalist system. Underdevelopment in 
Latin America was not the product of traditional or feudal structures, but a 
result of the contradictions of the capitalist system itself, as development in 
the centre was achieved through the expropriation of surplus from the 
periphery (Frank, 1967: 3). It was the world’s capitalist system which created 
structures of centre-periphery (or metropolis-satellite) both at the global 
stage and internally in dominated countries (Frank, 1967: 94). Frank’s core 
argument was that within this structure, the underdevelopment of the Third 
World was a necessary condition for the development of the industrialised 
countries.  
The central idea of the dependency thesis put forward by these authors was 
that development and underdevelopment are co-constitutive; they are the 
result of the core-periphery relation inherent to the capitalist system 
(Grosfoguel, 2000: 360). The underdevelopment of certain countries was not 
a result of their own internal economic structure, nor did it derive from the 
‘original or traditional state of affairs’ in these countries (Frank, 1967: 27). 
Underdevelopment was instead the consequence of the same world historical 
process that led to the development of Western countries, that is, of the 
contradictions emerging from the development of capitalism itself – in this 
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sense, ‘development and underdevelopment are opposite sides of the same 
coin’ (Randall and Theobald, 1998: 130).  
Also in this radical tradition we find Brazilian economist and sociologist Ruy 
Mauro Marini. Similar to Frank, Marini considered that what we find in Latin 
America are not remnants of feudalism or other pre-capitalist forms, but 
rather a ‘capitalism sui generis’ that can only be understood in the wider 
context of the global system (Marini, 1972). However, he intended to move 
beyond Frank’s approach by considering the specificities of dependency in 
different stages of capitalism. Drawing more directly from Marx's 
considerations of surplus value and the law of the falling rate of profit, Marini 
claims that Latin America played a double role in the international capitalist 
economy. First, as a supplier of primary products, Latin America has permitted 
advanced countries to specialise in industrial activity, by providing the means 
of subsistence to a growing urban and working population. Secondly, the 
region has also contributed to the shift towards an accumulation regime 
sustained by increasing productivity through the provision of cheap 
subsistence means for workers (Marini, 1972). 
To summarise, then, both ECLAC’s structuralist school and dependency 
theory, including its reformist and radical variants, share an interest in 
understanding the underdevelopment of Latin American countries, which is 
explained by focusing on the asymmetric structure of the international market, 
namely the region’s unfavourable position as a provider of primary 
commodities to industrial countries. For Prebisch and other structuralist 
economists, the deterioration of terms of trade was at the core of this process, 
and as such the pattern of Latin America’s development is inextricably linked 
to the cycles of primary commodities. Dependency scholars, while adhering to 
the structuralist description of the global economy, point to the contradictions 
of the capitalist system as the source of this imbalance and consequently of 
Latin America’s underdevelopment. Moreover, these latter analyses 
incorporate a sociological and political dimension by bringing to the forefront 
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the role of modernising elites as accomplices in the persistence of 
underdevelopment.  
These disagreements on the underlying mechanisms perpetuating the 
region’s state of dependency – namely the domestic economic structure versus 
the national class structure – inevitably leads to different considerations on 
how to escape underdevelopment. For structuralists, the nation-state has a 
pivotal role in the overcoming of this situation, particularly through the 
promotion of domestic industry and the aforementioned ISI strategy. 
Dependency theorists, on the other hand, place their trust in leftist movements 
for the end of underdevelopment, with Frank even suggesting that only a 
socialist revolution could reverse dependent relations (Palma, 2009: 249).  
Although dependency theorists have tried to move beyond the pure 
economism of ECLAC’s structuralism (Carballo, 2014: 9), they have not 
managed to escape certain ‘economic reductionism’, and have also overplayed 
the role of external variables in fostering conditions of dependency (Heron, 
2016: 174). There is little reflection upon how (domestic) political factors can 
intervene in these dynamics, even if the concepts elaborated by these 
intellectuals (particularly the structuralists) found a political-ideological 
expression in the developmentalist state. Additionally, international trade was 
largely regarded as a zero-sum game where competition among national 
political units was based on the price and composition – or surplus value – of 
traded goods: ‘Economic development in Latin America has frequently 
depended on favourable conditions for exports’ (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979: 
6). This equation of development with favourable trade conditions has 
resulted in a lack of attention to the nuances and complexities of commodities’ 
trade and production – including the role of non-state actors – and the 
expanded impact these activities have on social, political and economic 
conditions. Another criticism, mainly aimed at the dependency approach, 
pointed to its fundamentalist character, as while many authors considered 
development to be impossible within the capitalist system, the fact remained 
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that both high rates of GDP growth in the region between 1950s and 1970s 
and the East Asian Miracle, which was built on many policies prescribed by 
Prebisch, seemed to disprove this notion (Palma, 2009: 252; Margulis, 2017: 
3). Overall, these approaches do not seem to challenge the principles of 
classical growth theory and focus on exchange rather than on productivity or 
alternative paths to development. Development is thus considered to consist 
of maintaining a surplus in the balance of payments, and hence the role of 
commodities is understood purely in terms of their contribution to the 
external trade balance. In sum, ECLAC and dependency theory’s view of 
commodities and the governance of this sector is limited to their 
understanding of growth as linked to international trade, rather than to 
internal conditions of (re)distribution. 
The growing criticisms of these analyses, as well as the real crisis of the 
application of the ISI model and the growth of peripheral economies in East 
Asia, signalled the decline of these intellectual trends and the emergence of a 
neoliberal perspective empowered by the debt crisis that saw the ascendance 
in Latin America of the narrative: ‘there is no alternative’.    
There is No Alternative! The lost decade and the Washington Consensus 
By the 1970s the ISI model was in crisis. The system of fixed exchange rate 
chosen by Latin American countries was meant to facilitate imports of 
industrial inputs, but as a result provoked a strain on commodities exports, as 
these lost competitivity in the world market. Quotas on imports of 
consumption products continued to be raised, pushing for an expansion of 
debt as a way of financing domestic industries. Inflation and trade imbalances 
gradually built up, aggravated by the 1973 oil shock which increased prices of 
imports. This event also meant the sudden availability of dollars which 
contributed to substantial rise in the region’s debt levels.  By the end of the 
decade, many countries could not afford to service the debt acquired and were 
forced to devalue, as inflation levels soared. In a context of global recession, 
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commodity prices fell and hence failed to contribute to the economies’ balance 
of payments. With negative growth levels, and a mounting informal sector, the 
1980s came to be known as Latin America’s ‘lost decade’.  
Simultaneously, Western powers were experiencing a ‘neoliberal turn’. 
Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan were elected in the United Kingdom 
(UK) and the US respectively, implementing a policy program that aligned with 
the new political-economy paradigm. Commitment to principles of 
neoclassical economics and a return of monetarism replaced Keynesian 
policies, which were considered a failure in the wake of the 1973 oil shock of 
1973 (Harvey, 2005; Lapavitsas, 2005). As the state’s intervention in the 
labour market was rejected, the assumption that the free market was the most 
efficient principle for the organization of the economy dominated the 
intellectual debate. The state’s only role was that of facilitator of the markets’ 
efficient functioning: domestically, this meant deregulation; internationally, 
the elimination of trade barriers; and politically, the depoliticisation of 
policymaking (Wylde, 2012: 26).   
In Latin America, the initial turn to neoliberalism came from the newly 
established dictatorships that swept the region in the late 1960s and mid-
1970s. Under General Pinochet, Chile was one of the first countries to follow 
policy prescriptions from the ‘Chicago Boys’ - a number of Chilean economists 
who were trained in the Department of Economics of the University of Chicago 
with Milton Friedman, a leading advocate of the neoliberal counter revolution 
- and the ‘Chilean model’. This consisted in large privatisations, expansion of 
foreign investment to strategic sectors and increased reliance on primary 
exports, and was exported through Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) 
designed by International Financial Institutions (IFIs) (Taylor, 2006: 4). The 
debt crisis of 1980s and high levels of inflation created the conditions for IFIs 
and the US to encourage the SAPs as a recipe for tackling low growth and 
inflation in the region through conditionality agreements. The diffusion of 
these policy requirements throughout Latin America came to be known as the 
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‘Washington Consensus’, a term that embodied the expansion of neoliberalism 
via a list of principles that these nations were committed to (Williamson, 
1990).  
Even with some variation, the general tendency consisted in policies directed 
at establishing macroeconomic stability and opening of trade and financial 
markets. This acceptance that ‘there was no alternative’ (Munck, 2003: 495) 
and the dominance of neoliberalism in political and economic debates was best 
exemplified by the economic stabilization plan that came to be known as the 
Plan Real. This set of measures was orchestrated by one of the most prominent 
representatives of dependency theory and then Minister of Finance, Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso. Its main objective was to ‘establish an equilibrium in the 
Government’s accounts, with the aim of eliminating the main cause of 
hyperinflation’ (Inter-Ministerial message, quoted in Sainz and Calcagno, 
1999: 12). However, reforms introduced with this plan included numerous 
aspects of a neoliberal model, such as financial, trade and capital account 
liberalisation, labour market flexibilisation and privatisation (Mollo and Saad-
Filho, 2006: 103). Before the Plan Real, a similar approach had been taken in 
Argentina, where the ‘convertibility plan’ had established a pegged exchange 
rate system between the Argentine peso and the US dollar. This was part of a 
broader shift towards ‘technocracy’, whereby technocrats were believed to be 
the most competent state managers, and many of these policies were 
presented as ‘technical responses’ to issues like inflation (Saad-Filho, 2005: 
225), in consonance with the depoliticisation of policymaking advanced by 
neoliberalism.   
In sum, the intellectual challenge to the political and economic notion that 
the world had reached ‘the end of history’ became less prominent in the region 
during 1990s, strengthening the sentiment that there was no alternative 
(Corrales, 2012). This conceptualisation of development remained strongly 
economistic, just like structuralism and dependency theory before it, yet this 
was now driven by the tenets of neoliberalism. There was no particular focus 
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on primary commodities or their role in the economy, and if anything, this 
sector suffered from anti-inflationary exchange rate policies domestically and 
low prices in the international market. Economic governance was focused 
mainly on attracting financial flows through liberalisation and labour 
flexibilisation policies. However, an exhaustion of this model led to several 
crises in the region, such as the currency crisis in Brazil in 1998-1999 and the 
2001 crisis in Argentina. As a response, several left-wing governments were 
elected in Latin America, which to a great extent coincided with one of the most 
prolonged commodity price booms in decades.  
A new commodity boom and the rise of the ‘neos’: Post-neoliberalism and 
Neo-extractivism 
After a decade of neoliberal policies, it became clear that the drastic retreat 
of the state from economic activity, financial deregulation and the imposition 
of the policy recipes prescribed by the IFIs had failed to generate sustainable 
growth for the Latin American countries, and moreover, had deepened already 
existing inequalities and vulnerabilities amongst populations across the 
region. The most evident sign of this failure was the 2001 crisis in Argentina, 
as the country’s economy imploded, leading to a dramatic social and political 
crisis. Starting in 1998, with the election of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, a 
number of countries throughout the region elected candidates from left-
leaning parties: Ricardo Lagos in Chile in 2000, Lula da Silva in Brazil in 2002, 
Nestor Kirchner in Argentina in 2003, Evo Morales in 2005, Rafael Correa in 
Ecuador in 2007, and Fernando Lugo in Paraguay in 2008. These events were 
regarded as a new political moment in the region, which has been often 
referred to as Latin America’s ‘turn to the left’ or ‘pink tide’ – reflecting the left-
leaning, usually anti-American governments that gained power in these 
countries (Enriquez, 2013).7 By 2008, almost 60% of the Latin American 
                                                          
7 ‘Pink’ was used to distinguish these electorally chosen and more moderate left-movements 
from the ‘red’ left that was active in Latin America particularly between the 1960s and 1970s 
(Allen, 2008). 
2. Latin America’s Political Economy: a history of ‘booms and busts’ 
 
 
50 
population was governed by leaders on the left of the political spectrum 
(Macdonald and Ruckert, 2009: 1).  
As Grugel, Riggirozzi and Thirkell-White point out, it is no surprise that these 
changes emerged mainly in countries where the economic and social 
consequences of the Washington Consensus were strongest; or, where these 
policies had fostered corruption, inefficiency and inattentiveness to social 
demands (2008: 508). For many authors, the failure to deliver growth and 
public goods was at the root of the decline of the neoliberal model and the 
emergence and consolidation of ‘Left-of-Centre’ governments and the new 
social movements that arose alongside it (Panizza, 2005; Macdonald and 
Ruckert, 2009; Roberts, 2007).  These limitations have been referred to by 
Kenneth Roberts as ‘dual fault lines’ of Latin America’s democracy during the 
1980s and 1990s: the inherent tension between the new liberal regime and the 
extreme social inequality found in the region; and the increasing dependence 
and alignment with the US and consequent loss of national sovereignty (2007: 
3-4). While some authors also highlight some positive aspects of the neoliberal 
era, such as the consolidation of democracies in the region (Panizza, 2005), the 
negative social and economic consequences of those policies created the 
conditions for left or centre-left movements to access government through 
democratic elections, whether they were already established parties or new 
social and political movements. As Emir Sader put it, ‘post-neoliberalism is 
based on the conditions generated by liberalism, among whose consequences 
are the inability to return to long cycles of economic growth’, namely due to 
the dominance of financial over productive activity, and the concentration of 
investment in the former (Sader, 2009: 174). The region abandoned the idea 
that ‘there is no alternative’ and entered a moment of ‘repoliticization’ 
(Roberts, 2007).  
While these changes began in the late 1990s and early 2000s, only later did 
this trend attract attention from academia (Macdonald and Ruckert, 2009: 6). 
Initially, interest was ignited by in this revival of the Latin American left after 
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two decades of absence in the political arena. For James Petras and Petra 
Harding, the region was experiencing the ‘revival and growth of a new 
revolutionary left’ (2000: 3). Similarly, for Sader (2009) it was the election of 
Hugo Chavez in Venezuela which ‘heralded a new period, moving from a phase 
of resistance to one of hegemonic dispute’ (2009: 172), as social movements 
overcame their defensive position held for most of the previous decade.  
Some analyses of these transformations in Latin American politics tried to 
pin down the predominant feature of the parties and alliances governing these 
countries. Many initial studies hence focused on trying to categorise them into 
‘right’ or ‘wrong’ left (Castañeda, 2006), first or second wave (Petras and 
Harding, 2000), governments formed by already established leftist parties or 
coming from new emerging social movements (Roberts, 2007), and so on. But 
regardless of whether the differentiating element was the origin of the ruling 
party, their relationship with the US and opposition (or not) to market-
friendly policies, the concept of ‘pink tide’ was marshalled as a ‘catch all’ term 
to refer to the election of left-of-centre governments.  
While acknowledging variations within these governments, certain scholars 
have more recently preferred to conceptualise the transformation of the last 
decades as a moment of ‘post-neoliberalism’. The term gives context to the 
emergence of new regimes in the region, while remaining broad enough to 
encompass the differences with which these countries have experienced this 
‘turn to the left’. Definitions of post-neoliberalism usually embrace its 
‘intentionally vague’ character (Brand and Sekler, 2009: 12) as a resource for 
including a broad range of policies and regimes, without the need of a 
consensus over their specific features, or even whether they represent the end 
of neoliberalism or not.  
Post-neoliberalism has thus been defined as ‘a search for progressive policy 
alternatives arising out of the various contradictions of neoliberalism’ 
(Macdonald and Ruckert, 2009: 19); ‘a perspective on social, political and/or 
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economic transformations, on shifting terrains of social struggles and 
compromises, taking place on different scales, in various contexts, and by 
different actors’ (Brand and Sekler, 2009: 6); and as ‘an evolving attempt to 
develop political economies that are attuned to the social responsibilities of 
the state whilst remaining responsive to the demands of ‘positioning’ national 
economies in a rapidly changing global political economy’ (Grugel and 
Riggirozzi, 2012: 4), among others. The common thread among these 
approaches is an emphasis on social issues as central to this new framework. 
Underlying these conceptualisations is the understanding that the era of ‘no 
alternative’ or of ‘the end of politics’ is over. New governments have emerged 
that searched to break with neoliberalism – to some extent - and propose 
alternative models (Roberts, 2007; Brand and Sekler, 2009: 6).  
Initially, there were grand expectations about these new governments’ 
capacity to bring a definite end of neoliberalism – a sentiment very likely 
provoked by the enthusiasm following the breakdown of the Free Trade Area 
of the Americas (FTAA) talks. However, much of the literature has shown more 
caution by avoiding idealisations of the new governance model, namely by 
pointing out the continuities with the neoliberal era. Nicola Sekler (2009) and 
Sader (2009: 174) were more enthusiastic and presented post-neoliberalism 
as a counter-hegemonic perspective; as an opposition to neoliberalism’s 
principles of deregulation, financialisation and labour flexibilisation. However, 
Jean Grugel and Pia Riggirozzi questioned the extent to which the pink tide 
presented ‘genuinely new and alternative models of governance’ (2009: 3) or 
if, as Francisco Panizza argued, rather than new models being created from 
scratch, ruling parties were pursuing a strategy of ‘bending and moulding’ 
already established policies and institutions (Panizza, 2005: 730). Similarly, 
Laura Macdonald and Arne Ruckert (2009: 3) questioned whether these 
developments ‘represent the “death of neoliberalism” or whether 
neoliberalism has transmogrified into a new (post-neoliberal) body’ (2009: 2). 
In some cases, more than an alternative, post-neoliberalism resembles an 
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evolution of the neoliberal model, or as Jewellord Nem Singh, discussing the 
Chilean state, put it: ‘neoliberalism with a human face’ (2010: 1429). 
Considering the 2008 financial crash, Jamie Peck et al. argued that it was 
premature to claim that neoliberalism was over; indeed, as this concept does 
not entail a clearly defined economic or political model, it is difficult to 
proclaim its total failure (2010: 101).  
Although certain authors (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2012; Macdonald and 
Ruckert, 2009) deploy the term post-neoliberalism as a useful 
conceptualisation of the social, political and economic changes set in motion in 
Latin America, it risks over-simplifying the dynamic that these changes reflect. 
Efforts to construct a temporal account of the region’s development tend to 
over-emphasise the coherence, or even economic and political ‘success’, of 
different governance models. Similar to the notions of a ‘post-Washington 
Consensus’, ‘Buenos Aires consensus’ and even ‘Brasilia consensus’, the 
concept of post-neoliberalism generally reproduces a simplistic ‘before’ and 
‘after’ account of Latin American political economic history. Bob Jessop 
highlighted the problems with this kind of periodisation when discussing post-
Fordism, pointing out that ‘serious analysis of post-Fordism must go beyond 
noting that it occurs after Fordism and show how it relates to specific 
developmental tendencies and crises of Fordism’ (Jessop, 2005: 54). This 
temporal characterisation has also been used as a political construction, as 
Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner proclaimed the década ganada (decade of 
triumph) in opposition to the lost decades of 1980s and 1990s, a slogan also 
used by Rafael Correa in Ecuador.  
A common feature of analyses of post-neoliberal regimes is the emphasis on 
‘continuity and change’ with both neoliberalism and the developmentalist 
policies associated with structuralism. These new regimes did not reject the 
market, but rather reacted against ‘excessive marketization’ (Grugel and 
Riggirozzi 2012: 3). What Macdonald and Ruckert refer to as ‘discontinuity 
within continuity’ highlights the persisting adherence to several policies 
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established during the Washington Consensus - such as macroeconomic 
stability - and the incorporation of new approaches that break with that model, 
such as redistributive policies, social investment and the re-engagement of 
citizenship (Macdonald and Ruckert, 2009: 3; 20-22). The extent of continuity 
or change varies in the different regimes and according to different analyses. 
Jeffery Webber, for example, argues that Morales’ policy towards the 
hydrocarbons industry in Bolivia did not differ considerably from the 
neoliberal approach (2009). Nem Singh too, while studying state-owned 
companies in mining and hydrocarbons in Chile and Brazil, found substantial 
institutional stability throughout the different decades (2010, 2014). Marcus 
Taylor  goes beyond the idea of ‘discontinuity within continuity’ by writing that 
pink tide governance strategies are ‘a testament to the path-dependent 
qualities of neoliberal restructuring’, meaning the progressive policies and 
social inclusion mechanisms deployed in Latin American countries simply 
represent attempts to overcome neoliberalism’s contradictions (2009: 35).  
While the literature has pointed to the continuities between neoliberalism 
and post-neoliberalism, much of the attention has been focused on the new 
features of these governments that allow us to talk of a ‘post-neoliberal 
regime’. Much has been directed at understanding the state and its 
relationship with both the market and society. This has also implied a shift in 
attention towards the reconfiguration of hemispheric relations and the 
redefinition of citizenship and democratisation. Overall, as Jean Grugel and Pia 
Riggirozzi explain, ‘the role and the weight of the state versus the market’ lies 
at the crux of debates about the state in Latin America in the aftermath of the 
neoliberal era and, consequently, development models in the region (Grugel 
and Riggirozzi, 2009: 1). Macdonald and Ruckert also point to the ‘renewed 
vigour and significance’ of state involvement in issues of development and 
social equality (2009: 19). Post-neoliberalism embodies the ‘return of the 
state’ after being deemed inefficient by neoliberalism.  
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For Grugel and Riggirozzi, it is in this reconfiguration of the state-market-
society nexus that the fundamental nature of this new paradigm emerges. They 
identify two main pillars that constitute post-neoliberalism. The first is the 
political aspiration of ‘reclaiming the state’ and its authority in the realignment 
of a new social consensus (2012: 2). Here, the state reclaims its capacity to 
address what Christopher Wylde calls the ‘state-society’ developmental 
dichotomy, meaning its capacity to consolidate a new form of social contract 
(Wylde, 2012: 28). This incorporation of the social duties as a responsibility of 
the state has also created the space for new social movements to gain their 
place in the political arena and empower marginalised sectors of the 
population through a renewed citizenship (Brand and Sekler, 2009). As 
Macdonald and Ruckert put it: ‘the social has returned to the agenda of the 
state as a key site for state engineering, and new ways of connecting the 
market with the social sphere are being proposed’ (Macdonald and Ruckert, 
2009: 8). 
The second pillar is the use of economic policies for ‘rebuilding the state’ 
(Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2012: 3). The neoliberal assumption that the state’s 
intervention in the market is distortive is replaced by the state taking a 
managing role over the economy as a legitimate tool to foster development and 
respond to social demands. Post-neoliberalism attempts to resolve the ‘state-
market dichotomy’ (Wylde, 2012: 9) by creating a state that enhances its fiscal 
capacity and policy-making autonomy by encouraging production and 
increasing taxes, while at the same time maintaining some principles of the 
neoliberal model such as trade openness and macroeconomic and fiscal 
stability (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2012: 11). Some authors like Macdonald and 
Ruckert (2009) and Wylde (2012) consider this to be a sign of the return of 
the ‘developmentalist state’, or as Luiz Bresser-Pereira put it, the emergence 
of a ‘new developmentalism’ (2011; 2012a; 2012b).  
According to this author, new developmentalism is not an economic theory, 
but a national development strategy, an alternative proposal that emerged in 
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response to the failures of the Washington Consensus (Bresser-Pereira, 2011: 
113- 114). This represents a return to some of the principles and policies put 
forward by the Latin American structuralist economists of the 1950s. 
However, this new developmentalism also presents ‘changes and continuities’ 
with structuralist economics - or ‘old developmentalism’ - and neoliberal 
economic orthodoxy. Compared to old developmentalism, the new strategy 
supports export-led industrialization and a competitive exchange rate; also, 
the role of the state is important but only for assuring a strong domestic 
market and reducing inequalities, rather than taking a leading role in 
industrial development and assuring savings for investments (Bresser-
Pereira, 2011: 119). As for its differences with neoliberal economic orthodoxy, 
while the neoliberal approach to growth meant a limited role for the state 
combined with market deregulation, new developmentalism considers growth 
to be driven by a national development strategy defined by the state, which 
also, to an extent, intervenes in and regulates the market, limiting the place of 
foreign savings in domestic growth. In terms of macroeconomic policies, 
Bresser-Pereira points to the difference between the mandate of the Central 
Bank in neoliberal and new developmentalist models: while in the former this 
institution solely targets inflation, in the latter the control of the exchange rate 
and employment are added to their list of tasks (2011: 123).  
Overall, post-neoliberalism’s strategy for ‘rebuilding the state’ is based on 
the design of a developmental strategy that draws from elements of both 
Keynesian theory and structuralist economics, and principles of budget 
balance and inflation control. This balanced view of the new economic strategy 
that emerged in Latin America, consistent with the idea of ‘continuity and 
change’ or ‘middle way’ (Tussie and Riggirozzi, 2015), is also in line with Ulrich 
Brand and Nicola Sekler’s words of caution against distinguishing post-
neoliberalism from neoliberalism on the grounds of the ‘return of the state’. 
The authors claim that while neoliberalism is usually presented as reflecting a 
dichotomy between the state and the market, the state had a particular role 
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regarding social, economic and political issues; namely a repressive one 
(2009: 7).  
A key element in the emergence of these post-neoliberal regimes, and one 
which is identified by many authors, is the coincidence of this ‘turn to the left’ 
with the explosion of a commodity boom and the consequent hike in products’ 
prices. This phenomenon has been the dynamic force behind the region’s fast 
growth in the last decade, and has thus created favourable conditions for post-
neoliberal governments’ goal of reclaiming and rebuilding the state. As this 
chapter has shown, and which was echoed by Galeano’s words at the 
beginning, the problem of resource-dependency and ‘primarisation’ of the 
economies has been a constant presence in Latin American thinking and 
persistent feature of the region’s socio-economic history (Cardoso and Faletto, 
1979; Marini, 1973; Quijano, 2000). 
Several authors have identified this turn within the economies in the Global 
South towards resource-led development and increasing resource-
dependency as a new accumulation regime termed ‘new extractivism’ or ‘neo-
extractivism’ (Veltmeyer and Petras, 2014; Gudynas, 2009; Machado Araoz, 
2013). Horacio Machado Araoz (2013) defines this as ‘political-economic 
regimes based on the over-exploitation of the natural goods of their territories’ 
(2013: 129), whereby resources are extracted and shipped to external 
markets, reaffirming Latin America’s role as the supplier of primary resources, 
and simultaneously deepening the dependency on that market (Gudynas, 
2009: 188).  
This phenomenon and the effect it has had on economies in the Global South 
has been dubbed the ‘Commodities Consensus’, which is underpinned by an 
agreement (tacit or explicit) over the inevitability of the expansion of 
extractivist activities (Svampa, 2013). The transition from the Washington to 
the Commodity Consensus is expressed as a return to economic activities 
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based on the extraction and export of natural resources, particularly in Latin 
America. Argentine sociologist Maristella Svampa defines this Consensus as:  
a new order, both economic and politico-ideological, sustained by 
the boom in international prices of primary resources and 
consumption goods increasingly demanded by the core economies 
and the emerging powers, which creates undeniable comparative 
advantages in economic growth and the increase of monetary 
reserves, as well as it produces new asymmetries and deep 
inequalities in Latin-American societies (Svampa, 2013: 31).  
The political, economic and ideological consequences of this global 
arrangement have sparked numerous conflicts over the control and use of 
land, the expulsion of peasant and indigenous communities, as well as 
provoking discussions about the nature and role of the state in the region. 
Referring to this last point, Eduardo Gudynas considers this new extractivism 
to be a ‘progressive’ extractivism, as left-of-centre governments take a more 
active role in the governance of natural resource exploitation, through the 
imposition of royalties or corporation taxes (Gudynas, 2009: 193). The claim 
has limited empirical verification, however, as shown by Pablo Davalos and 
Veronica Albuja (and which will be further explored in this thesis) in their 
analysis of the distribution of tax income from oil exploitation in Ecuador 
(2014).     
Several authors draw links between the neoliberal project and the 
emergence of this new extractivist model. The pink tide spurred the 
expectation that such an ideological change would also include a 
transformation in the relationship between the state and transnational 
capitals, especially with regards to the redistribution of rents and the role of 
nature within economic development (Arsel, 2012). However, many of these 
accounts attribute to neoliberalism a key role in the consolidation of the neo-
extractivist model and more generally the return of extractive industries to the 
forefront of economic growth in the Global South (Svampa, 2013; Singh and 
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Bourgeouin, 2013; Veltmeyer and Petras, 2014; Haarstad, 2012). Policies of 
market liberalisation, privatisation, attraction of FDI, and flexibilisation of 
labour markets have contributed, according to these authors, to the 
exploitation of the resource boom that began in the 21st century. While the 
conditions were established under the neoliberal model, the post-neoliberal 
state has moved towards the exercise of control over the resource market and, 
in a way, built a ‘post-neoliberal’ society through that capacity. Nem Singh’s 
analysis of oil and copper markets in Brazil and Chile illustrates how post-
neoliberal states built the ability to oversee and enhance market 
competitiveness through the design of neoliberal reforms (Nem Singh 2013). 
In a way, the neo-extractivist model itself represents the elements of 
continuity and change that those using the concept of ‘post-neoliberalism’ 
emphasise.    
Post-neoliberalism and more specifically neo-extractivism, remain 
intellectually and empirically rooted in Latin America. Neo-extractivism is, to 
some extent, revamping the claims of the structuralist and dependency 
analyses of asymmetries in the global system by which Latin America 
maintains a vulnerable and dominated position. Global dynamics in primary 
commodities prices have put this sector of the economy again at the forefront 
of the discussion. However, approaches that critically engage with neo-
extractivist focus less on the structural processes underpinning this situation 
of inequality, and instead concentrate on the effects these modes of production 
and accumulation have on the environment and the local populations. 
Research is grounded on the local and national level, rather than on the global 
political economy. An illustrative case that highlights the distance in analytical 
perspective between neo-extractivism and more structuralist accounts is the 
‘Gudynas/Harvey controversy’, a debate between Eduardo Gudynas – one of 
the main critics of neo-extractivism – and members of David Harvey’s research 
team in Ecuador over the usefulness or not of recurring to some of Harvey’s 
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concepts such as accumulation by dispossession to understand the situation in 
Latin America.8  
Overall, there seems to be a disciplinary distinction among the different 
approaches to understand Latin America’s development and its relation to 
cycles of commodities booms and busts. While ECLAC’s structuralist analysis 
and dependency theory might have been criticised for their overly economistic 
approach, post-neoliberalism and neo-extractivism place more emphasis on 
the state’s mediation of social and political processes, instead of the role 
played by the dynamics of global capitalism. In terms of political economy, 
economists like Bresser-Pereira hint at the emergence of neo-
developmentalism as a political economy strategy inscribed in post-
neoliberalism that draws from both structuralist economics and neoliberal 
principles. However, it fails to link how these policy strategies in the context 
of a commodity boom constitute the politics of the post-neoliberal state in 
Latin America. Finally, critiques of neo-extractivism coming from political 
ecology and agrarian studies remind us of the dangers and implications of 
commodity-based growth, but they do so namely in terms of its consequences 
for the environment and for local rural populations, which calls for a more 
fundamental debate of how development should be understood and pursued.  
   It is important to consider that these academic debates have been held in a 
context in which policy discussions, both in the region and globally, have 
emphasised the production of primary commodities as a key strategy for Latin 
America. More specifically, in terms of agricultural commodities, international 
institutions such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) have 
highlighted the region’s potential to become the ‘new global breadbasket’ and 
private transnational initiatives have similarly pointed to the role that Latin 
America can achieve in a global context of food insecurity (Zeigler and Nakata, 
2014; Regúnaga, 2013). As will now be explored in the last section of this 
                                                          
8 For the initial article by Gudynas and the following responses see Rosa Luxembourg 
Foundation (2015)  
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chapter, the centrality of agricultural commodities to Latin America’s global 
position necessitates an analytical approach that can conceptualise the role of 
the state in managing the political and economic effects of commodity booms 
that take place at different spatial scales.  
Towards a spatial political economy of Latin America 
Since its incorporation into the global capitalist system, Latin America’s fate 
has been closely tied to the variations in prices of primary products. 
Consequently, the region has produced a vast amount of literature on this 
issue, with the emphasis placed on different aspects of commodity production 
depending on the era: in the 1950s the focus was on the external trade balance 
as the fundamental source of dependence and underdevelopment; and since 
the 1990s commodity booms have been seen as an opportunity to strengthen 
democratic institutions and enhance social progress. These different 
approaches offer a number of helpful tools to advance the study of natural 
resources exploitation in the region, but they also contain certain 
shortcomings that inhibit a more complex understanding of the interactions 
between global, regional, and domestic dynamics.  
Throughout the diverse intellectual traditions explored in this chapter, the 
state is understood as an agent with the capacity to enact different paths to 
development. For the structuralist and, to some extent, dependency tradition, 
national authority was regarded as having the capacity to reverse their 
countries’ dependence on primary commodity exports and hence 
underdevelopment. There is a reaffirmation of autonomy on the basis of 
sovereignty in the international order (Blaney, 1996). Their only focus, 
however, is on how the state can transfer resources from primary production 
to industry through trade and fiscal policies. Its role is linked to the 
conceptualisation of development in this tradition, mainly as a function of the 
surplus or deficit on the external balance of payments.  
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Post-neoliberalism, on the other hand, focuses more on the changing role of 
the state, from a facilitator of trade and financial liberalisation in the 1980s 
and 1990s, to an instrument for rebuilding the state-society nexus. In this 
context, resources originating in the global commodity boom became 
instrumental to the post-neoliberal state – a source of income to fund the social 
expenditure that sustained this nexus. Similar to the prescriptions of the 
structuralist school, the state became a more active agent in the economy 
through the imposition of royalties and taxes on trade. However, the main aim 
was not to radically change the productive structure of the country, but to 
strengthen the social and political alliances built by these governments.  
The post-neoliberal understanding of the state in Latin America offers a 
helpful framework to account for the transformations experienced in the 
region since the late 1990s and especially on the importance given to new 
definitions of citizenship and even of politics. By focusing on these socio-
political aspects, however, this approach falls short in understanding how 
processes of global capitalism have formed the material foundations of such 
transformations. In other words, there has been insufficient attention paid to 
how flows of capital can create patterns of uneven development at the local, 
national, and regional level, as capital follows profits and flees whenever 
economic activity slows down. Whether by changing the domestic productive 
structure through import substitution or by opening up the economy and 
facilitating the inflow of capital through a liberalisation of the market; the 
problem addressed by the different intellectual traditions concentrated on the 
best way for the state to manage the cyclical movement of capital. It seems that 
in moments of ‘booms’, when the region is benefitting from soaring 
international prices – such as in the last decade - less attention is paid to how 
these recurring processes play out for the countries involved. The neo-
extractivist literature has focused more specifically on the role of commodities, 
but again, their analyses focus on the study of the adverse environmental and 
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social consequences of the expansion of commodity production throughout 
the region.   
Overall, while the different traditions presented here have advanced the 
understanding of the governance of commodity production in Latin America, 
there is still a need for an approach that successfully integrates the political 
aspects – i.e. the role of political actors, power relations and governance – as 
well as the economic variables related to flows of capital and productive 
structures. Moreover, the interaction between global price booms and political 
and social transformations in Latin American countries would require a more 
inter-scalar approach that accounts for the different levels of interaction and 
co-constitution of local, national, regional, and global processes. While many 
authors have already pointed to the existing contradictions between the 
discourses that reclaim indigenous conceptualisations of development such as 
buen vivir (living well) and the persistence and expansion of extractivist 
activities largely funded by transnational companies, these contradictions 
should be further explored in search for a better understanding of how – and 
to what extent - the commodity boom explains the configuration of the post-
neoliberal state.  
By bringing in space, understood as a relational concept, this thesis intends 
to build upon existing intellectual traditions, as it will account for the 
structural dynamics of global imbalances and the renewed agency of the Latin 
American state, which is underpinned by social and ideological changes as well 
as favourable economic dynamics. As such, this approach will provide new 
insights into the mechanisms of governance of the creation and distribution of 
wealth in contexts of structural change such as commodity booms. The next 
chapter will develop the theoretical and conceptual framework that guides the 
analysis of the soybean commodity boom in South America from the 
perspective of the political economy of space.  
   
3. Capitalist space and processes of transformation 
'From colonial expansion to the building of 
suburbs, from the destruction of 'local 
peoples' in the inner city and the Amazon, 
capitalism always was a geographical project'  
Neil Smith (1992) 
 
Introduction 
As presented in the previous chapter, accounts of the processes and 
transformations initiated by the commodity boom have so far been unable to 
fully comprehend the complexity of the political economy of the soybean 
complex in the La Plata basin. While the ECLAC tradition has focused on the 
structural dimension, depicting a geography of ‘winners and losers’ solely 
based on territorial divisions at the international level, more recent analyses 
of the ‘post-neoliberal state’ have emphasised the efforts of governments in 
Latin America to recover state autonomy in a post-Washington Consensus 
world. The former perspective focuses on the international, and the latter 
focuses on the national, such that both fall short in understanding how these 
different levels – as well as regional and local dynamics - interact and are 
mutually transformed, as exemplified by the recent resource boom.  
These perspectives largely rely on a state-centred ontology that has been 
dubbed the ‘territorial trap’ by John Agnew (1994). This is in part due to a lack 
of awareness of the spatiality of political economy processes such as 
commodity booms, meaning how they acquire particular geographical 
expressions – for example, through a particular division of labour between 
different regions, or the organisation of a specific economic activity at the local 
rather than national level. The absence of spatiality is by no means particular 
to these approaches. Stephen Bates and Nicola Smith (2008) and Huw 
3. Capitalist space and processes of transformation 
 
 
65 
Macartney and Stuart Shields (2011) have called for further reflection and 
awareness of space in analyses of change and scale in political science and 
critical IPE. As Bates and Smith have pointed out, reflections on space can 
provide ‘a more sophisticated understanding and explanation of continuity 
and change’ (2008: 200). If space is understood as a social and historical 
process, and not merely a container of social relations, then we can further 
explore its role in the reproduction of capitalist relations, and more 
specifically, in the transformation of the nation-state and its capacities.  
This chapter presents an alternative to state-centric approaches that will 
allow for a better understanding of the nuances of the political economy of 
Latin America during recent decades. To do so, it draws on concepts from 
human and political geography.  These concepts enable an analysis of spatiality 
in political economy and the identification of the geographical impacts of 
capitalist processes. By doing so, this thesis will move away from a 
conceptualisation of ‘space-as-container’ or as absolute – meaning as a static, 
given place where economic, social, and political relations are forged – and 
towards a relational understanding that highlights how space is created 
through the construction, deconstruction, and reconstruction of capitalist 
accumulation processes (Brenner, 1999a: 43). This framework facilitates the 
understanding of processes of transformation that capitalism sets in motion; 
for example, how agricultural landscapes have changed in South America, as 
crop diversity is replaced by a monotony of soybean, or how forests disappear 
to make way for the expansion of oilseed production. These dynamics have 
fundamental impacts on geography, and express a series of socio-economic 
relations that exist at different scales.  
As a general framework, this thesis conceives these developments as an 
exemplification of dynamics of uneven development (from now on UD). UD 
was most extensively theorised by Neil Smith (2010), who developed a 
framework that explores the differentiated geographical development of 
regions as a function and reflection of the inherently contradictory tendencies 
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of capitalism, particularly the dynamics of equalisation and differentiation, 
which will be further explained in this chapter. These patterns of UD emerge 
at different levels of economic, social, and territorial organisation. The chapter 
will also examine the concept of scale, understood not as a universal or given, 
but as ‘materially real frames of social action’, and how processes of rescaling 
are transforming the geography of capitalism and creating new dynamics of 
capital accumulation (Smith, 1995: 60). This problematisation of scale as static 
leads us question the nation-state as the principal level of economic 
organisation, as well as to examine the spatial strategies that the state can 
deploy. As such, this chapter will unpack concepts of deterritorialisation and 
reterritorialisation as mechanisms through which public and private authority 
can be grounded in specific territories or diffused so as to enhance capital’s 
mobility or fixity (Brenner, 1999b). A focus on these mechanisms allows us to 
re-emphasise the role of the state in processes of political economy without 
falling into the ‘territorial trap’ (Brenner, 1999a: 46; Agnew, 1994), by 
understanding how state policies can facilitate the integration of economic 
activities at different scales.  
By incorporating these concepts into the analytical framework, this thesis 
intends to follow previous efforts in critical IPE to engage with the ‘spatial turn’ 
experienced in other social sciences (McCartney and Shields, 2011: 375). 
Human geographers such as Neil Brenner, David Harvey, and Neil Smith share 
many of the same theoretical concerns as critical IPE scholars, particularly a 
commitment to analysing the dynamics of capitalist development (and their 
expression in space) and the power struggles that result. First, however, this 
chapter will argue that a spatial approach will provide new insights into these 
processes and give an overview of the concept of space in its relational sense. 
The chapter will continue by explaining the three key elements that will frame 
this research: UD, scale, and processes of de- and reterritorialisation.  
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Space as a relational concept – or the importance of being spatial  
The expansion of soybean needs to be understood as a spatial phenomenon, 
specifically in light of the changes witnessed in the past two decades. Since the 
mid-1990s, soybean production in South America has expanded rapidly, 
displacing other productive sectors and changing the landscapes of affected 
regions. The total area planted with soybean almost doubled in Argentina and 
Brazil between 2000 and 2014 and tripled in Paraguay in the same period, an 
expansion that is the result of both the replacement of other crops and the 
incorporation of new land into the agricultural frontier (FAOSTAT, 2017). This 
growth is not only reflected in production volumes, but it has been expressed 
by fundamental physical changes that have transformed the geography of the 
region, such as expanding deforestation, the construction of new roads, river 
dredging, and the opening of new ports. These physical modifications 
associated with the growth of the soybean industry have left an indelible 
imprint on the region’s landscape. Furthermore, various financial instruments 
and market infrastructures have been developed, creating extensive virtual 
connections between the Southern Cone and economic centres around the 
globe. These intangible innovations, associated with the globalisation of the 
soybean trade, have effectively shrunk the relative space separating Latin 
America from other world regions. All of this suggests that the soybean boom 
must be grasped as an inherently spatial phenomenon. 
Authors such as Turzi and Pearce (2011; 2012) have understood the 
expansion and hegemony of the soybean production complex in the Southern 
Cone as the emergence of a new, transnational geopolitical and economic 
entity: the ‘Soybean Republic’ or ‘Soylandia’. This reflects a vision of national 
borders in flux, to the point that the state seems to lose control of the social 
and economic activities occurring within its territory. These studies do, like 
much of IPE scholarship, recognise the existence of spatiality, either implicitly 
by highlighting the emergence of this transnational entity and discussing 
national strategies, or occasionally explicitly by making reference to a territory 
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with certain characteristics (cf. Macartney and Shields, 2011). These scholars 
therefore recognise that the processes and transformations related to the 
soybean boom entail a certain kind of geography (2011: 376). Yet, to quote 
Henri Lefebvre, the theorist often credited with inspiring the spatial turn in 
social sciences, a serious engagement with space itself remains ‘[c]onspicuous 
by its absence’ – the fact that the word ‘space’ is mentioned on every page 
notwithstanding’ (Lefebvre, 1991: 3). 
The recognition of geography by the aforementioned approaches does not 
develop into a deeper theoretical or philosophical awareness of space that 
appreciates this dimension as both resulting from and constituting social 
relations, as Bates and Smith have noted (2008). Space is conceived as an 
arena where things happen, where social, political and economic relations 
simply take place. Macartney and Shields (2011: 376) illustrate this constraint 
by indicating how globalisation studies still maintain a vision of an 
international order bounded by sovereignty and hence by a Westphalian 
understanding of the global system. That is to say, many IPE analyses still fall 
into the ‘territorial trap’ highlighted by Agnew, whereby the existing 
configuration of national state territory is assumed to be static and natural. 
The underpinning ontology is one where space – and nature – is understood 
as an objective entity, separated from human activity and hence from social 
relations. Such an understanding of space and society, human and nature, as 
disconnected from one another prevents us from analysing transformations of 
space and nature as inherently political and as symptomatic of the dynamics 
of the capitalist system. This refusal to understand space as social and political 
encourages scholars to explain geographical processes such as urban 
expansion or natural disasters like droughts in merely technical terms, which 
assume the independence from society of these events. As argued by Edward 
Soja, a prominent postmodern geographer and follower of Lefebvre: ‘A 
continuing aversion to any hint of a geographical determination of social life 
makes it difficult to see that spatiality is itself a social product that is not 
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independently imposed and that it is never either inert or immutable’ (Soja, 
1989: 127). In a time when geography and nature is changing so drastically, to 
maintain society and space as separated constrains our comprehension of 
many of the processes taking place.  
   In contrast, space, as understood by Soja should be conceived as both the 
result of and the condition in which social relations occur – it is ‘an 
embodiment and a medium of social life itself’ (1989: 120). Spatiality is 
inherently relational, as it is entrenched in social, economic, and political 
relations. For example, the reorganisation of space via urban planning in Rio 
de Janeiro’s favelas should not be simply conceptualised as a technical project 
aimed at improving residents’ life quality, but must rather be seen as a strategy 
inherently related to global mega-events like Brazil’s hosting of the World Cup 
and the Rio Summer Olympics. While urban policies in this city were framed 
in a narrative of ‘Post-Third-World-City’, claiming they would ensure 
integration and social benefits for local populations; this spatial project was 
embedded in neoliberal tactics for exclusion and repression, as for example 
investments in infrastructure and housing forced the relocation of local 
residents from strategic areas that had been selected for renewal (Richmond 
and Garmany, 2016). Geography and spatial configurations should not be 
regarded as isolated from other processes – there are no ‘spatial laws and 
spatial processes, spatial causes and spatial relationships’ on their own – but 
only as expressions of social laws, causes and relationships (Massey, 1984: 3). 
Space is constructed by social interactions.   
   As a central organising principle of modern life, capitalism is at the core of 
the social relations shaping space, and thereby creates a specific geography.  
Relations of production are ‘space-forming and space-contingent’ (Soja, 1989: 
126), and capitalism has developed a unique spatiality as it evolved: from the 
dismantling of the feudal countryside, to the urban explosion of the industrial 
revolution and the emergence of an international division of labour, to the 
development of technology poles like Silicon Valley and areas with distinct 
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rules such as Special Economic Zones (SEZs). Different spatialities have 
emerged, concomitant to the dynamics of capital accumulation, namely 
transformations in production, labour and capital mobility (Harvey, 1985: 
133). Different regimes of accumulation necessitate and cause new geographic 
configurations that reflect the often contradictory relations of production 
underpinning them.  
Capital accumulation, and the political regulation of this process, develops in 
particular ‘spatio-temporal matrices’ (Jessop, 2000: 327), leading to a 
particular spatial structuring of social life (Soja, 1989: 127). With each new 
wave of capital expansion, various patterns of spatial organisation arise that 
enable the creation and distribution of profit. As Neil Brenner explains:  
Each successive round of capitalist industrialization has therefore 
been premised upon socially produced geographical 
infrastructures that enable the accelerated circulation of capital 
through global space. In this sense, as Harvey notes, ‘spatial 
organisation is necessary to overcome space’ (Harvey, p. 145). 
(Brenner, 1999a: 43)  
Here the author is signalling how certain physical structures enable the 
overcoming of that same space, and of space in general, in order to accelerate 
and expand the reproduction of capital. For example, the growth of the 
construction industry and the physical emergence of immense property 
developments was necessary for the creation of a multi-billion dollar property 
market that collapsed in 2008. As such, infrastructure, both physical, like 
housing developments and urban infrastructure, and institutional, such as 
credit provision and specific financial markets, constitutes the structural basis 
necessary for the continuous expansion of capital accumulation.9  
                                                          
9 Chapter 4 will explore how transport infrastructure projects are the outcome of the need for 
fixity in the process of the expansion of the soybean production complex, assuring at the same 
time the globality of the soybean market, and the production of new spaces for the continuous 
exploitation of resources. Similarly, chapter 5 will explore how the same motivation lays 
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Generally, analyses of territorial organisation and spaces of capital 
accumulation have focused on waves of new industrial development and the 
role of urban spaces as facilitators of this process (Jessop, 2002; Harvey, 2008; 
Smith, 2002; Brenner, 1999b). However, this thesis focuses on agricultural 
production, and thus with the ostensibly rural sphere. Yet as will be elaborated 
in the following chapters, capitalist agriculture, and soybean production in 
particular, has little in common with traditional conceptions of peasant 
production and rural life, but has rather become part of industrial production, 
or, in the words of Lefebvre, is absorbed by the urban space (2014: 2). The 
urbanisation of the countryside, according to Lefebvre, is the result of 
transformations in agriculture production that have made it subordinate to 
industrialisation and urban life (Lefebvre, 2014).  
Nevertheless, there are certain specificities to agricultural activity which 
mean it cannot be easily assigned to the urban sphere. Firstly, agricultural 
production remains largely dependent on the physical expansion of the 
productive frontier for growth, despite yield increases through technological 
improvement – that is, producing more in less space. Extending the commodity 
frontier is a faster – and cheaper – means to increase production levels. 
Secondly, due to the low quantities of labour needed for this capital-intensive 
production, housing agglomerations do not often emerge near sites of 
agricultural production and thus there is less demand for urban infrastructure. 
Hence, the physical infrastructure demanded is not urban infrastructure, but 
rather transportation facilities for faster mobilisation of increasingly large 
volumes of grains and by-products.  
Previous empirical studies show the analytical capacity that space and other 
human and political geography concepts can offer in the study of political and 
                                                          
behind the development of financial instruments, but in this case, the ‘annihilation of space by 
time’ is assured not through the development of fixed structures, but rather by expanding 
capital’s mobility in the virtual space created for such end.  
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economic processes. Gavin Bridge et al. (2013) provide a new account of 
changes in energy policy by applying a breakdown of some fundamental 
spatial terms. The convergence of energy and geography approaches proposed 
by these authors reveal important issues for energy transition. For example, 
the strategies used by states and firms in developing energy systems at the 
national level as opposed to the EU regional level; or how there were 
simultaneous tendencies towards cross-border homogeneity, as regulatory 
standards converged; and heterogeneity, due to the development of 
differentiated low carbon energy innovations (2013).  Similarly, focusing more 
on the theory of UD elaborated by Neil Smith, Emily Eaton analyses the 
Agrarian Question – the debate over the role of agriculture in capitalism and 
whether peasants could become allies of the working classes or a reactionary 
force against it - through the lens of this framework. According to Eaton, UD 
gives an additional perspective that shows how both sides of the debate are 
correct, that is, agriculture is increasingly equalised with other productive 
sectors in capitalism, but at the same time creates a very differentiated 
geography based on both product differentiation and scales of production, 
between subsistence, family, and capitalist farming (Eaton, 2011: 248-249).   
This is not to suggest that any attention to space constitutes a single, 
essentially coherent framework. Spatial analyses have prompted at least two 
different approaches. On the one hand, authors like Bridge et al. (2013), Bates 
and Smith (2008) and Massey (1992) focus on the social relations that are 
involved in the different geographies produced. This means a focus, for 
example, on institutional and policy change, the creation of spaces for 
exchange, the sociological dimension of an urban development, and the 
geographical division of labour. On the other hand, a geographical approach 
can also illuminate the relationship between capitalism and nature, by treating 
anthropological and ecological worlds not as two separate entities which 
sometimes connect to one another, but as an integrated whole in which human 
and non-human life co-constitute and transform each other (Moore, 2017; 
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Eaton, 2011). From this perspective, environments are built according to the 
‘commodity frontier’, to the requirements for the capitalist production of 
assets (Moore, 2011a). This frontier has expanded capitalist space, advancing 
the way in which commodities are transformed from their raw stage, into 
cheap energy, labour, and food (Moore, 2000). Capitalism creates its own ‘way 
of organising nature’  and society – both nature and people ‘follow’ the 
commodity, meaning they move and re-organise spatially according to the 
needs of commodity production (Moore, 2011b). This latter approach implies 
a focus on processes of political ecology, impacts on nature and its 
transformation by capitalist processes. While not addressing the political-
economic impact of these transformations as it is the aim of this thesis, these 
approaches provide an insight into how capitalist spaces are formed and 
modified through the interaction of actors, nature, institutions and 
infrastructures at different scales of the capitalist system.  
From Fôrdlandia to Soylandia: uneven development and the seesaw 
movement of capital 
The Amazon jungle already swallowed the Winding Brook Golf 
Course. Floods ravaged the cemetery, leaving behind a stockpile of 
concrete crosses. The 100-bed hospital designed by the acclaimed 
Detroit architect Albert Kahn? Plunderers destroyed it (Romero, 
2017). 
This is the description of the abandoned town of Fôrdlandia in the Amazon 
Basin, founded in 1928 by Henry Ford. The automobile industrialist built this 
US refuge in the heart of the Amazon in the hope of raising Ford’s 
competitiveness by ensuring access to cheap rubber, a key component in car 
manufacturing. The city included American-style houses, modern hospitals, 
schools and even a water tower (Reed, 2016). The imperatives of capitalist 
production and the search for profits took Ford on this endeavour into the 
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middle of the Amazon rainforest, and it was these same imperatives that 
transformed this one-time US fantasyland into a landscape of ruins. 
Fôrdlandia, and other cases of rapid spatial development and consequent 
abandonment, are indecipherable to orthodox social science. John Weeks 
(2001) states that mainstream economists have tended to claim that under 
circumstances of free markets and the free circulation of goods, all economies 
would tend towards convergence. Yet these accounts fail to explain the 
emergence of acute geographical variation. Nations, regions, and towns 
develop unevenly: different nations and subnational regions experience 
varying rates of growth, while cities are home to both multi-billion dollar 
financial centres and deprived housing estates. According to Smith, traditional 
geographical theories have also dismissed the historical significance of these 
development patterns with the transhistorical claim that ‘everything develops 
unevenly’ (Smith, 2010: 3). Such approaches deny the manner in which 
modern transformations in spatiality – such as the emergence of geographical 
differentiation – are historically-specific to the evolution of capitalism. Both 
the peak of Fôrdlandia and its ruination should be understood not as isolated 
and incidental occurrences, but as equally inscribed in the cycles of capital 
accumulation.  
In Uneven Development (2010), Smith draws attention to the ‘dramatic 
restructuring of the geographical space’ (2010: 1) and to how these 
transformations are inseparable from changes in the geography of capitalism. 
By drawing on the tradition of human geography, Smith develops a framework 
for understanding patterns of geographical differentiation as expressions of 
the contradictory dynamics of capital (2010: 1). According to this approach, 
processes of gentrification, geographical divisions of labour between and 
within national states, the modification of landscapes, and other spatial 
differentiations, are not ‘given’ or the result of nature as an external and 
independent force, but rather the result of the internal contradictions of 
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capitalism. It is the system’s own dynamics that generate uneven spatial 
differentiation.  
Equalisation and differentiation 
For Smith, the unevenness of the geography of capital emerges from the 
contradiction between the tendencies toward equalisation and differentiation, 
opposing forces which emerge from the worldwide expansion of capitalist 
relations of production. These tendencies contradict each other in space, 
resulting in patterns of capitalist development that are distinctly ‘uneven’. As 
put by Nicos Poulantzas, these tendencies are inevitably interconnected: 
‘Separation and division in order to unify; parcelling out in order to 
encompass; segmentation in order to totalize; closure in order to homogenize; 
and individualization in order to obliterate differences and otherness’ 
(Poulantzas, 1980: 107). In the same way that fixity and mobility are tied 
together in the expansion of capitalist accumulation, the tendencies of 
equalisation and differentiation, though opposing, develop together.  
Equalisation derives from the way that both labour and nature become 
commodified and priced through wages and rents. This represents the 
consolidation of the domain of exchange value over use value, feeding into the 
long-term tendency towards the equalisation of nature and flows of people. 
This point derives from Marx’s own conceptualisation of use and exchange 
value: ‘As use values, commodities are, above all, of different qualities, but as 
exchange values they are merely different quantities’ (Marx 1976: 128). The 
global ‘race to the bottom’ with regard to wage rates as well as ‘land grabs’ for 
the acquisition of cheap farmland can both be seen in these terms. As 
capitalism develops, the thirst for exchange value draws previously un-
priceable things into circulation. Through the extension of the commodity 
form across different geographical expanses, goods, services and labour are 
rendered different quantities of the same homogenous social substance, what 
Marx refers to as abstract labour, and thus exchangeable via the imposition of 
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a monetary value. In spatial terms, such equalisation is realised through the 
evenness of development of productive forces, for example in the 
mechanisation of agriculture for the supply of primary resources for 
industrialisation (Smith, 2010: 153-155). This tendency towards equalisation 
is also apparent in aesthetic terms, such as the Dubaization of global cities to 
landscapes of ‘yellow Britain’ covered by rapeseed crops – both constituting 
responses to the movements of the general rate of profit (Yigitcanlar and Bulu, 
2015; Poulter, 2012).  
This spatial equalisation is connected to broader tendencies of economic 
homogenisation. Marx’s identification of the tendency towards the 
equalisation of profit rates across different sectors is grounded in a parallel 
tendency towards the equalisation of productivity rates – due to capital’s 
ability to move from one industry to another, firms are forced to introduce new 
technologies and innovative production processes so as to retain investment. 
In agriculture, this is expressed by the rise of ‘factory farming’ and bio-
engineering of plants and genetically modified crops. Production processes 
and the use values themselves – in this case, those provided by nature – are 
modified so as to fit consumption needs and shorten turnover time, with 
corresponding negative impacts on crop diversity (FAO, 2010). The industrial 
mode of production is extended to the rural, reaffirming Lefebvre’s 
understanding of the countryside as part of the urban space.   
However, as Smith points out, there is also a counter tendency to 
equalisation, namely, differentiation. While the logic of exchange value tends 
to create a qualitative equality amongst commodities, capitalist production 
must nevertheless be divided into different sectors - at global, regional, 
national, and subnational scales. Capitalist production requires specialisation, 
which translates into a division of labour throughout all levels of organisation. 
This produces a specific spatiality, whereby different geographies are forged 
that reflect the historical spatio-temporal matrices of capitalism, whether in 
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the form of imperialist geographies, core/periphery dynamics, or North/South 
divides (Harvey, 1985: 142).  
This tendency towards differentiation, expressed as the division of 
labour/capital into discrete sectors, and the subsequent centralisation in these 
spaces, creates a concentrated and highly developed built environment. This 
process is bolstered by the concentration and centralisation of capital. The 
concentration of capital develops as the profit motive pushes for increasing 
investment in, and accumulation of, means of production, in order to increase 
the magnitude of output (Smith 2010: 161). Centralisation occurs when 
individual capitals are combined, leading to the destruction of two previously 
existing capitals and the creation of a new larger one (Fine and Saad-Filho, 
2004: 86). The spatial correlate of this is the aggrupation of individual capitals 
from one sector in a limited area, contributing to the differentiation of the 
geographical space. There is a tendency, for example, for factories of garment 
clothes to be centralised in South Asia, and consequently, labour also tends to 
locate itself in proximity to these centres, moving from peripheral, rural areas, 
into urban settlements around the factories (Smith 2010: 166). The City of 
London is another relevant example of how vast volumes of global capital find 
an entry point in a centralised zone; one that constitutes the epicentre of much 
of the UK’s dynamism and unevenness (Green, 2014). In short, then, 
tendencies of concentration and centralisation of capital bolster the 
differentiation of space, by rapidly accelerating the development of isolated 
islands of production.  
Both differentiation and equalisation are inherent to capitalist accumulation 
and a product of abstract labour. While all production is equalised through the 
commodity form, concentration and centralisation of capital creates 
differentiated spaces and scales of production. These contradictory tendencies 
are consequently imprinted on space, creating landscapes of UD (Smith, 2010).  
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The seesaw movement of capital 
The patterns of UD created by the tendencies explained above are not static. 
As something that is socially constructed and relational, space is not stable, but 
is rather continually restructured as social relations – and relations of 
production – are transformed (Soja, 1989: 129). Fôrdlandia was a spatial 
configuration that seemed appropriate to the post-war economic model, and 
its subsequent decay and disappearance from the global production chain is a 
result of the emergence of new regimes of accumulation. However, the 
structures, roads, and ruins of Ford’s Amazonian project remain, leaving an 
imprint on the Brazilian forest of the once dominant mode of accumulation.  
These marks left behind by different historical geographies of capitalism 
correspond to what Smith calls the ‘seesaw movement of capital’ (Smith, 2010: 
196). Diverse spatio-temporal matrices emerge not only as new relations of 
production emerge, but also as capital moves from one area of the world to 
another in the search of higher profits. According to Marx, profitability in areas 
of concentrated development is eventually exhausted, sometimes just in that 
sector/region and sometimes on a global scale, causing capital to flee to other 
less-developed regions. Smith translates this dynamic in geographical terms: 
‘Capital attempts to seesaw from a developed to an underdeveloped area’ 
(Smith 2010: 198). This causes the violent devaluation of whole spaces - e.g. 
Detroit or Coventry after the divestment from their automobile industries, or 
the aforementioned Fôrdlandia - and the relocation of capital to new pastures. 
Cycles of booms and busts create sudden geographies of erosion, as capital 
rapidly concentrates and later swiftly flees a particular asset or sector, as is 
evidenced by the ‘modern ruins’ of the Spanish housing boom, with at least 
three million empty properties and tens of thousands still unfinished 
(Blanchar, 2015). In the words of David Harvey:  
Capitalism perpetually strives, therefore, to create a social and 
physical landscape in its own image and requisite to its own needs 
at a particular point in time, only just as certainly to undermine, 
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disrupt and even destroy that landscape at a later point in time 
(1985: 150).  
The coherent geographies or spatial fixes that capitalism needs for 
expanding its accumulation process are not stable or perpetual. When a crisis 
of profitability arises, that space is devalued as capitalism flees to a new area, 
and a new geography of capitalism emerges. 
The logic of the seesaw movement of capital described by Smith depends 
largely on the capacity of capital to move quickly from one place to another in 
pursuit of the highest profits, while being simultaneously reliant on the 
development of a built environment that supports production and circulation 
of capital in its commodity, money, and labour forms. For the creation of 
surplus value, capitalism requires not only labour power, but also machinery, 
storage, transportation, and other physical structures that enable the 
production, exchange, and consumption of commodities (Harvey, 2006: 233). 
These structures must be embedded in a landscape, and they cannot be easily 
transferred to other localities, but rather they are devalued when production 
moves to a different place or the activity they were built for is no longer 
profitable. Harvey describes this dual dynamic as capital’s need for both 
mobility and fixity (1985). In order to overcome space, in the form of the 
absolute distance between the sites of production, sale, and consumption, 
capital is paradoxically forced to fix itself in space, through the creation of 
physical infrastructures. In other words, mobility necessitates fixity. This 
dynamic results in the emergence of structurally coherent economic regions; 
spatial configurations in which production and trade take on a specific 
geographic pattern so as to maximise profitability. For example, the ‘Soybean 
Republic’ consists of a variety of fixed, physical spaces, including arable land, 
storage and transport infrastructure, industrial capacity and financial and 
regulatory institutions – all for the purpose of facilitating and accelerating the 
negation of the space that stands between the production and sale of this 
oilseed. 
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While the tendencies of equalisation and differentiation described in the 
previous section create patterns of uneven development, capital’s drive 
towards higher rates of profit and the inevitability of crises in that process, 
enhance the rapid devaluation of some areas and the development of others. 
The ‘seesaw movement of capital’ described by Smith accentuates the 
unevenness created by the mobility and fixity of capital and consequently the 
underdevelopment of those regions left behind. The next section explores the 
ways in which the state has been transformed by these dynamics and its 
capacity to manage uneven development.  
Uneven development and the state 
These more or less coherent spaces often coincide with territorial 
administrative structures, most notably the state. While benefitting from the 
profits accruing from these zones of production, the state is also forced to 
manage the contradictory forces of mobility and fixity, and the consequent 
‘geopolitical rivalries for influence or control over other territories’ (Harvey, 
2005: 83). However, it is important to point out that these economic regions 
need not correspond to national boundaries. In fact, the states’ structural 
coherence can also be transformed by the seesaw logic of capital, with the state 
assuming different spatialities that do not necessarily align with what is 
understood as the nation-state.  
Saskia Sassen analyses this phenomenon through a focus on land 
acquisitions by foreign buyers or leasers who have been driven by developed 
countries’ increasing demand for commodities (2013). This massive process 
of acquisition is producing, according to Sassen, a ‘partial disassembling of the 
national territory’, as these territories become de-linked from the formally 
established national state, by expelling people and rejecting the authority of 
state institutions (2013: 27). Processes or activities that are located within 
what is considered part of a nation’s formal sovereignty, is not necessarily part 
of the national sphere or subject to the authority of the national state. The 
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contradictions of equalisation and differentiation, and of the mobility and 
fixity of capital, emphasised by Smith, are expressed in what Sassen calls the 
‘juxtaposition of the national and the global’ (Sassen, 2000: 221) or the 
‘endogenizing of the global into the national’ (Sassen, 2013: 27). This is 
evidenced, for example, by the emergence of financial hubs, an activity that is 
deeply global and ‘virtual’, but still needs national spatial fixity. Similarly, 
extractivist industries like mining express the radicalism of these dynamics, as 
‘natural wealth excavated from the depth’ of the Global South is ‘piled up on 
the surface’ of large cities in the Global North (Bridge, 2009: 45).   
Furthermore, Sassen (2013) recognises that these tensions can be found in 
cross-border areas, such as the maquiladoras located in Export Processing 
Zones (EPZs) in Mexico. The fact that these are located within the borders of a 
national state, does not imply that we are looking at a national process, or that 
it is under national sovereignty (2013: 28). These areas facilitate the state’s 
global insertion at the same time as they create ‘massive structural holes in the 
tissue of national sovereign territory (2013: 16). While Sassen believes that 
we are looking at a ‘new economic geography of centrality, one that cuts across 
national borders and across the old North-South divide’ (Sassen, 2000: 225), 
Smith tells us that the seesaw movement of capital, and the cycles of 
accumulation and crisis, are inherent to the capitalist system, and hence the 
geography of capital and the geography of the nation-state are subject to 
constant transformation. 
Taken together, Smith’s and Sassen’s approaches offer a novel perspective 
on the nature of Soylandia and its relationship with the states of the Southern 
Cone. Underlying the theoretical concepts developed above is the assumption 
is that capitalism produces space.10 At the global scale, this implies that 
                                                          
10 Smith elaborates this argument on the fundamental link that Marx drew between space and 
use-value, and identifying its spatial properties, spatial relations, and geographical space. The 
first concept refers to the actual extension and shape, the physical properties of an object; 
while the spatial relations of a use-value is the usefulness of a commodity in relation to other 
objects, spaces and activities, and this is what lies ‘at the basis of our analysis of location’ 
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nothing is left untouched by the expansion of capitalist production. If all space 
is produced, then the idea of ‘natural economic territories’ does not hold: what 
are sometimes considered ‘natural regions’ are in fact spatial expressions of 
capital’s contradictions. By conceptualising the growth of the Soylandia as one 
half of capitalism's UD – agglomeration of investment in one place, dearth of 
investment in another (encapsulated by the case of Fôrdlandia) – we are 
forced to see the role of the Paraguayan, Brazilian and Argentinian states in a 
new light. Instead of constructing an autonomous cross-border growth model, 
as traditional regionalism emphasises, these states have instead been forced 
to attempt to manage the anarchically competitive process of capital 
accumulation within the soybean sector, without totally foregoing the political 
goals that they have promised their electorates. When focusing on how 
national states attempt to govern the process of UD, it is crucial to go beyond 
analyses of space in general and to examine the ‘production of scale’ (Smith, 
2010: 225). By unpacking this concept and the way in which scales are 
constructed and interact with one another, it is possible to understand the 
transformations of the nation-state and why the national is not the only level 
of political economic organisation. The next section explores the concept of 
scale and its role in the contemporary capitalist system.  
Unpacking the concept of scale 
As a key concept in geography, and particularly economic geography, scale is 
a tool for the conceptualisation of places and for building coherent relations 
between them (Sokol, 2011: 16). While it has usually been used descriptively 
to understand or express levels of organisation, scale began to be introduced 
as an analytical framework with the rise of globalisation studies, as the 
transformative effects of ‘rescaling’ began to be felt (Herod, 2011: 1). As an 
                                                          
(2010: 113-114). For example, the spatial properties of an industrial factory are given by its 
size, materials, etc., while its spatial relations are dependent on the place its situated; for 
example, if it is located in Birmingham, and used as a cultural space after being abandoned; or 
in an EPZ in South East Asia, where a multinational company locates its main garment 
production. Finally, the geographical space is the totality of spatial relations (2010: 114). 
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analytical tool that allows for the spatial conceptualisation of different types 
of social activity, the notion of scale entails a central organising principle. For 
example, scalar organisation in the military – brigade, battalion, company, etc. 
– is a function of security requirements. In the case of the global political 
economy, the principle of scalar organisation is inherently linked with the 
accumulation imperatives of capitalism (Smith, 2010).   
Scale is usually understood as a ‘container’ – the location where social 
activities occur and within which the production of space takes place (Brenner, 
1998a: 460). The urban, the national, and the global, appear as ‘ontologically 
given’ arenas. However, as Smith points out, there is nothing natural about 
these various scales – they have no prior existence outside of the historically 
specific social relations that give them meaning (Smith, 1992: 73). The author 
himself recognises that to only identify these three scales was limited, and that 
more attention should be paid to others, such as the household (Smith, 2011: 
261). In this sense, the understanding of space as socially produced forces us 
to conceptualise scale, ‘the most elemental differentiation of geographical 
space’, as established and produced precisely through social activity (Smith, 
1992: 73). The way in which we define an event is determined by the manner 
in which social, economic, and political life is organised. For example, a 
drought in the US may be considered a local issue with regards to its 
immediate impact on farmers, a national issue due to its effects on US 
agricultural exports, or a global issue because of its impact on international 
commodity prices. Scale, then, is an essentially social spatial differentiation, 
and is thus subject to transformation as social relations develop.  
In Uneven Development (2010), Smith identifies three scales at which 
uneven geographical development can take place: the urban, the global and the 
nation-state. Of these three scales in which the global political economy is 
organised, the national has historically been the predominant scale of activity. 
For Jessop, this primacy is linked to the need for relatively closed borders for 
mass-production and mass-consumption in the post-war reconstruction 
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period (2003: 180). According to Tilly (1992), however, the relevance of the 
nation-state as a central unit in the economy is associated with its own 
emergence as a political unit, as it is its capacity to accumulate and concentrate 
capital – as well as coercive capabilities – which makes it the central scale for 
social, political and economic organisation. Key to the consolidation of the 
national as the dominant scale of economic organisation was the necessity of 
the capitalist class to organise spatially the production and accumulation of 
capital and labour markets within national borders (Herod 2011: 17). As 
Harvey (1985) argued, the structured coherence of production and 
consumption is stronger and more clearly delineated when it coincides with 
the institutional infrastructure of the state.  
However, the consolidation of a globalised system challenges the hegemony 
of the nation-state, as we witness a proliferation of scales for the organisation 
of the economy. At the global level, it is the imperatives of capitalist production 
that orchestrates the geographical distribution of economic activity. In this 
context, the emergence of new scales is an indicator of a larger process of 
rescaling within the global political economy, whereby new spaces and 
temporalities for the organisation of capital accumulation emerge and 
challenge the primacy of those already established. This has been framed in 
different terms by various authors, from the ‘politics of scale’ (Brenner, 2001), 
to the ‘production of scale’ (Smith, 2010), and the ‘relativisation of scale’ 
(Jessop, 2003). Despite their differences, all of these approaches advance the 
notion of a competitive struggle between existing and emerging scales over 
which will become the ‘new anchor point around which other scales can be 
organized’ (Jessop 2003: 181). The proliferation of new scales reflects an 
attempt to restructure the spatial roots of politico-economic, as well as social 
and cultural, processes. Such rescaling has taken place in the spheres of both 
capital and labour: from the multinationalisation of corporations, to the global 
expansion of labour movements, such as the Global Union Federation (GUF) or 
the anti-sweatshop campaigns (Herod, 2011: 22).  
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However, it is important not to understate the role of the national scale in 
global capitalism and to see processes of re-scaling as evidence of the 
disappearance of the nation-state. Rather, it is crucial to focus on the 
transformation of the nation-state’s role in the spatial organisation of 
economic activity. The creation of cross-border areas like the SIJORI Growth 
Triangle in Southeast Asia or the formation of common markets like the EU 
illustrate the ways in which the state acts as an engine for re-scaling efforts. As 
Brenner states: ‘the territorial state is itself a multiscalar form of capitalist 
territorial organisation that encompasses national, subnational, and 
supranational scales’ (Brenner, 1998a: 468). In this sense, the state facilitates 
the organisation of capitalism at different scales, the national being one 
amongst many. While the relevance of the national as a dominant scale might 
have diminished, the role of the state, particularly in the mediation of 
processes of UD, has not disappeared.   
The expansion of the soybean production complex in South America has seen 
the emergence of different scales of accumulation, distribution, organisation, 
and conflict. In each of this thesis’ empirical chapters there is a multi-scalar 
dimension, as well as processes of rescaling. Cross-border transactions often 
escape the control of national governments, and the ownership of capital is not 
determined by national borders, as illustrated by statements of many officials 
and producers in Brazil: ‘soy planted in Paraguay is Brazilian’ (interview 
APROSOJA, 2014). Similarly, transport infrastructure projects are determined 
by the demands of the global market, rather than the principles of the national 
economy or the needs of local populations. A great proportion of newly built 
roads in the Southern Cone are designed for commodity transport, with the 
movement of national citizens considered incidental.  
The configuration of scales that emerges from the dynamics of capital 
accumulation, then, is a ‘historically specific, multi-tiered territorial-
organization’ (Brenner 1998a: 464). Furthermore, a particular set of 
interrelated scales is linked to the specific accumulation regime associated 
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with soybean in the Southern Cone. Brenner highlights the scalar dimension of 
these spatial forms, or what he calls a ‘scalar fix’ (1998a), building on Harvey’s 
conceptualisation of ‘spatial fix’, which denotes the tendency of capital to 
search for different coherent and stable geographical configurations in the 
aftermath of overaccumulation crises. The continued reproduction of capital 
after a crisis is achieved through the emergence of a new bundle of 
hierarchically organised boundaries, or ‘scalar fixes’, which can facilitate 
renewed capital accumulation (1998a: 464). While Harvey’s concept of spatial 
fix presupposes the relocation of economic activity, Brenner adds that this 
relocation also implies a different hierarchy of scales, as for example the 
national scale might lose relevance in favour of supranational or global 
arrangements, or the urban scale might appear as the main locus of 
accumulation. 
   To summarise this section, scale is neither a natural nor static unit of space. 
Scale is inherently social, fundamentally shaped by the dynamics of uneven 
capitalist development, and subject to transformation – rescaling – as the 
imperatives of capital accumulation change. The new constellation of scalar 
arrangements that emerge following economic crises should be understood as 
scalar fixes, which allow capital accumulation to continue in a spatially 
reconfigured manner. It is against this background of scalar transformation in 
the organisation of capitalist social relations that we can understand the 
processes of de- and reterritorialisation, which will be discussed next.  
State space and processes of de- and reterritorialisation 
The existence of a multiplicity of scales, interconnected and interdependent, 
is the spatial expression of social relations at a certain moment of capitalist 
development. The creation, transformation, and destruction of different scales, 
and the consolidation of different ‘scalar fixes’, is the result of the waves of 
growth, crises of overaccumulation, and consequent new expansion that 
characterise the capitalist mode of production. It is through these cycles of 
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expansion, destruction and reconfiguration that new scalar fixes are produced 
and new patterns of UD emerge. As explained earlier, UD is the result of the 
contradictory tendencies of equalisation and differentiation. These tendencies 
are expressed spatially through the contradiction between fixity and mobility, 
that is, between the simultaneous need of capital to both quickly migrate to 
different spaces and to develop physical infrastructures that enable what Marx 
called the ‘annihilation of space by time’ (Marx, 1973: 539). This opposing but 
indivisible need for agility and rapidity in capital’s turnover time and for 
immobile structures to assure this process, is captured by the processes of 
deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation (Brenner, 1998a: 462).11   
Traditionally, territoriality has been associated with the nation-state, as the 
container of social, political and economic relations within a set of clearly 
defined borders (Brenner et al., 2003: 2). Moving beyond state-centric 
ontologies, territorialisation implies establishing mechanisms for the 
organisation of social relations over a certain space, or different ‘geographical 
strategies of partition and integration employed by economic and political 
actors (states, firms) in the exercise of authority and/or commercial power’ 
(Bridge et al., 2013: 336). This is exemplified by spaces such as the EU, the 
‘company town’ or the shopping mall, territories with distinct and 
differentiated norms and governance regimes. The ‘taken-for-grantedness’ of 
state territoriality can be traced back to the establishment of the Westphalian 
state-system and the coupling of sovereignty and territoriality as the basis of 
modern nation-state legitimacy (Brenner et al., 2003: 2). However, as 
explained in the previous section, the advent of globalisation and the challenge 
of other scales for the primacy of political and economic organisation have put 
                                                          
11 The concepts of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation were first introduced by Deleuze 
and Guattari in their work Anti-Oedipus as part of their schizoanalysis approach. Initially 
designated to describe the process ‘to free desire from established organs and objects’ 
(Holland, 1999: 19), the authors also link this concept to issues of capitalism such as the 
separation or detachment of the labour force from the means of production (i.e. land) and their 
re-attachment or reterritorialisation into new means of production (1999: 19-20). Both 
processes were tied together, with the state having the capacity to simultaneously 
deterritorialise and reterritorialise (Buchanan, 2008: 107). 
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into question this seemingly unbreakable link between state space and a 
coherent, well-defined territoriality.  
Analysing the prolific literature on globalisation, Brenner identifies two main 
approaches to the methodological challenge of state territoriality. Firstly, 
authors such as Immanuel Wallerstein have applied the same state-centric 
conceptualisation to the global scale, thus developing a focus on ‘global 
territorialism’ (Brenner 1999a: 53). Wallerstein’s world systems theory – 
much like structuralism and dependency theories in Latin America – considers 
the world to be divided between countries of the centre and periphery, that is, 
the differential levels of development were explained by the asymmetrical 
relationship between advanced and developing nation-states as a fundamental 
feature of the structure of the capitalist system. This approach falls into the 
territorial trap by fetishising the national territory, and thus failing to analyse 
how patterns of unevenness and differentiation exist both at the subnational 
and regional level. Secondly, Brenner argues that several accounts – such as 
O’Brien (1992) and Scholte (2000) – have focused on processes of 
deterritorialisation, that is, the increasingly mobile and immaterial nature of 
social, economic and political relations, pointing to the disintegration of the 
nation-state and the consolidation of other scales, either sub- or supra-
national, as a reflection of the rise of transnational capital. This approach 
hence considers processes of deterritorialisation to be diametrically opposed 
to and mutually exclusive with dynamics of territorial fixity (Brenner, 1999a: 
60).  
However, Brenner identifies three shortcomings of this approach. First, it 
conceptualises territoriality as an absolute reality – it is either exists or it does 
not – excluding the possibility of exploring the ways in which territory is 
eroded or transformed. Second, scales are conceived as part of a zero-sum 
game instead of engaged in inter-related and interdependent dynamics. And 
third, it assumes a complete separation between processes of 
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deterritorialisation and spatial fixity (1999a: 62). Overall, Brenner claims, 
these limitations fail to understand that:  
Processes of deterritorialisation are not delinked from 
territoriality, for their very existence presupposes the production 
of fixed socioterritorial infrastructures within, upon, and through 
which global flows can circulate (1999a: 62).  
   Deterritorialisation should be understood as the uprooting of social 
activities from a particular set of territorial boundaries and their consequent 
reconfiguration at a supraterritorial scale; while reterritorialisation denotes 
the re-rooting of such activities within certain territories. Together, these 
processes express the moments of motion and fixity of capital – the dual 
quality of economic activity. While processes of de- and reterritorialisation are 
opposed to one another, they are also inextricably linked in the cycle of capital 
accumulation. The scalar structure of accumulation regimes is ‘moulded’ by 
the contradiction between fixity and motion (Brenner, 1998a: 461), and it is 
this same contradiction that constitutes the basis for the geographical 
differentiation created by the ‘seesaw movement of capital’ (Smith, 2010). The 
opposing forces of equalisation and differentiation, fixity and motion, and de- 
and reterritorialisation are the underpinning forces of the ‘construction, 
deconstruction and reconstruction of geographical landscapes’ (Brenner, 
1998a: 462) in capitalism, which assume an inherently uneven shape. 
   It is crucial to conceptualise de- and reterritorialisation, not as purely 
structural forces, but as strategies wielded by a variety of actors (from states 
and other political authorities to private capitals) to influence the geographical 
organisation of social, political and economic relations. This allows us to focus 
on ‘the interaction of political power and bounded space’ (Bridge et al. 2013: 
336). For example, Bridge et al. (2013) demonstrates how the UK’s energy 
system was being reterritorialised in light of the EU’s efforts to construct a 
European energy strategy, at the same time as the role of urban and local 
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initiatives were being revalued in the use and management of these resources 
(2013: 336). Similarly, the emergence of transnational and non-governmental 
initiatives for the governance of soybean production, such as the Roundtable 
on Responsible Soy,12 or the development of networks of private actors for the 
exchange of technologies and discussion of trade strategies, such as Mercosoja, 
enable the organisation of economic and political power at a different scale. 
Yet, nation-states, while losing their hegemony as the primary scale of 
capitalist production, remain essential components of globalisation (Brenner 
1999a: 44), and this is especially reflected in their role as agents of 
territorialisation in the reconfiguration of processes of capital accumulation. 
Through deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation, the state can become an 
organiser of not only the national scale, but also the global or the local. The 
policies it decides to enact, through fiscal policies or currency manipulation, 
can be seen as mechanisms through which it acts as a mediator, or agent, in 
the processes of rescaling (Brenner, 1998a: 467). 
This is illustrated, for example, by the state’s involvement in developing large 
physical infrastructure projects, such as the construction of the highroad BR-
163 in Brazil connecting soybean production areas with new international 
ports, which will be further developed in Chapter 4. While remaining careful 
not to fall into the ‘territorial trap’ of understanding the nation-state as the 
only locus of economic, political and social organisation processes – but also 
without discarding the state’s role within the global process of capital 
accumulation – it is crucial that we understand the state as an institutional 
infrastructure for the organisation of capital accumulation across different 
scales, and as a crucial proponent of reterritorialisation. These alternative 
scales, such as the urban, benefit from efforts by the nation-state to 
                                                          
12 The Roundtable on Responsible Soy (RTRS) is a global initiative that gathers civil society 
organisations and members of the soy value chain in order to  encourage the production of soy 
in a responsible manner, reducing the social and environmental impacts of this activity. The 
RTRS has developed a standard for Responsible Soy Production worldwide that seeks to 
promote ‘soy production that is socially equitable, economically feasible and environmentally 
sound’ (Responsible Soy, 2017). 
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accommodate regulatory frameworks that would consolidate the city as the 
main locus of, for example, financial activity.  
According to Lefebvre, it is the state which imposes a spatiality upon the 
chaos of economic, social and political life. Through the coordination of flows 
and stocks – in other words, mobile and fixed capital; dynamics of de- and 
reterritorialisation – the state is capable of spatially coordinating the economy 
(Lefebvre, 2003: 85). Lefebvre argues that the state constitutes a fixed 
institutional framework ‘upon which each round of capital circulation is 
grounded’ (Brenner, 1998a: 469), and hence, the state is a key actor in the 
geographical reconfiguration and rescaling of the capitalist mode of 
production.  
Not only is the state active in exercising territorialisation strategies for the 
cycle of capital, but it is also ‘an institutional mediator of uneven geographical 
development on different spatial scales’ (Brenner, 1998a: 462). The 
development of the state as an immobile infrastructure and its capacity for 
developing territorialisation strategies to organise scalar reconfigurations is 
essential for its capacity to regulate the flows and stocks that are circulating at 
different scales. Through these mechanisms, the state attempts to legitimate 
patterns of uneven geographical development that emerge from regimes of 
accumulation. As I will explore in the second section of this thesis, the 
governments of Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil have each utilised fiscal and 
monetary policy so as to affect the allocation of wealth created by the soybean 
sector across different scales; by, for example, promoting competition at the 
subnational level, or centralising resources and determining distribution at 
the national scale. The state’s role in the intermediation of uneven 
geographical development does not necessarily imply that it is able, or willing, 
to actually tame these differences or eliminate then, but it can alter or even 
deepen them, as well as attempt to marshal them for its own political purposes 
or those of the political party in government.  
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Lefebvre argued that the participation of the state in regulating capitalist 
organisation heralded the advent of a ‘state mode of production’ (SMP) – an 
institutional framework which simultaneously assures nationally grounded 
‘specific patterns of capitalist industrialisation’ (Brenner, 1999a: 45), and the 
regulation of the resulting UD. In this sense, the state constitutes a fixed 
structure upon which capital can build new forms of territorial organisation 
(Brenner 1998a: 469). On the one hand, the state is engaged in the production 
of space for the unfolding of relations of production, productive forces, and the 
production, realisation and allocation of surplus value (Lefevbre, 2003: 93). 
This essentially means that it sets the rules for territorialisation and the 
realisation of the capitalist mode of production. In the context of agricultural 
production, this involves, for example, determining limitations of 
deforestation activity, or modifying levels of taxation that could 
(dis)incentivise the expansion of soybean production. On the other hand, it is 
by being involved in the establishment of a historically specific spatial 
configuration for capitalist accumulation that the state is capable of controlling 
and regulating – to a certain extent -  the flows and stocks of capital and hence 
the forms of UD that are created in the process. If territorialisation can be 
deployed as a strategy for the territorial organisation of political power by 
different agents, the state is described by Lefebvre as a key actor in these 
processes.  
Lefebvre’s conceptualisation of the SMP does not imply a reaffirmation of the 
state territoriality as unchallenged and dominant, but rather helps us identify 
it as an agent in the creation and management of processes of rescaling and 
the reconfiguration of new scalar fixes. States attempt to govern the uneven 
spatial dynamics that are created through capital accumulation. Even as 
globalisation challenges the territorial sovereignty and relevance of the 
nation-state, it remains the most developed and longstanding institutional 
infrastructure for the organisation of political power. The existence of durable 
institutions upon which political power is territorialised is ‘an essential 
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precondition for the state’s ability to regulate flows’ (Brenner 1998a: 469). In 
other words, through redistribution and the creation of new scalar 
configurations, state institutions look to legitimate the geographies that 
emerge from the seesaw movement of capital. De- and reterritorialisation, 
then, are strategies wielded by nation-states to impose a kind of spatial and 
scalar order onto the uneven dynamics of capitalist development.  
Methodology and research strategy  
As outlined in the Introduction, this research has put forward a qualitative 
analysis that combines a case study examination of the soybean complex in 
South America with a comparative approach that focuses on the strategies 
developed by the state in Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay to govern the 
dynamics of uneven development emerging from the expansion of the soybean 
complex. The analysis is built upon data acquired through over 50 elite 
interviews in Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay; secondary sources, 
including policy and technical reports; and descriptive statistics, along with 
newspaper articles to contribute to the corroboration process.  
I conducted 54 interviews in Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay 
during my time in these countries between July and December 2014. The 
research strategy aimed to select interviewees from three main groups. The 
first group consisted of former and current civil servants and cabinet members 
from different Ministries in charge of policies linked to the agricultural sector, 
namely the Ministries of Economy, and Agriculture and Livestock. These actors 
provided information on the relevant policies developed regarding the 
agricultural sector, their understandings of the expansion of soybean 
production, and the role of the state in promoting or regulating this 
phenomenon. The second was made up of members of unions or associations 
of agricultural production and employees or officials from agribusiness 
companies, both domestic and transnational. This group offered perspectives 
from the private sector – from medium and small-scale farmers to large 
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trading companies – and unique knowledge of the mechanisms that enabled 
the enlargement of the soybean chain, as well as the relevant market dynamics. 
The third group consisted of specialists, academics, and members of think 
tanks and international organisations. These interviewees provided different 
analyses of the soybean complex and highlighted broader and longer-term 
trends regarding this sector. 
To engage with representatives from these three groups, I first identified 
relevant actors from each group in all three countries, and then proceeded to 
select interviewees based on a three-part strategy. Firstly, I drew from my 
existing contacts in Argentina, where I had worked for a International 
Relations think tank, which was part of an initiative linking private entities 
dedicated to agribusiness in Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay (GPS – 
the Southern Producing Country Group). Second, I directly contacted 
government agencies, government departments, and agribusiness 
associations that I had identified as relevant. This strategy was especially 
successful in Brazil, where many officials from the different government 
ministries responded positively to my calls and emails. Thirdly, I attended 
several conferences and seminars on issues of trade and agriculture where I 
engaged with participants and presenters who fell under the three categories 
mentioned above.  After the initial contacts were made through these three 
avenues, the sample of interviewees was expanded based on a process of 
snowballing. Through this strategy, I was able to interview a broad range of 
actors, including former Ministers of Agriculture and Environment, former 
Secretaries of Trade and Agriculture, former members of government directly 
involved in the design of certain controversial policies, as well as authorities 
from producers’ associations, agribusiness enterprises, and leading analysts 
from both trading companies and research institutions.  
The interviews would start with an open-ended question on the conditions 
and dynamics that facilitated the expansion of the soybean complex. This 
allowed the interviewee to develop a narrative on what they considered the 
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main elements in the consolidation of the complex and its main challenges, out 
of which I was able to identify how questions of tax, exchange rate, 
infrastructure and financialisation were key in defining the soybean sector as 
both a transnational phenomenon and a concern of the national state. The 
interviews were semi-structured, as the aim was to let the interviewees speak 
extensively and freely. While the first interviews were more exploratory, the 
interview questions would be modified progressively to access more detail of 
the processes described. This was particularly important to identify the 
commonalities and specificities of each country studied.  
The information accessed through these interviews was triangulated with 
other sources in order to corroborate the claims that underpin the analysis of 
this research. First, the information was compared with the accounts provided 
by interviewees from different groups. That is, between government officials, 
members of private companies and institutions, and analysts, to check the 
differences or similarities in their description of relevant processes. Second, 
when relevant, the data provided by interviewees was checked against official 
statistics, both from national agencies as well as from international 
organisations, as detailed in the Introduction (see p. 22). These descriptive 
statistics on production, crop area, trade, fiscal revenues, and exchange rate 
fluctuations were used to support and extend the analysis of the dynamics 
identified by interviewees. Third, reports and analyses from global and 
national research institutions, international organisations, and local and 
international NGOs, as well as academic studies, were incorporated to 
triangulate the data emerging from interviews and complement the analysis 
on issues that were not sufficiently explored in the interviews. Fourth, 
examples that reflected struggle in the distribution of wealth, or the social and 
environmental effects of soybean expansion, that were highlighted in 
interviews but that were not possible to identify from statistics or existing 
reports, were triangulated with newspaper articles that either supported the 
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claims made in the interviews or reflected similar dynamics to those described 
by interviewees.     
Conclusion 
This chapter proposed a theoretical framework that will underpin the 
empirical analysis of the governance of industrial agriculture in South 
America, particularly looking at the expansion and regulation of soybean 
production in the countries of the La Plata River Basin: Argentina, Paraguay, 
and Brazil. The aim was to introduce a spatial approach from a critical IPE 
perspective to understand and analyse the processes of transformation in the 
aforementioned national economies and the different ways in which the 
corresponding states have attempted to govern such developments. To do so, 
the idea of space as a relational concept was introduced, and its usefulness in 
understanding processes of political and economic change was elaborated. By 
overcoming the idea of space as a simple container where political, economic, 
and social activities take place, it is possible to view changes in landscapes and 
patterns of spatial differentiation as historically determined expressions of 
social relations – and more specifically, capitalist social relations. Within this 
broader resignification of space and its role in the operation of the capitalist 
system, there are three closely interrelated concepts that can further explain 
the processes taking place in South America: UD, (re)scaling, and 
(de/re)territorialisation.  
UD, when analysed at any given moment in time, can be understood as a 
frozen image of the contradictory tendencies of the capitalist system. Yet at the 
same time, UD is a dynamic phenomenon that is transformed as capital moves 
from one place to the other, and develops regimes of accumulation that end in 
crises of overaccumulation, hence creating new patterns of UD. These forms of 
UD do not occur at a single level, but at several scales at the same time. 
Incorporating the concept of scale allows us to identify the process through 
which a multiplicity of scales, understood as levels of economic and political 
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organisation, such as the local, the regional, and the global, emerge as spaces 
of struggle coexistent and interrelated to one another.  
The historically specific ‘scalar fix’ associated with a particular regime of 
accumulation is the consequence of the contradiction between fixity and 
motion. This tension emerges from capital’s need to move quickly from one 
place to the other as a response to crises of overaccumulation, and at the same 
time its dependence on fixed structures that can enable this mobility – the 
‘annihilation of space by time’. Territorialisation denotes the strategies 
through which public and private authorities determine this fixity, by 
organising political, social, and economic processes in a particular spatial and 
geographic configuration. Through deterritoralisation and reterritorialisation, 
the mobility and fixity of capital is realised – strategies that target a variety of 
different scales. While the state is not the only actor to wield such strategies, it 
remains a crucial force behind these processes.  
Guided by this theoretical framework, the structure of this thesis intends to 
follow the geographical (re)configuration of the soybean productive complex 
in South America and the strategies of de- and reterritorialisation that have 
been pursued by the states involved. The next part of the thesis (Chapters 4 
and 5) will focus on the contradiction between fixity and mobility and the 
spatial reconfiguration of dynamics in the region. Chapter 4 will focus on 
physical infrastructure for the transport of commodities, representing 
processes of reterritorialisation; while Chapter 5 addresses the most evident 
form of deterritorialisation, namely, the creation and expansion of financial 
markets as sources of capital accumulation. The latter part of this thesis 
(Chapters 6 and 7) will focus on the state as an agent of territorialisation of 
capital accumulation and as a mediator of forms of UD. To do so, Chapters 6 
and 7 will explore how policies of taxation and macroeconomic management 
are designed and applied in each country, and the impact they have on the 
scalar and geographical allocation of profits and hence on patterns of UD. 
These states’ interventions, however, were not always for the purpose of 
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ameliorating these contradictory dynamics, but rather can also foster 
unevenness and deterritorialisation.   
   
4. Physical infrastructure and accumulation: the politics 
of fixed capital 
 
Introduction 
In 1914, the Panama Canal was opened: an incredible work of engineering 
that connected two oceans and unlocked immense opportunities for world 
trade. As McCullough argues (1978: 11), this was not just a large-scale 
technical endeavour, but also a ‘profound and historic event and a sweeping 
human drama’ that ‘affected the lives of tens of thousands of people at every 
level of society and of virtually every race and nationality’. A century later, the 
canal has undergone the largest expansion since its inauguration, with 
increased capacity and more efficient logistics for maritime transport (Canal 
de Panama, 2017).  
   The impacts of this innovation on the soybean industry have been 
succinctly summarised by the US’ United Soybean Board: ‘Panama Canal – 
more exports, more profits’ (United Soybean Board, 2014). As in many 
primary commodity export industries, profits in the soybean sector are chiefly 
made by trading in large volumes. An expanded Panama Canal means that 
larger and more frequent shipments can cross the bi-oceanic channel in the 
direction of both the Asian and European markets. The importance of this 
project brings to light the significance of the development of transportation 
infrastructure in this sector. The agglomeration of investment in the Southern 
Cone – one half of the seesaw movement of UD – is only possible through the 
integration of social scales, in this case, local and regional farming is 
transformed into national export performance and finally realised upon the 
global market. Paradoxically, such scalar integration, expressed as the mobility 
of commodities and capital flows, is entirely dependent on the creation of fixed 
infrastructures in specific territories. This chapter will explore the strategies 
through which state and private sector actors have attempted to maximise the 
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profits of the soybean complex by creating fixed structures to facilitate 
mobility; strategies of reterritorialisation for the purpose of 
deterritorialisation.   
   This chapter engages with this particular aspect of the spatio-temporal 
matrix of commodity production; that is, the construction of transport 
infrastructure as a key element in the process of capital accumulation 
associated with the soybean industry. Roads, ports, machinery, and bridges 
usually go unnoticed in political economy analyses, as the existence of these 
structures is generally taken for granted and assumed as given. The purpose 
of this chapter is to demonstrate two important points: firstly, the centrality of 
these fixed structures in the production of wealth, as a necessary condition – 
along with capital mobility – for the creation of profit; and secondly, that this 
need for fixity, for economic activity to be grounded in particular territories, 
in turn creates new spaces, gives rise to processes of rescaling, and contributes 
to the seesaw movement of capital and thus the emergence of patterns of UD.   
This chapter demonstrates that transportation infrastructure plays a very 
significant role in the spatio-temporal matrix of soybean; namely, to realise the 
‘annihilation of space by time’. In doing so, these projects materialise the 
simultaneous and contradictory moments of reterritorialisation, as they 
constitute built structures grounded in territory, and deterritorialisation, as 
their main purpose is to extract the commodity from its production location 
and exchange it on the global market. Moreover, in the cases explored in this 
chapter, the state plays a pivotal role in enabling the expansion of this modality 
of capital accumulation. The strategies undertaken to achieve this range from 
deregulation and the facilitation of private management (Argentina), to the 
direct state funding of infrastructure development (Brazil). These policies 
created conditions for the concentration and centralisation of capital, either in 
a logistics hub, or by motivating the purchase of large extensions of land for 
soy farming, deepening geographies of uneven development.  
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   Mapping the full extent of the infrastructure involved in the functioning of 
this commodity’s production process would be impossible within the confines 
of this thesis, which is why this chapter focuses on three cases that are most 
relevant for the soybean complex and that also reflect the different dynamics 
associated with these spaces. First, the chapter will explore the development 
of a logistics commodity hub in Argentina located on the margins of the Paraná 
River: Gran Rosario. This 80km area boasts some of the largest grain 
processing and handling facilities in the world, and is responsible for exporting 
80% of Argentina’s soybean produce. Second, the chapter considers the 
development of a highway connecting the South, Centre-West, and North 
regions of Brazil. The BR-163, initially planned during the 1970s, has been 
revamped as a response to soybean producers’ demands for better access to 
ports. Third, the chapter will discuss the recent development of a barge fleet 
in Paraguay and the role of the Paraguay-Paraná waterway in the 
transportation of export commodities. The chapter concludes by highlighting 
the different mechanisms through which these spaces are created in response 
to the expansion of the soybean complex, while at the same time creating 
uneven social, economic, and environmental dynamics.  
A multi-functional commodity hub: the Gran Rosario Complex, Argentina   
As a global system, capitalism requires the transport of commodities from 
their points of production towards their destination markets. This section 
analyses the role of logistics hubs, which are zones of high capital 
concentration and centralisation that act as gateways to global markets and 
are thus essential in the consolidation and smooth functioning of an export-
oriented economy.  
Commodity chains are embedded in specific social and institutional contexts. 
The latter are not only transformed by the presence of such economic 
activities, but also have transformative effects upon them, thus giving rise to a 
co-constitutive process (Henderson et al., 2002: 445-446). This 
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embeddedness is territorial as well as institutional. Firms locate themselves in 
areas with natural or institutional endowments for the strategic purpose of 
profit maximisation. Consequently, these capitals become spatially ‘locked-in’ 
and attract other firms, creating new nodes in the global production network 
(2002: 452). This process of spatial gathering allows the formation of clusters, 
which can be organised vertically by bringing together different stages of the 
production chain, or horizontally by connecting different firms located at the 
same stage of the production process. In particular, the Gran Rosario complex 
constitutes an essential node in the agribusiness sector, and specifically the 
soybean commodity chain. This constitutes a significant point for connecting 
farmers, suppliers, and storage facilities; incorporating processing plants that 
advance the industrialisation of agricultural products, and linking the 
commodity chain with external markets.  
The Rosario-San Lorenzo-San Martín complex, also known as the Gran 
Rosario area, is a collective of grain handling facilities and ocean vessel loading 
berths that extends for 80km on the shore of the Paraná River in the Province 
of Santa Fe, Argentina. The complex is located at the heart of the Rio de la Plata 
Basin, the most extensive fluvial way in Latin America.13 Its geographical 
locality gives the area of Gran Rosario a unique position for connecting the 
national, regional, and global economy. As Figure 4.1 shows, the ports of 
Rosario, San Lorenzo and San Martín are part of a larger network of naval 
infrastructures connected to the port of Buenos Aires and Nueva Palmira in 
Uruguay, which access the Atlantic Ocean via the La Plata River. While this 
might not be an image easily associated with analyses of commodity booms, it 
expresses the dimensions of the processes involved in the materialisation of 
these cycles.   
                                                          
13 The basin covers around 3,200,000 square kilometres, the equivalent to a third of the 
European continent. It is comprised of the basins of the rivers Paraná, Paraguay, Uruguay and 
La Plata crosses the territories of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. 
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 The Gran Rosario area gathers a number of actors and activities, forming a 
multi-functional cluster. There are three main activities that are developed in 
this complex, and their geographical concentration makes this area a key nodal 
structure in the global production chain. These functions are: agro-industrial 
cluster; logistical hub; and financial and commercial centre. The first point 
refers to the concentration of grain crushing plants, as 80% of the installed 
oilseed crushing capacity of the country is located there (J.J. Hinrichsen, 2014). 
This is especially relevant in a country where exports of soybean cake and oil 
represent almost 34% of its overall agricultural exports (IICA, 2016), making 
it the world’s number one exporter of soybean oil and oil-cake (UN Statistics 
Division, 2016). Besides its industrial capacity, the city of Rosario, located 
close to the Gran Rosario area, gathers a number of institutions that are part 
of the soybean complex, one of the most important being the Bolsa de 
Comercio de Rosario (Rosario Board of Trade), an institution founded in 1884 
to provide transparency for grain exchange in Argentina. The institution has 
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fostered a physical grain market, as well as a futures and securities market, 
hence becoming a pole for the exchange of financial assets linked to 
agricultural production (see Chapter 5).  
However, the aspect of this commodity complex of most importance for the 
purpose of this chapter is that of the logistical hub. The area of Gran Rosario is 
the main point of dispatch for agricultural produce destined for export 
markets. Most soybean production is found only 400km from this industrial 
Figure 4.1 Main Ports and Terminals, Argentina 
 
Source: J.J. Hinrichsen, 2014 
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and port complex, and this combination of proximity and development of 
infrastructure makes it one of the most efficient logistics hubs in the world. 
There is an average of 10 thousand trucks per day entering the complex during 
harvest time (interview CIARA, 2014), each carrying around 30 tonnes of 
soybean and other grains. This would be enough to meet the entire annual UK 
demand in a matter of days. Throughout the Gran Rosario complex there are 
over twenty loading berths through which most of the agricultural production 
destined for foreign markets is dispatched. As previously mentioned, data 
from 2012 shows that almost 80% of Argentina’s grain and by-products 
exports were shipped from these ports. This includes 27,428,838 tonnes of 
grains (67% share of total shipments); 23,788,526 tonnes of by-products 
(93.12%) and 4,061,236 tonnes of oils (81.35 % share of vegetable oil 
deliveries from Argentine ports) (J.J. Hinrichsen, 2014). In 2010, there were 
2,028 ocean vessels that entered through the river of La Plata and headed up 
towards the Paraná River into the Gran Rosario complex.14 During harvest 
time, the monthly volume of foreign currency coming from the sector has been 
consistently above US$2 billion since 2010 (CIARA, 2015). These figures 
illustrate the size and consequent impact of the logistical operations 
associated with grain production.  
The Gran Rosario complex also benefited from the routes provided by the La 
Plata basin waterway. Production of soybean in Paraguay, for example, is 
largely found on the margins of the Parana River, due both to the soil 
conditions and for transport purposes, as much of the produce travels down 
the river to be exported from the ports in Argentina or Uruguay. Industries in 
Gran Rosario profited for some time from a system of ‘temporary import’ to 
receive and process soybean originated that in Paraguay. The ‘temporary’ 
feature meant that this produce was only imported to be transformed into a 
by-product and later exported. Argentina’s superior capacity and the easy 
                                                          
14 Of these, 27% were Handy-size boats of up to 35,000 DWT;14 28% were Handy-max of up 
to 50,000 DWT and 44% were Panamax boats with a capacity of up to 80,000 DWT (Boot and 
Zuidwijk, 2013). 
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access through the waterway facilitated this scheme, which de-incentivised 
industrial development in Paraguay and allowed the Gran Rosario complex to 
absorb added value. However, this system ended in 2009 as it was suspected 
to be used to pass off Argentinian soybean as Paraguayan, hence avoiding the 
tax imposed on exports at the time (see Chapter 6). Due to the numerous 
bureaucratic obstacles that the Argentinean government has imposed on the 
import and export of agricultural commodities, Paraguayan soy – which needs 
to leave the continent through one of its neighbouring countries – is 
increasingly leaving through Uruguay; travelling down the Uruguay River 
basin before finally being exported through the Uruguayan port of Nueva 
Palmira.  
The emergence of the port hub for grain handling in the area of Gran Rosario 
is linked to the particular pattern of soybean expansion in Argentina. As it was 
further explained in the Introduction of this thesis, soybean was initially 
introduced into Argentine agriculture in the 1970s, and production began to 
increase in the 1980s, with a considerable jump in the 1996/1997 campaign 
after the approval of GM varieties (Giancola et al., 2009). The transformation 
of Gran Rosario into a large-scale logistical centre was thus part of the broader 
spatial configuration of the soybean spatio-temporal matrix, with Rosario 
becoming a central piece in the Argentine and the global agricultural 
commodity network. 
While the first port terminals were developed by the state in 1949, it was in 
the 1980s that the number of grain handling terminals began to grow, with 
some additional legislative changes in the early 1990s that framed the 
development and consolidation of the logistics complex (Boot and Zuidwijk, 
2013: 174). These changes were enabled by the national state through a series 
of legislative changes that proved fundamental in the consolidation of Gran 
Rosario. The main element was the modification of the Law of Ports, first in 
1979 and later in 1992, which allowed the first private terminals in the early 
1980s, and later in the 1990s resulted in the construction and private 
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administration of general load and container berths (Boot and Zuidwijk, 2013: 
174-175). This enabled private capital to invest in more advanced logistical 
equipment and facilities, competing directly with the state managed ports, and 
to push for further works to increase the number and size of vessels accessing 
the area. During the 1990s, projects were completed to increase the depth of 
the river to allow for easier access to the Atlantic Ocean, as well as investments 
in railroad systems to facilitate access to the port area (Lopez and Qüesta, 
2011). As a result, these localised capabilities have transformed the Paraná 
Upriver area into a key ‘command and control’ (Sturgeon, 2003) hub for the 
global network of oilseed production. In spite of the state’s role in providing 
favourable legislation, as well as conditioning work, there have been demands 
from the sector to further improve access to the port area through additional 
railroad routes and to further deepen the river to allow access for larger boats. 
As a manager from the Chamber of Oil Industry of Argentina said: ‘businesses 
cannot substitute the state’ in providing the logistics and transportation 
infrastructure necessary for the continual expansion of Gran Rosario’s volume 
capacity, and for incentivising soybean production in more remote areas 
(interview CIARA, 2014). Through these strategies, the Argentine state has 
promoted the reterritorialisation of the soybean complex, by rooting it in this 
incredibly concentrated agro-industrial complex, so as to allow the 
deterritorialisation of this same industry through the flow of soybean 
commodities to foreign markets.  
While the state played a key role in providing the conditions for the settling 
of a logistical hub on the bank of the Paraná River, it was the dynamics of 
capital towards concentration and centralisation that made the Gran Rosario 
the vast hub that it is today. As it was described above, this area was 
responsible for handling and trading the majority of soybean produced in 
Argentina, the third largest soybean producer in the world, giving us some 
indication of its significance. Moreover, Gran Rosario held some of the largest 
industrial installations for processing grains in the world. An example of this 
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was the ‘mega-plant’ for the production of oil, pellets and biodiesel from 
soybean processing, owned by the Argentine company Vicentín and the Swiss 
firm Glencore, which involved an initial investment of US$30 million (Clarín, 
2007). A new segment inaugurated in 2013 demanded an additional 
investment of over US$400 million (RosarioNet, 2014). As a manager from the 
Chamber of Argentine Oil Industry said, ‘there is no going back’ (interview 
CIARA, 2014), as these mega-plants constitute a fixed feature of the local 
landscape and a key locus for the coordination of the soybean complex. Any 
drawback in terms of production levels or demand would produce a massive 
devaluation of the built infrastructure and leave the complex’ enormous 
capacity without a purpose.  
Spatial transformations around the Gran Rosario complex – through the 
improvement of road and railway access, and the deepening of waterways to 
allow the entry of larger shipments – act to enlarge the scope of soybean’s 
economic space and thus expand the commodity frontier. Similarly, the 
existence of a significant idle capacity for processing oilseeds in the area, 
which reached 30% in 2015 (Neffen, 2015), incentivises producers to further 
increase production volumes and hence cultivated land in the country. This 
reflects the conceptualisation of space as both shaped by and shaping relations 
of production. While initial investments and infrastructure developments 
were deployed as a response to market transformations – in this case, the 
expansion of an agro-export economy – the resulting built environment played 
a role in shaping expectations and consequently influencing existing social, 
economic, and political relations.  
Overall, the development of a built environment and the concentration of 
activities has contributed to the vertical and horizontal bundling of the 
soybean and overall agricultural commodity network, making Rosario a 
central hub and key connector between the production of the soybean 
commodity and its realisation on the global market. This area has become a 
central node in the drive for both faster turnover time, and the handling of 
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increasingly large oilseed volumes. First, through the connection with 
production points and export markets and the development of technologically 
advanced grain handling facilities, the title of ‘most efficient cluster on the 
planet’ (interview CIARA, 2014) has been given to Gran Rosario, based on its 
capacity to ‘annihilate space by time’ (Marx, 1973). This strategy to reduce 
turnover time accelerates the circulation of capital and consequently enhances 
its concentration and centralisation. Second, the number of works on the river 
and the construction of larger industrial infrastructures and berths enabled an 
expansion in volumes traded and hence in profits, especially considering that 
in agricultural trade profits are usually achieved by increasing the scale of 
production or trade. This second strategy then contributed to the increasing 
concentration of capital and consequently the intensification of UD. These 
developments, however, have not occurred without profound environmental 
and social impacts, thus perpetuating the production of space and social 
relations in two important ways. 
Firstly, while the Paraná River is particularly deep by nature, making it an 
attractive route for the entry of large vessels, the current depth is the result of 
dredging works to allow access by larger ships to the loading ports in the area. 
There have been demands from the sector to maintain and increase this even 
more, so as to allow easier access and mobility of ships (Boot and Zuidwijk, 
2013). This is just one example of how nature has been altered according to 
the demands of capital, and particularly of how the Paraná-Paraguay basin has 
been transformed into a commercial and industrial space. This has been done 
as part of a larger project developed by the countries of the La Plata River Basin 
that have created the Paraná-Paraguay Hidrovía (waterway) that reaches 
from Puerto Caceres in Brazil to the North, and Puerto Nueva Palmira in 
Uruguay to the South. The program, which connects Bolivia, Brazil, Argentina, 
Paraguay and Uruguay, was developed for commercial purposes, transforming 
the river way into a channel for the international shipment of goods. This 
transformation risks the sustainability of the waterway as a rich ecosystem, 
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and could entail negative consequences for the local wildlife, the environment, 
and even the livelihoods of populations that depend on fishing or other 
subsistence activities.  
Secondly, the Gran Rosario complex has given rise to profound social 
contradictions. While it facilitates the realisation of millions of dollars every 
week, it is also an urban conglomeration characterised by poverty and the 
increasing dominance of narcotrafficking organisations. Rosario, dubbed the 
‘narco city’ of Argentina, is the country’s most dangerous city, with the highest 
rate of homicides (Stocker, 2013; Boole, 2014). With a growing population 
concentrated in the neighbouring areas, the poor state of roads, and the 
enormous circulation of trucks heading to the grain handling facilities 
prevents access of ambulances and security forces, leaving the population in a 
position of great vulnerability (interview CIARA, 2014). Another indication of 
this link was highlighted by researchers at the National University of Rosario. 
In collaboration with trade unions and social organisations, in 2010 they 
initiated a project named ‘Invisible Territories’ aimed at mapping the health 
and environmental impact of the activities of the agro-industrial complex. The 
project identified over 230 cases of environmental contamination by agro-
industrial and oil companies, usually connected to irregularities in the disposal 
of chemicals or exposure of workers to these fumes (UNR, 2011). Rosario has 
become what Maristella Svampa and Enrique Viale termed a ‘commodity-city’, 
an expression of the economic, social, and environmental dislocations created 
by the consolidation of a commodity hub fundamental to the circulation of 
soybean capital (Svampa and Viale, 2014). As these cases illustrate, the 
development of large built environments that respond to the movement of 
capital in search of larger profits create patterns of UD at different scales, 
including the local, as multi-million dollar investments co-exist with pollution, 
health afflictions, and lack of access to social services for the local population. 
The Gran Rosario complex has been consolidated as a determinant link in the 
chain of Argentine soybean production and distribution. Its immense capacity 
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for storing, processing and moving soy produce into the largest vessels in 
existence allows the transportation of incredibly large volumes of 
commodities to distant markets, such as Europe and China. Due to the vast 
built environment created to serve such a purpose, the commodity hub has 
become an enclave economy in itself, an anchor for the export of natural 
resources. Enmeshed in this place are dynamics of concentration and 
centralisation of capital, as the 80km area of land holds some of the largest 
investments and biggest grain handling and processing facilities in the world. 
While the BR-163, which will be analysed in the next section, expands through 
thousands of kilometres, opening up the soybean frontier, the concentration 
and centralisation of capital in Rosario created similar dynamics. However, by 
deepening the hub’s capacity for processing and trading, it also incentivises 
the creation of new spaces of agricultural production in remote areas of 
Argentina. The development of this agro-industrial cluster cannot be 
understood without recourse to the role of the state in promoting its 
development – measures that constitute strategies of reterritorialisation for 
the purpose of the greater integration of national and global scales of capital 
accumulation. Yet, as Smith warns, these processes do not expand without 
creating imprints, and the social and environmental effects created are part of 
the patterns of geographical UD carved out by the soybean complex and its 
spatio-temporal matrix.   
A soybean corridor in the Amazon basin: BR-163, Brazil 
As previously mentioned, Brazil is the world’s second largest producer of 
soybean and cultivation of this oilseed covers 27.7 million hectares (CONAB, 
2016), approximately the size of Italy. However, key to the profitability of such 
an extensive productive area is the capacity to transport produce to its 
destinations, whether that be domestic or external markets. The vast 
extension of the Brazilian countryside becomes one of the greatest challenges 
in the success of the soybean complex.  
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The last twenty years has seen a significant reconfiguration of the spatial 
ordering of agriculture in Brazil. This has been driven by the advancement of 
soybean production, fuelled by a combination of technical innovations, 
international prices, and migration in Brazil. Motivated by the prospect of 
access to cheaper property, many farmers from the traditionally agricultural 
South began to settle in the Centre and Centre-West of Brazil and create large 
farms that now characterise the landscape of states like Mato Grosso and Mato 
Grosso do Sul (interview Nidera Brasil, 2014). Driven by the profitability of the 
agricultural sector, the commodity frontier has expanded (and continues to 
expand) dramatically, as it incorporates more territory in the Centre and 
North of the country.  
This geographical transformation has had a number of implications. In terms 
of production methods, it has been underpinned by the consolidation of highly 
mechanised and large-scale agriculture in Brazil, accompanied by technical 
innovations that improved planting conditions, namely the development of a 
soy seed variety resistant to more tropical climates. This in turn changed the 
characteristics of the actors involved, with the emergence of large agribusiness 
companies managing vast expanses of land dominating the sector, in contrast 
to the traditional medium-sized land holder farmer in the South of the country, 
who were usually organised in cooperatives. Moreover, the spatial 
configuration of the national economy was altered, as these regions, 
particularly the state of Mato Grosso, previously in the periphery, became the 
geographical centre of one of the most dynamic sectors of the economy. This 
was also expressed politically, perhaps most evidently by the appointment of 
Blairo Maggi, the world’s largest soybean capitalist and former governor of the 
regional state, as the Minister of Agriculture in 2017. In addition, this 
reconfiguration also had important social consequences, as the urban 
agglomerations in these regions augmented and living conditions changed. For 
example, the states of Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul and Goias, which had 
very low levels of Municipal Human Development Index (MHDI) in 1999, 
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improved significantly and achieved levels of MHDI in the ‘high’ band in 2010 
(Atlas do Desenvolvimento Humano no Brasil, 2017). While the reasons 
behind this improvement were manifold, and must also be contextualised 
within the national increase of MHDI, part of this improvement can be 
attributed to the emergence of a wealthy rural class associated with soybean 
production (interview CPDA(a), 2014).  
Yet the expansion of this commodity frontier and the reconfiguration of 
space is not only limited to the area of direct soybean production. The 
circulation of agricultural commodities, in this case soybean, is fundamental, 
particularly for commodities that are largely consumed in foreign markets. 
While farms located in Southern states had more direct access to the main 
ports of the country – Paranaguá and Santos – the new locations of production 
were isolated, largely unpopulated and in general quite dislocated from the 
core economic circuit of Brazil. There was a disparity here; a detachment 
between the Southern part of Brazil, which has been traditionally more 
developed and containing the necessary road and maritime infrastructure for 
the trade of commodities, and the Centre-West and North of Brazil, where new 
agricultural production has mostly been located. Existing patterns of UD, 
whereby the South-West of the country has historically enjoyed an 
economically dominant position, are being redefined by the emergence of a 
process of capital accumulation based on highly-mechanised, large-scale 
production of soybean.    
Part of this reconfiguration and of improving circulation of commodities, was 
highlighted in the need to address the so-called custo Brasil – the Brazil cost – 
which entails ‘the cost of the lack of infrastructure and the losses in terms of 
logistics’ (interview MAPA(a), 2014). This problem was raised as one of the 
main challenges facing the Brazilian soybean industry in almost every 
interview conducted, from members of producers’ associations (interview, 
ABIOVE, 2014; interview CNA(a), 2014), to staff in government ministries 
(interview MAPA, 2014; interview SPA, 2014). However, while this cost is 
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specifically attached to soybean in this case, the term has been more generally 
used to describe the operational costs for businesses in Brazil compared to 
other countries (The Economist, 2007). In other words, this cost represented 
the failure of Brazilian capitalist geography to ‘annihilate space by time’.  
Demands from the private sector for public investment in infrastructure to 
address the custo Brasil express the role of the state in processes of spatial 
reconfiguration and re-scaling. While logistics and transportation solutions 
might be planned on the national scale, it creates ‘forward’ impacts upon global 
circuits of commodity trade, and has ‘backward’ implications for regional and 
local dynamics of urbanisation, deforestation and economic development. 
Such fixed infrastructure is thus essential for scalar integration. In this case, 
the Brazilian federal state was requested to assume responsibility for 
facilitating the conditions for capital accumulation and the re-scaling of the 
Brazilian national economy into the global economy as an efficient provider of 
soybean. Space is therefore determined by the imperatives of capital 
accumulation, while the space produced by this process in turn creates new 
social relations and new spatial configurations.  
The difficulties of Brazil’s freight system are usually presented in contrast to 
the situations in Argentina and the US, the country’s main competitors in the 
soybean export market. While in Argentina the core soybean producing area 
is only 400km away from the main export point, the Centre-West region of 
Brazil – responsible for most of the country’s soybean production – is 2,000km 
away from the main ports of São Paulo and Paraná (Hirakuri and Lazzarotto, 
2011). This has significant impacts both on the time and cost of transportation. 
While a soybean shipment will take around five hours from the state of 
Cordoba in Argentina to China, it would take around seven to eight days from 
Mato Grosso to the port of Santarem, in the state of Pará (interview CPDA(b), 
2014). In terms of cost, freight represents around 30% of the total cost of 
production and delivery of soybean to port from Mato Grosso, the costliest 
element overall (Martins and Oliveria, 2012: 7). As a point of comparison, the 
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cost of cargo shipments from Mato Grosso to the closest port was US$47 per 
tonne, while in Argentina it was an average of US$13.4 (Correa and Ramos, 
2010), resulting in remarkable differences in terms of overall costs and profit 
margins. According to Correa and Ramos (2010), one of the main reasons for 
this deficiency in logistical costs was the lack of multi-modal connections for 
the circulation of commodities; in other words, Brazil chiefly relies on a single-
modal system based on roadways for the transport of grains (2010: 450). 
Despite this reliance on road transportation, in an effort to address this ‘bottle-
neck’ created by Brazil’s underdeveloped infrastructure network, one project 
in particular stands out, and that is the construction and pavement of a 
highway connecting the South-West and the North-East of the country: the BR-
163 road.  
The road-dominated transport matrix of Brazil is the result of historical and 
political conditions, particularly the development of the automobile industry 
and the low oil prices of the second half of 1950s, which incentivised the 
expansion of roadways. The concentration of industrial activity in the state of 
São Paulo in the Centre-South of the country, and the rodoviarista (roadway) 
culture, made it difficult to further integrate other parts of the country through 
the development of alternative transport such as railways (Correa and Ramos, 
2010: 453). The resulting geography of UD meant that the Centre-West and 
North of the country suffered from a lack of connection to, and integration 
with, the economic and political power centres, due to the lack of physical 
infrastructure. During the 1970s, the military government developed a series 
of projects encapsulated by the I Plan Nacional do Desenvolvimento – PND 
(National Development Plan) and II PND. These programmes included the 
planning and construction of a series of roadways that would reach the most 
distant areas of the country. However, the Brazilian financial crisis in the 
1980s left most of these projects unfinished.  
One of these incomplete projects was the paving and opening of the BR-163 
road that connects the South-West and North of the country. This road is 
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3,467km long, stretching from Tenente Portela in Rio Grande do Sul, all the 
way to the port of Santarem on the shore of the Amazon River. It goes through 
the Centre-West of the country to the state of Pará in the North, hence 
connecting the main soybean-producing states of Mato Grosso and Mato 
Grosso do Sul to Santarem, a grain-handling port on the Tapajós River, in 
proximity to the confluence with the Amazon River. Figure 4.2 shows the route 
followed by the BR-163, with the green areas showing the agricultural lands 
from the year 2000, making visible the connection between the infrastructure 
project and the development and expansion of agricultural production. While 
the path for the road was planned and in fact opened during the 1970s, most 
of this route was not paved, and even today a large section in the state of Pará 
is unfinished. The project of re-paving this road was linked to the construction 
of a grain terminal in Santarem belonging to Cargill, one of the world’s largest 
agricultural traders (Barbosa, 2015). The BR-163 offered the possibility of a 
cheaper route for soybean produced in Mato Grosso and other states in the 
Centre-West towards export markets, and the Cargill terminal facilitated the 
way to the Panama Canal and offered an alternative to the already saturated 
Southern Brazilian ports. 
At the end of the 1990s, agriculture began to yield increasingly large 
surpluses and a new era of agro-exporting was inaugurated. This was 
consolidated during the first term of President Lula da Silva, and under his 
government the project to pave the BR-163 was re-instated, along with other 
infrastructure projects intended to support the expansion of the agricultural 
sector and the production of soybean in particular. The large volumes of grains 
being produced and exported demanded the development of more diversified 
points of trading, as well as cheaper alternatives for exporting. The main ports 
used here were Santos - close to São Paulo - and Paranaguá, in the state of 
Paraná, south of São Paulo. The movement of production towards the Centre-
North of the country has created the need to find export points in the North of 
the country, especially given the saturation experienced by the Southern ports 
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(interview SPE, 2014; Chatham House, 2017). Increasingly more soybean is 
exported to Asia through the port of Belem and Santarem in Pará, and Porto 
Velho in Rôndonia. Access to these points is available through the Amazon 
River, hence motivating the creation of a route that provides entry to this area.   
The development of the BR-163 was the result of active involvement from 
the national and regional states as part of the overall policy of support for 
soybean production and the expansion of the agricultural frontier. It is 
therefore, to a great extent, a state-led strategy of reterritorialisation. The 
projects under the Development Plan (I PND and II PND) were recovered and 
re-instated during the governments of Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Lula 
da Silva’s. Initially, the project raised concerns among environmental and 
grassroots movements over its environmental impacts, namely the expansion 
of deforestation in the Amazon. This led Lula’s  government to set up an Inter-
ministerial Working Group in charge of designing a Sustainable Development 
Plan for the Area of Influence of BR-163 (Barbosa, 2015: 87). Moreover, 
economic diversification became one of the pillars of the Pará state 
government, which therefore incentivised the cultivation of soy, exploration of 
new resources, and in general privileged the interests of soy-related 
businesses (Vegas Leão and Bandeira, 2012: 1-2).  
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While the state was a key actor in enacting this project, it was the dynamics 
of capital accumulation that highlighted the need for such an infrastructural 
development. This was chiefly achieved by transforming Santarem into an 
emerging alternative hub for soybean processing and trading. The most 
evident example is the aforementioned construction of a Cargill Agricola S.A. 
terminal for grain handling in the Port of Santarem, which until that moment 
had only one terminal, increasing the volume of annual loads at a mean rate of 
7.4% since the beginning of its operations in 2003 (Labtrans, 2013: 90).15 
Additionally, pressure from the business sector was organised through 
farmers’ associations, and it boasted the highly significant support of Blairo 
Maggi, mentioned above, then Governor of the State of Mato Grosso and owner 
of the soybean-producing Amaggi Group. Maggi proposed, in 2003, that the 
pavement of the BR-163 was done under the Parceira Publico-Privada – PPP 
(Private-Public Partnership framework), an initiative through which the 
federal, regional or local government was able to sign a contract of services 
with a private company (Portal Brasil, 2012). In this case, the partnership 
would include ADM, Cargill, Bunge, Dreyfus, Amaggi, and Sumitomo, which 
would have received the right to charge tolls on the BR-163 in exchange for a 
multi-million dollar investment (Barbosa, 2015: 91). However, opposition to 
this project made it difficult to pass in the legislative branch and eventually 
Lula Da Silva’s government secured federal funding to start pavement in 2009 
through the Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento - PAC (Programme of 
Acceleration of Growth).  
Besides its impact on the speed and cost of the circulation of soybean, the 
finalisation of the BR-163 and its full functioning will bring about 
transformations in the environment surrounding this construction. Correa and 
Ramos (2010) warn about the wave of investments that could flow into the 
                                                          
15 Currently the terminal handles soybean and corn. Most of the grains come from the state of 
Mato Grosso, 80% in trucks until Porto Velho or Miritituba and from there in barges until 
Santarem; while the remaining 20% arrives through the BR-163 directly to the terminal 
(Cargill Brasil, 2017).  
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state of Pará where the road crosses, and the likelihood of further 
deforestation in a region that lacks effective governmental control (2010: 
463). This absence of law enforcement, also highlighted by Fearnside (2007: 
602), was apparently ‘solved’ with the implementation of frameworks of 
‘environmental governance’ that, as Brenda Baletti (2014) argues, have had 
dubious results for the conservation of the local environment. According to the 
author, these frameworks not only failed to disincentivise deforestation, but 
also created impacts on the local community, due to the displacement of 
subsistence farmers, and political structures, as it contributed to the 
consolidation of power relations benefitting trading companies. This analysis 
clearly shows the ways in which the production of space is determined and can 
in turn determine social and economic relations; or, in the words of Soja, how 
production of soybean is both ‘space-forming and space-contingent’ (Soja, 
1989: 126). 
The project to finalise the pavement of the BR-163 and make it fully 
functional tackles one of the main obstacles for the expansion of agribusiness 
in general and soy in particular in Brazil. By reducing transport costs as well 
as facilitating the incorporation of new territories into the agricultural 
frontier, this ‘commodity corridor’, in a similar fashion to the ‘commodity city’, 
both accelerates and expands soy’s process of accumulation. The ‘annihilation 
of space’ between the South-West and North of the country also involves the 
creation of new natures, as deforestation advances and the biome of the 
Amazon is transformed; new regionalities, with the settling of displaced 
communities in close proximities to the road, as well as farmers coming from 
the South; and new scales, with the production and trade of soy acquiring new 
dimensions as it drags the subnational states into its circuit.   
While initially planned for integrating populations in the Centre and North 
of the country, the recovery of the BR-163 project responded to imperatives in 
the process of capital accumulation linked to soybean. Today, the ‘soybean 
corridor’ enhances the mobility of soybean production, while leaving an 
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indelible mark on the landscape of the Brazilian Amazon. A study proved that 
the transport of soybean from Mato Grosso to the Santarem Port – compared 
to southern ports of Santos and Paranaguá – would represent a 20% reduction 
in costs (Correa and Ramos, 2010: 461). An expansion of Cargill’s grain 
handling terminal in Santarem was started in 2014, which allowed for an 
increase in the loading capacity from two million tonnes a year to five million 
tonnes annually (Cargill Noticias, 2014). In this sense, the BR-163 is less a 
project of social integration at the national level as originally conceived, and 
more an attempt for national economic integration into the global scale.  
Soybean’s fleet and the Paraguay-Paraná waterway 
As a land-locked country, the development of transport infrastructure that 
allows the circulation of goods is essential in Paraguay’s economic 
performance. This is especially the case since growth in the Paraguayan 
economy has been mainly driven by the export of soybean, which, alongside 
beef, represented 38% of its total exports in the first eight months of 2015, 
according to the World Bank (World Bank, 2015). Paraguay produced over 9 
million tonnes of soybean in 2013 (FAOSTAT, 2017) of which 7.5 million were 
exported abroad (UN Statistics Division, 2016). Hence, connections between 
soybean growing areas and maritime ports is a priority for the accumulation 
process associated with this commodity. Costs also play an important role in 
the decision to privilege the use of waterways for this purpose, as it is cheaper 
for transporting large volumes of grains.    
Paraguay depends heavily on its navigation routes to dispatch its produce to 
international markets. Some of its production goes to Brazil on trucks, usually 
to be processed and consumed domestically there. However, 75% of its foreign 
trade is transported through the fluvial route (IADB, 2013: 3), particularly via 
the Paraguay-Paraná River way to the ports of Montevideo in Uruguay, the 
Rosario area in Argentina, or Paranaguá and Rio Grande in Brazil. 
Approximately 80% of its soybean exports find their way out of the country 
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through fluvial means (CAF, 2009), and in turn the oilseed represents around 
55% of the total fluvial exports (ABC Color, 2015a). Hence, Paraguay depends 
greatly on the La Plata basin for the circulation and transport of its produce to 
different distribution points. This has encouraged the development of a great 
barge fleet, as well as the installation of several ports along the shores of the 
Paraguay and Paraná rivers.  
The need for navigation as a channel to export its products has incentivised 
Paraguay investment in barges, and the country now has the third largest fleet 
of river barges in the world (Trepowski et al., 2014: 60). Indeed, the barge 
industry itself has become a significant source of economic activity, 
contributing 3.8% of Paraguay’s GDP in the five years between 2008 and 2012 
(Trepowski et al., 2014: 60). According to the Paraguayan Institute of 
Economic Research (IPIE), in 2014 Paraguay had 2,346 barges – dry, liquid, 
and tugboats - 15% more than in 2011 (Trepowski et al., 2014). This 
transportation infrastructure allows the movement of large volumes and 
loads, making it the most cost- and time-efficient way to dispatch soy from the 
country towards its export markets. The development of this large fleet and 
the installation of numerous shipyards in the country - increasing from two to 
eight in the last four years - is largely perceived as one of the best examples of 
the success of the Paraguayan soybean sector and the spill-over effects it has 
had in the local economy (interview UGP(a), 2014; interview IPIE, 2014). 
The existence of a large barge fleet and the dominance of fluvial 
transportation for the expanding soybean production has also entailed the 
development of inland port infrastructure in Paraguay. According to the Latin 
American Development Bank, Paraguay has 44 private ports and eight public 
ports, the most important ones being Asunción, Concepcion, Pilar, and Villeta 
(CAF, 2009). These are mostly located on the margins of the Paraguay and 
Parana Rivers, where many fluvial ways in the Eastern region of the country 
(the region that currently hosts the main soybean production areas) flow into. 
The Paraguay-Parana River system is thus the main channel for international 
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trade, both due to its location close to important production areas, as well as 
its connection to the River Plate Delta and consequently to the ports of Rosario 
(Argentina) and Nueva Palmira (Uruguay), which are suitable for bulk cargoes, 
Paraguay’s main form of export (Wilmsmeier and Sanchez, 2009: 50). Already 
in 2007 over 13 million tonnes of grains were being transported through the 
Paraguay River, with an increase of 30% expected the following year (CAF, 
2009: 16-17). This figure is likely to be considerably higher today, taking into 
account both the increase in production of soybean in Paraguay and the 
number of barges acquired by the country in the last four years.  
Paraguay’s position as a landlocked country reliant on primary exports 
highlights the need to develop a system of well-connected transport links that 
connect the economy to global markets. One of the main challenges in this 
regard is the country’s lack of direct access to maritime ports. However, 
Paraguay does boast its own port installations in Nueva Palmira in Uruguay, 
Rosario and Buenos Aires in Argentina, and Santos, Paranaguá, and Rio Grande 
in Brazil (CAF, 2009). In this case, national space is not determined by the 
political borders of its territory, but these places in fact act as extra-territorial 
spaces for the Paraguayan state. These areas are managed by the National 
Administration of Navigation and Ports, though some of these facilities are not 
actively used by the landlocked country, especially the free port area in 
Rosario. Only in 2016, authorities from Paraguay and Argentina started to 
discuss the reactivation of the Paraguayan free zone, potentially a key space 
for the facilitation of soybean exports (La Nación Paraguay, 2016). The 
Paraguayan state’s reterritorialisation strategies – through their fixed capital 
investments in foreign ports – are simultaneously deterritorialised from the 
actual Paraguayan national territory.  
In the effective use of these spaces, however, the Paraguay-Parana waterway 
is key, as it provides cost and time-efficient access to these distribution points. 
This waterway is, on one hand, the main channel for the realisation of profit 
from the country’s second main export product – soybean – and, on the other 
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hand, the source itself of Paraguay’s principal export product – energy – which 
is provided by the electrical dams of Yacireta and Itaipu. As such, this fluvial 
system lies at the heart of Paraguay’s capacity for redefining its spatial political 
economy.   
The great distance between sites of production and overseas shipment and 
the lack of direct access to ports directly increases Paraguay’s transportation 
costs in relation to its neighbouring competitors. The Development Bank of 
Latin America (CAF) highlights that the cost of transport of goods per tonne to 
and from Paraguay is higher than any other country on the American continent 
(2009); and in a report on logistics inefficiencies in land-locked countries in 
South America, ECLAC establishes that fluvial transportation generates most 
of the additional cost in the transportation of commodities (meat and soy in 
this analysis) (Salas and Gonzalez Ramirez, 2014).  
These two key obstacles to the cost effective transportation of large volume 
of goods – particularly soybeans – are to be addressed through the proposed 
solutions of greater intervention in the river way through works of dredging, 
and increasing signalling and using of lights with the purpose of a 24-hour 
navigation. Already, droughts in the area have reduced the maximum draft 
(CAF, 2009), particularly in the region of Asunción. The Pilcomayo River, part 
of the waterway complex, has been particularly badly hit by the lack of rains, 
with reports stating the river was ’60 per cent sediment and 40 per cent water’ 
(Desantis, 2016). Overall, the improvements deemed necessary would provide 
increased draft of the rivers, wider canal breadth, enabling navigation of larger 
convoys and 24 hour navigation (Wilmsmeier and Sanchez, 2009: 54). These 
changes are supposed to reduce fluvial transport costs by up to 33%, with a 
potential to be reduced by 50% ‘under optimum conditions’ (2009: 53). 
Similar to the cases of Argentina and Brazil, the imperative to reduce costs and 
increase profit margins has resulted in deep imbalances in the geography of 
Paraguay.  
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Its dependence on the Paraná-Paraguay waterway – a project promoted by 
the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) – only incentivises further works on the rivers 
as well as creating pressure to increase the volume and traffic along these 
waterways. The production of new spaces for expanding capital accumulation 
is thus not only pursued by the national state, but other public authorities at 
different scales also actively engage in this process, including international and 
regional organisations. Kneen (2002) highlights the fact that environmental 
and economic impact studies requested by these international bodies were 
quickly dismissed at the outset of this programme because they failed to 
provide an estimate of the potential impacts. As environmental organisations 
and independent researchers pointed out, the idea that engineering work on 
such a scale could have only minor effects on the environment shows a lack of 
understanding of the complexity and interconnectedness of the waterway 
ecosystem (2002: 9). The negative spill-over effects consist of loss of flora and 
fauna diversity, as is already being demonstrated in the Pilcomayo River, 
where yacare caimans and other animals are dying. This degradation of the 
local ecosystem adds to the damaging consequences suffered by local 
populations as well, as residents with cattle ranches struggle to provide fresh 
water for their livestock (Desantis, 2016). This scene of ruination starkly 
contrasts with the massive profits accrued by the region’s agro-exporters.  
Beyond the segment on Paraguay being addressed here, the Paraguay-
Paraná waterway hub involves five countries and covers an area of influence 
of over 2 million square kilometres. As such, this space is one of the axes of the 
Integracion de la Infraestructura Regional Suramericana (IIRSA) initiative 
(Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America), and within it 
five sub-areas are identified, each with strategic functions and a number of 
infrastructural projects to be deployed so as to expand the potential of the area 
for the transport of energy and natural resources (IIRSA, 2013). This complex 
plan of infrastructure projects was agreed at the First Summit Meeting of South 
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American Presidents, which was later incorporated into the more 
institutionalised South American Council of Infrastructure and Planning, as 
part of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). The pursuit of these 
projects will situate the waterway and South America regionally, as an access 
point to natural resources, and globally, as a strategic point of connection 
between Europe and Asia (Barkin, 2009: 6).  
The development of an extensive barge fleet and the constant works on the 
river ways that go through Paraguay cannot be comprehended without taking 
into account the country’s increasing dependence on the export sector, 
dominated by soybean production. The Paraná-Paraguay basin is transformed 
– even produced – as a commercial network and as a strategic structure for the 
circulation of commodities and the realisation of their exchange-value. State, 
private sector and international organisations have interacted to facilitate its 
consolidation. Public institutions are pushed into increasing and maintaining 
the intervention on the river ways in order to assure the rapid and 
straightforward navigation of private capital, on the promises of positive spill-
over effects for the national economy, while ignoring the possible impacts on 
the environment and local populations. What this represents is the strategic 
deployment of processes of reterritorialisation in order to enhance commodity 
mobility and connect the national and global scales – thus etching deep groves 
in Paraguay’s geography that will last as historical artefacts of the soybean 
boom.  
Conclusion: ‘Expanding possibilities and profit potential’ – the 
globalisation of the ‘Soybean Republic’ 
This chapter aimed to understand physical geography, particularly transport 
and logistics infrastructure, as a fundamental element of the South American 
soybean complex. By doing so, it shed light on the overall system of production 
of wealth in the aforementioned sector, the role of the state in providing 
infrastructure, and the geographies that emerge from this booming industry. 
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The centrality of logistics infrastructure in the creation of wealth in the 
soybean complex is clearly explained by a manager of agribusiness company 
Nidera:  
When you think about the world of commodities you have two 
blocs that are very important: crushing; and the other one, logistics. 
And you need investments in both of them. These are businesses of 
high rotation and low [profit] margins. Anything that accelerates 
rotation, is welcomed. Anything that threatens the [profit] margins, 
you want to avoid. Faced with fluctuations of the commodity, there 
are some elements that are stable, and as time goes by, they can 
have a great impact on the [profit] margins, such as the cost of 
freight … the efficiency of ports… (interview Nidera, 2014) 
This evidences the significance of infrastructure and all built environment 
for the ‘annihilation of space by time’, meaning, increasing turnover time, in 
order to reduce costs and expand profit margins. The analysis presented in this 
chapter provided key insights for answering the research question of this 
thesis, namely, how states govern the creation of wealth in the context of a 
commodity boom, and more specifically, the spatial dynamics that emerge in 
that process. Through examples from each of the countries studied, this 
chapter unpacked the ways in which the creation of built environments 
supports and expands capital accumulation in the soybean complex. 
Fixed capital is a necessary condition for all modes of production. Yet within 
the capitalist economy, the built environment needs to support not only the 
production of use-values, but the constant expansion of production to serve 
the accumulation of further exchange-value. The cases of the Gran Rosario 
complex in Argentina, the BR-163 road in Brazil, and the Paraguay-Paraná 
river way are key examples of how the soybean economy has created a 
particular built environment – rooted in specific national territories – for the 
sole purpose of faster circulation of larger volumes of soybean from its 
production sites in the Southern Cone, to different points in the global value 
chain.  
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This chapter first analysed the Gran Rosario hub, where dynamics of 
concentration and centralisation of capital have succeeded in consolidating a 
logistical and industrial commodity hub used almost exclusively for the 
processing and handling of soybean grains. Referred to by some as the ‘Chicago 
of South America’, in just 80km of space, Gran Rosario boast the capacity to 
export 80% of Argentina’s soy grains and by-products – one of the world’s 
largest net exporters of agricultural commodities. The agglomeration of 
immense capital and wealth in this area is in sharp contrasts to the difficulties 
experienced by the local population, who have been exposed to polluting 
waste and have been unable to access security or health services due to the 
overwhelming presence of soybean cargoes. Next, it examined the case of the 
re-pavement of the BR-163 highway in Brazil, connecting the South and North-
West of the country, and passing through the Amazon. The finalisation of this 
road will give soybean producers in the Centre-West of Brazil cheaper and 
more direct access to foreign markets, at the same time as opening up a new 
region to the advancement of industrial agriculture. It has also contributed to 
the transformation of the Centre-West from a ‘forgotten’ region at the 
periphery of the Brazilian political economy into a dynamic zone central to the 
national and global economy. Moreover, authors such as Fearnside (2007) and 
Correa and Ramos (2010), as well as environmental organisations like 
Greenpeace (2006), have warned of the dramatic environmental and social 
consequences that could result from a disorganised and uncontrolled flow of 
investment in this area. Finally, the expansion of soybean production in 
Paraguay, and the country’s rising dependence on the export of this oilseed, 
have created pressure for increasing human intervention in the river ways that 
surround the landlocked country, which are the main channels for the 
circulation of commodities.  
The cases analysed here constitute part of the specific organisation of space 
created by the process of capital accumulation associated with the soybean 
complex. They are part of the spatio-temporal complex as, on one hand, they 
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become part of the built landscape of the region – expressing the moment of 
reterritorialisation – while on the other, their main function is to facilitate the 
transportation of the commodity towards global markets, enabling its mobility 
– the moment of deterritorialisation. The Gran Rosario logistic hub, the BR-163 
and the Paraná-Paraguay waterway are part of the geography created by this 
process; yet at the same time these infrastructural developments contribute to 
the creation of new spaces, as other regions become accessible and the total 
cultivated area expands. They set in motion dynamics that create patterns of 
uneven development, expressed both in the consolidation of larger farms on 
the side of the BR-163 road in Brazil, and in the ruination of the ecosystems on 
the margins of the Paraná-Paraguay waterway in Paraguay. In these processes, 
states emerge as key in the enabling of these projects and consequently in the 
modality of accumulation; either through deregulation and the promotion of 
private governance (Argentina and Paraguay), or by directly financing these 
projects (Brazil). 
The three cases presented in this chapter show that we cannot understand the 
development of the soybean complex by reference to transhistorical processes 
of humanity’s agricultural interaction with nature. Rather it is capitalist 
agriculture, with its constant quest for higher profit rates, and its need for a 
fixed infrastructure which reproduces the circuit of capital, that have 
produced new natures, created new scales of economic activity, incorporated 
isolated regions into the productive sphere, and increased the volume and 
turnover time of the soybean complex. While capitalist agriculture demands 
the development of the built structures explored in this chapter, the 
production of wealth is also the result of capital’s simultaneous capacity for 
mobility, which allows investment to flow to areas of high profitability. The 
next chapter will analyse the mobile nature of capital in the soybean complex, 
specifically through the analysis of financialisation, and hence understand how 
both fixity and mobility, while contradictory, create the necessary conditions 
for the expansion of capital accumulation in this sector. 
   
5. Financialisation and accumulation: the politics of 
capital mobility 
  
Introduction 
In mid-2008, at least US$ 200 billion were invested in derivatives based on 
commodities (Kerckhoffs et al., 2010). That same year, a food crisis triggered 
by surges in food prices extended throughout the Global South. It has been 
increasingly evident that these two facts are connected and that financial 
speculation in agricultural commodities has contributed to the rising volatility 
of food prices. This chapter explores the mechanisms and processes through 
which financial instruments have been linked to agricultural trade and 
production in the countries of the Southern Cone. As the examples mentioned 
show, these trends are part of a global phenomenon of financialisation linked 
to agricultural commodities.  The previous chapter focused on how the 
expansion and enlargement of the built environment for the transportation of 
soybean was fundamental in the transformation of the commodity into its 
money form. This creation of fixed structures constituted strategies of 
reterritorialisation of economic activity that in turn made the trade of large 
volumes of soybean and the realisation of profits possible. In contrast, this 
chapter aims to highlight how the same objective – wealth creation – is 
achieved through an opposite but complimentary dynamic: capital’s ability to 
move quickly from one asset, place, and scale, to another. The expansion of 
financial activities into industrial agriculture has heightened this mobility, as 
finance’s virtual nature facilitates sudden and dramatic changes in the 
availability of capital from one sector to the other. Financialisation thus allows 
the ‘freeing’ of capital from a particular economic activity and the 
deterritorialisation of assets from a particular geographical scale in a way that 
physical infrastructure does not. In this sense, financial flows are constitutive 
of the seesaw dynamics of capital and patterns of UD.  
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The mechanisms explored in this chapter represent different ways in which 
profits are increasingly earned through financial transactions, rather than 
production, and hence how transnational financial capital has penetrated the 
soybean complex. The growing participation of investment funds and 
international banks in the production of soybean, whether through rural 
credit, insurance, the banking system, or new investment arrangements, 
points both to the growing concentration and centralisation of capital in the 
soybean sector, and to the increasing deterritorialisation of profit-making 
from processes of agricultural production grounded in these territories. 
Similar to the dynamics analysed in the previous chapter, the processes 
studied here suggest the key role of the state as an enabler of the expansion of 
capital accumulation through financialisation. Through the deregulation of 
investment and renting conditions (Argentina), the financial support for credit 
and insurance products (Brazil), and the reliance on private governance of the 
banking system (Paraguay), the state is instrumental in creating the necessary 
conditions for the growing financialisation of the soybean complex. 
This chapter explores how the financialisation of agriculture, and more 
specifically of the soybean complex in South America, enables capital’s 
mobility and consequently creates uneven geographical configurations. The 
structure of this chapter is as follows: it will first give a brief overview of the 
context in which these dynamics have emerged globally; it will then focus on 
the different mechanisms of financialisation of agricultural trade, mainly the 
existing futures exchange markets and the possibility for new mechanisms at 
a regional level; and finally it will provide an analysis of the financialisation of 
soybean production in each country, with an emphasis on new structures of 
organisation of production in Argentina, issues of rural credit and insurance in 
Brazil, and the rise of foreign capitals in the Paraguayan banking system. The 
purpose is to show how the financialisation of the soy complex has enhanced 
capital mobility and thus transformed this industry’s mode of accumulation by 
consolidating processes of deterritorialisation. Nevertheless, as this chapter 
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will demonstrate, deterritorialisation can provoke countervailing tendencies 
of reterritorialisation, as state and private actors in the Southern Cone attempt 
to assert control over this economic activity. In particular, while processes of 
financialisation may appear completely detached from state activities, the 
state has at times acted as both a facilitator of and obstacle to the emergence 
of these channels of profit creation through market making or regulation.  
Financialisation of agricultural commodities: history and evolution 
The term ‘financialisation’ has been subject to much debate about its 
significance and implications, and has been used to refer to a wide range of 
issues. The purpose of this chapter is not to explore all of the extensive 
literature associated with the term, but rather to analyse the increasing use of 
financial instruments in agricultural economy. This chapter will use Krippner’s 
definition of financialisation as ‘the tendency for profit making in the economy 
to occur increasingly through the financial channels rather than through 
productive activities’ (Krippner, 2011: 4). In the context of the agricultural 
economy, this conceptualisation reflects the increasing domination of financial 
over productive activity in the creation of profit, which highlights the need to 
explore the mechanisms through which such financial profits are generated, 
and the consequences it entails for the sector. In other words, finance, due to 
its mobile nature and multi-scalar capacity, creates lucrative revenue streams 
deriving from the global agriculture sector.  
The relationship between agriculture and finance is centuries old (Clapp, 
2012). It was the need for upfront capital for inputs like seeds and fertilisers 
that encouraged the establishment of derivative agreements: farmers would 
sell their harvest in advance as a way of covering initial costs. This contract, 
called a ‘forward’, would result in the actual exchange of the product for a price 
previously determined. For buyers, this transaction hedges against increase in 
prices as well as failure to deliver by producers; while for farmers, this protects 
them against sharp decreases in price. In this way, forwards act as insurance 
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for both parties, though in the form of a zero-sum game, as the increase or 
reduction of the spot price16 inevitably benefits one and hurts the other (Bryan 
and Rafferty, 2006: 42). Forwards are thus the most direct and simple form of 
a derivative. 
In more general terms, derivatives are ‘financial assets whose price is based 
on the price of an underlying commodity, in this case agricultural crops’ 
(Fairbairn, 2015: 234). In addition to forwards, there are three key types of 
derivative: futures – agreements over the purchase of a commodity at a fixed 
price in the future; options – option to buy or not a certain commodity in the 
future at a price determined at the moment of transaction; and swaps – a cash 
flow to a third party as insurance over the financial instrument of the asset 
holder.  
As these instruments emerged, so did new actors who were not directly 
involved in the food or agriculture sector: non-commercial traders, who 
became involved in the exchange of these contracts, not as a business 
insurance but as a speculative activity. Some have argued that these financial 
actors play a productive role, because they provide the market with liquidity, 
take risks in exchange for profit, and have a ‘price discovery’ function, since 
they usually reflect the information held by commercial traders and can 
provide direction on planning for farmers and other actors within the 
productive chain (see Clapp and Helleiner, 2012: 186; Fairbairn, 2015: 235). 
On the other hand, financial derivatives are not free of risk; sellers are not 
required to own the asset over which the derivative is based on, and hence big 
losses or gains can be made from small investments. These two elements make 
it a rather attractive activity for speculation and, as such, there is a tendency 
                                                          
16 Spot price is the price of a commodity or financial asset when it is traded immediately. It is 
the price at the moment of the transaction, different to the future or forward price, which refer 
to the price at which the commodity will be sold at a future point in time.  
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towards the increasing detachment of these contracts from the real products 
they are supposed to be related to.   
The links between the financial sector and agriculture began to intensify in 
the 1990s and the extent of this connection became quite evident with the food 
price crisis that erupted in 2007-2008. Many analysts presented this event as 
a fundamentals crisis, implying that it was related to changes in the global 
supply and demand of agricultural commodities and levels of international 
stocks, aggravated by a diversion of resources to the production of biofuels 
(Clapp, 2012: 129-132). However, Clapp argues that there are indicators 
pointing to another factor in the context leading to the crisis, ‘an additional 
ingredient to the perfect storm’ (2012: 134), namely the increasing role of 
financial markets. This crisis triggered an interest in the links between 
food/agriculture and finance, and the food crisis has also been highlighted by 
several authors as evidence of the significant consequences that the 
financialisation of agricultural production has had for the global food system 
(Clapp and Helleiner, 2012; Fuchs et al., 2013; Fairbairn, 2014; Isakson, 2014).  
Clapp and Eric Helleiner (2012: 189) point out that some analysts had 
started to use the word financialisation in reference to commodity markets 
before the food crisis. This observation originated in the progressive 
deregulation of the agricultural derivatives market in the US and the 
increasing role of non-commercial actors in the creation and exchange of these 
instruments. Some of these deregulatory measures included the explicit 
prevention of regulation of over-the-counter (OTC) swap derivatives linked to 
commodity markets, which had been offered by banks since the early 1990s; 
and the expansion of exemptions given to financial institutions to increase the 
number of their position limits – meaning, the number of derivatives and 
commodity-based financial titles institutions are allowed to sell and trade 
(Clapp and Helleiner, 2012: 187). As a result, the volume and variety of 
agricultural derivatives expanded rapidly after the 2000s with limited control 
or oversight by regulators (Martin and Clapp, 2015: 554). Increasing 
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deregulation combined with financial actors’ growing interest in commodity-
based instruments as a source of higher profits and diversification (Geman, 
2015: 13) pushed the number of assets in Commodity-Index Funds (CIFs)17 to 
over US$ 200 billion in mid-2008, from only US$ 15 billion five years before 
(Clapp and Helleiner, 2012: 188). 
Several financial actors have been incorporated into the agricultural sector 
through its increasing financialisation. Banks, for example, began to sell CIFs 
which followed the prices of several commodities, of which agricultural 
products usually constituted around a third, thus offering investors exposure 
to these markets without actually buying any asset (Clapp, 2014: 802). In turn, 
banks were driven into hedging the risks of offering such products by investing 
in the futures markets themselves (2014: 802). Investment in farmland and 
agriculture-based companies have also drawn the attention of several 
institutional actors such as pension and hedge funds, university endowments, 
private foundations, life insurance companies and sovereign wealth funds, 
(Clapp, 2014: 803; Fairbairn, 2014: 778). The presence of these actors was 
further fuelled by the price spike experienced after 2002, in which 
financialistion played an important role, hence forming a cycle of reinforcing 
dynamics. The presence of these financial institutions has transformed the 
food chain in its entirety, from the control of land by large transnational 
companies to large food retailers being increasingly driven by the ‘shareholder 
value’ principle or being acquired by private equity funds. This has in turn 
affected the functioning and stability of actors at every stage of the production 
chain (Isakson, 2014; Burch and Lawrence, 2013).   
The financialisation of agriculture has not only been characterised by the 
integration of non-agricultural actors, but also by the transformation of 
                                                          
17 Commodity Index Funds (CIFs) are derivatives which are linked to prices from a number of 
different commodities, usually agricultural commodities, minerals, livestock and petroleum 
products; with agricultural commodities generally making up a third of it. CIFs provide 
exposure to commodity markets by following broad movements in prices without having to 
actually realise any purchase of commodities (Clapp, 2014: 802; Irwin and Sanders, 2011).  
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agricultural players into financial operators. Murphy et al. (2012) have 
identified this development, pointing to how transnational trading companies 
– namely the so-called ABCDs18 – have benefited from their status as 
commercial traders to offer financial services to third parties and managing 
funds as a mechanism for hedging their own risks as well as expanding their 
profits.  
The complexity and scope of financial actors and instruments linked to the 
agriculture and food complex have deepened dramatically since the 2000s. 
These dynamics have created processes of rescaling at all stages of the food 
production chain, with sources of finance for production and trade coming 
from foreign and sometimes non-identifiable sources. Some of these processes 
involve the governance of food chains being driven by demands of shareholder 
value, or land becoming dislocated (or deterritorialised) from its local and 
absolute location to be rescaled into a regional or global accumulation process, 
through processes of corporate acquisition known as ‘land grabbing’ (Sassen, 
2013).  
These changes have also been evident in institutionalised commodity 
exchange markets, which were initially small associations that subsequently 
evolved into large, publically traded corporations (Martin and Clapp, 2015: 
554). The most important of these exchange markets is the Chicago Board of 
Trade (CBOT). As Hieronymus explains, the history of agricultural 
commodities futures trading is inextricably linked to the creation and 
evolution of the CBOT (Hieronymus, 1977: 72). Chicago’s key location in 
proximity to the fertile lands of the Corn Belt and the water channels made it 
the main centre for the exchange of commodities in the first half of the 
nineteenth century. CBOT was established in 1848 and the market quickly 
evolved from the exchange of simple forward contracts to futures, options and 
                                                          
18 ABCDs is the acronym used to refer to the ‘big four’ agricultural trading companies which 
largely dominate the commodity trading market. The acronym stands for the initials of these 
companies: Archer Daniels Midland (ADM), Bunge, Cargill, and Louis Dreyfus Company (LDC).   
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swaps (Fairbairn, 2015: 235). This institution is now part of a larger 
corporation, the CME Group, which also includes the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange, the New York Mercantile Exchange and the Kansas Board of Trade 
(Martin and Clapp, 2015: 554).  
The CBOT is the most important commodity exchange market in the world, 
both in terms of volume of exchange as well as in value. Its dominance is 
inevitably a reflection of the US’ share in the physical market for the 
production and trade of soy, wheat and maize. The board sells a number of 
agricultural futures, of which soybean futures have been the most numerous 
contract exchanged there. These instruments, as the CBOT claims, ‘allow 
hedgers and traders to capture the special economic relationships that exist 
among soybeans and the two principal soybean products throughout the 
production, processing, and marketing processes’ (CBOT, 2005: 2, emphasis 
added). Through the purchase of such contracts, individuals or financial 
institutions are thus capable of controlling part of the production of, and 
generating profits derived from soybean and other grains. Through these 
mechanisms, profits are created on the expectation of profits, which further 
dislocates the process of capital accumulation from agriculture’s use value.  
Overall, there is extensive evidence pointing to the expanding process of 
financialisation of agriculture. While this may have become most apparent 
during the food price crisis of 2007/2008, the conditions for the increasing 
role of financial capital in the agricultural economy were set earlier. The state 
played a fundamental role as both regulator and controller of this process. 
Academic interest has also followed the questions emerging from the global 
food crisis; however, it has focused chiefly on developments in the Global 
North, mainly the US, Canada and the EU, thus neglecting a large geographical 
area with a pivotal role in the current food system. It is also worth noting that 
while the CBOT is still secure in its leadership among exchange markets 
globally, alternative institutions, such as the Dalian Commodity Exchange, are 
emerging worldwide with an increasing role in agricultural future trades. This 
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is evidenced by the fact that the Dalian soy meal future is the most traded 
contract in the world (Meyer et al., 2017). The growth of the Chinese market 
in particular has been mainly driven by the trade of soybean and soybean oil 
derivatives, and saw a 68.7% increase in 2009 (Burghardt and Acworth, 2009: 
25). The following sections will explore how the development of financial 
derivatives and other financial instruments have impacted upon the soybean 
and - more broadly - agricultural complex in South America.  
Financialisation of trade  
In order to understand the different ways in which financial capital has made 
its way into the agricultural sector in South America, this chapter will 
differentiate between the process of financialisation of soybean trade and 
financialisation of soybean production. These two aspects are closely 
connected: the creation of a futures market for the trading of soybean served 
as a source of finance and risk management for businesses involved in the 
direct production of soybean. By distinguishing between the use of financial 
instruments in the trading of soybean and the role of financial capitals more 
directly in the production process, it is possible to understand the different 
dynamics through which the process of deterritorialisation creates new 
spaces, links different scales and contributes to the emergence of patterns of 
UD. This will be done by first focusing on the emergence of national markets 
for the exchange of soybean derivatives and their functioning in South 
America; second, by analysing the relationship of these institutions with the 
dominant exchange market globally, the CBOT; and finally, by addressing the 
possibilities for the emergence of a regional commodity market exchange. It 
will be evident from this section, then, that the spatial dynamics engendered 
by an increasing presence of finance in agriculture in the Global North have 
had similar effects on soybean production in South America – such as higher 
vulnerability to speculative movements in price and availability of liquidity – 
while also provoking other rescaling dynamics at the regional level.  
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The existing literature has focused more on the financialisation of trade, the 
historical progress of which was examined in the previous section. The 
creation of agricultural derivatives was a response to trends in the global 
political economy, and their role in South America is inextricably linked to 
these developments. Financialisation of production, on the other hand, has 
attracted less attention. One of the reasons for this being, as Visser et al. put it, 
that the ‘private financial sector is usually cautious to invest in actual 
agricultural production yet eager to speculate in related derivatives markets’ 
(Visser et al., 2015: 545, emphasis original). The role of financial capital in 
production has thus been more timid, but has nevertheless expanded in the 
last ten years given the potential for profit that the sector has offered.  
South American markets for agricultural derivatives  
There are three main markets for futures in the countries that concern this 
thesis: BM&F Bovespa, based in São Paulo, Brazil; the Rosario Futures 
Exchange (ROFEX) and the Buenos Aires Futures Exchange (MATBA), both in 
Argentina. Paraguay is the only country that does not have a market for futures 
of its own. 
BM&F Bovespa is one of the largest exchange markets in the world, ranking 
higher than ROFEX and MATBA in the Futures Industry Association (FIA) 
ranking. However, soybean’s share in this market is rather small compared to 
other contracts - both agricultural and others – and it is traded at a similar 
volume to Rosario and Buenos Aires. In 2012, commodities contracts in BM&F 
Bovespa represented only 0.4% of the total of contracts negotiated that year; 
and of that, 2.5% were soybean contracts (including futures, put and call 
options) (BM&F Bovespa, 2017).  Agribusiness actors in Brazil do not consider 
this exchange to be particularly relevant and in general express a preference 
for using Chicago’s futures exchange (interview FIESP, 2014; interview MAPA, 
2014; interview SPA, 2014). This reflects the largely global vision held by the 
Brazilian private sector, which is generally more concerned with enhancing 
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the position of Brazilian soybean on the global scale, rather than developing 
alternative spaces for financial development nationally or regionally. 
Argentina’s two futures markets are much more heavily influenced by 
soybean production, and the volume of contracts traded reflects this. ROFEX 
(Mercado a Termino de Rosario S.A.) was founded in 1909 with the aim of 
providing a market for the exchange of futures and options contracts based on 
commodities in Argentina. It is located in the city of Rosario, the main centre 
for agricultural trade in the country. Often referred to as ‘the Chicago of South 
America’, it bears many resemblances with the North American city, due to its 
key location in relation to both production centres and global markets, which 
has contributed to its consolidation as the hub for trade and distribution of 
agricultural production (see Chapter 4).  
While also trading wheat and maize, the most important commodity traded 
in ROFEX is soybean, and the organisation offers four different contracts, 
varying in size and delivery type (the contract is either realised by delivering 
the actual commodity or the cash from its sale).19 The availability of multiple 
types of contracts is reflective of the expanding role of this commodity in the 
financial market, as more options means that soybean derivatives can be 
purchased for different purposes or by actors with different interests. This is 
reflected too in the number of contracts traded in ROFEX, as operations in the 
Division of Agricultural Derivatives grew consistently since 2009, chiefly 
through the increase in soybean contracts, which in 2014 represented more 
than half of all agricultural futures traded (ROFEX, 2017; Marcus et al., 2010). 
ROFEX also trades a Chicago soybean contract, a derivative liquidated by the 
international benchmark of the price of soybean futures in the Chicago Market 
                                                          
19 The contracts available on soybean are Soybean (U$S), Rosafe Soybean Index, Soybean Up 
River and Soybean Chicago. The Soybean contract is by delivery, while the Rosafe Index is 
cash-settlement only. In 2011, ROFEX launched the Soybean Chicago contract, a smaller 
contract, for only 5 tonnes to exchange soybean futures from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
(CME). All other contracts are for 30 tonnes (ROFEX, 2017).  
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Exchange (CME). This contract can be negotiated not only as an agricultural 
derivative, but also on the market’s Division of Financial Derivatives, and as it 
does not require delivery of the product, it can be incorporated into a larger 
investment portfolio (ROFEX, 2016). This instrument thus further severs the 
connection between the concrete, use value aspect of soybean production and 
the exchange value that the soybean commodity represents. In this sense, such 
a derivative signifies an enhanced deterritorialisation of profit-making from 
the territorially-based process of agricultural production, as well as 
demonstrating the global scale of ROFEX’ operations. 
MATBA is the second largest market for agricultural commodities 
derivatives in the region. Most of the contracts traded in MATBA are 
agricultural derivatives: wheat, maize, soybean, sorghum, sunflower, barley, 
soybean oil and an agricultural commodities index – or Indice de Commodities 
Agricolas (ICA) in Spanish. A contract for the dollar is the only non-commodity 
based product. While ROFEX presents itself as the main player in commodity 
futures in Argentina, MATBA has evidently been more dominant, particularly 
when looking at the volumes traded in each contract, and more specifically in 
soybean. MATBA’s own analysis shows that in the second half of the 1990s, the 
institution was more dynamic than ROFEX and even the São Paulo exchange 
(BM&F Bovespa) (Wolberg, 1998). In 2010, out of a total of almost 20 million 
tonnes of agricultural derivatives, 15 million tonnes corresponded to soybean 
contracts. The market reached a peak in 2012, when over 25 million tonnes of 
soybean contracts were negotiated, a ratio of over 50% relative to the 40 
million tonnes of soybean produced that year (MATba Datacenter, 2016; 
Direccion de Estimaciones Agricolas y Delegaciones, 2017).  
In this sense, Argentina’s two major markets for futures differentiate 
themselves from both Paraguay and Brazil – as the former lacks markets of 
this kind altogether, and the second appears to privilege the US for agricultural 
derivatives. Moreover, Argentina’s markets are dominated by soybean, and 
have found their dynamism and expansion largely thanks to the oilseed and its 
5. Financialisation and accumulation: the politics of capital mobility  
 
 
142 
by-products. By 1999, soybean futures were already performing remarkably 
well in international markets, which led analysts at MATBA to consider the 
soybean-based products to be one of the most important strategic products in 
the domestic and international future commodities market, with a 
‘consolidated present, and promising future’ (Wolberg, 1999: 14).  
Markets for derivatives constitute a crucial space in the Argentine soybean 
complex. The growth in volume and value of both ROFEX and MATBA confirms 
the expanding role of soybean as a source of profit for financial markets and as 
an influence on the physical market through price discovery. Certain evidence 
suggests that there is increasing interest in buying soybean contracts not with 
the intention of acquiring the physical product, but as purely profit-making 
exercise. For example, only 2% of commodity futures contracts globally end 
with delivery of the physical good (Thomson and Dutta, 2015: 23). However, 
this has not been a linear tendency; rather, the trade of futures and options has 
largely followed trends in the international price of commodities. As ROFEX 
notes, the ratio of production/volume of futures and options traded for soy, 
wheat and maize has settled around 30% in 2016, after having reached the 
maximum of 50% in 2011-2012 (ROFEX, 2017), a time when the international 
price of soybean was escalating and reached its peak in July 2012.  That means 
that during 2011-2012, the volume of soy traded through derivatives was 
equal to half of all grain production in Argentina. Financial instruments have 
had an increasing role in soybean markets at the regional and national level, 
as well as the global; and as prices rise, production expands, and the presence 
of speculative capitals through derivatives markets enhances the volatility that 
already characterises this sector.  
The Chicago Board of Trade and its role as a global price-setting space  
As described in the section above, CBOT has historically been the leading 
market in the exchange of commodity derivatives worldwide. This is the result 
of the volume of contracts negotiated there, which in turn is linked to the US’ 
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productive and export capacity. Its influence comes from its position as an 
international benchmark and price setter for all the other financial and 
physical transactions in the sector. The ‘exclusive and pure’ price of soybean – 
and other commodities - is defined by Chicago (interview Molinos, 2014). 
While considered international, implying it is the expression of global trends 
in supply and demand of soybean and other commodities, the CBOT’s price-
setting capacity demonstrates Chicago’s – and more generally the US’ – 
authority in the governance of the agricultural commodities’ market. The US 
domestic conditions do not only determine the international benchmark for 
agricultural commodities derivatives, but the institutional infrastructure is 
also immersed in the US’ regulatory context, reinforcing the US state’s capacity 
to influence this global market. This domination by a specific state power hints 
at the groundedness, or reterritorialisation, of the globally agreed value of 
agricultural commodities. This territorial power is exercised across multiple 
scales, as the price determined by the CBOT is also used as a reference for 
regional and national markets, as the section above has shown, with ROFEX 
selling contracts based on the US institution’s benchmark.  
In smaller markets outside the US, such as ROFEX and MATBA, the price 
established in Chicago – termed the flat price – is only part of the component 
of the final price. A second element – called the premium – contributes to the 
final price of soybean at the national level. This premium is determined by 
domestic conditions, particularly in large producing countries such as Brazil 
and Argentina, such as logistics, regional factors such as location and climate, 
or conditions of production. These can push the final price upwards or 
downwards, by adding to or subtracting from the flat price. For example, the 
premium will be negative during times of harvest in South America when there 
is more availability of soy, hence driving down the CBOT flat price. In a sense, 
the premium acts as a rescaling mechanism by emphasising domestic and 
regional variables, such that the final price of soybean reflects conditions at a 
variety of geographic scales. 
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Not only do domestic conditions still have a considerable influence over the 
national price, but also, due to their increasing size and relevance, these 
markets have growing impact on the CBOT price itself. Alterations in the 
supply from South American producers can affect the composition of the 
Chicago benchmark (interview Molinos, 2014), hence reflecting a slowly 
emerging re-balancing of influence in the global food system, as markets 
previously in the periphery of the price-setting mechanisms are gaining 
relevance on the global scale. Similarly, the Dalian Market Exchange in China 
is also growing in significance, particularly in the soybean market, as between 
2007 and 2008 soybean futures and soybean meal futures were the most 
traded contracts (Burghardt and Acworth, 2009: 28). In this sense, the spatial 
reconfiguration of the agricultural derivatives market follows the 
transformations in the geography of agricultural production, and indeed the 
world economy more broadly, experienced in the last decades. 
The CBOT is influential not only as a price-setting mechanism, but also 
impacts upon the value and popularity of a specific contract, which is seen as 
a secure and profitable investment. As we have mentioned before, ROFEX, as 
well as MATBA and BM&F Bovespa, sell soybean contracts - in addition to 
wheat and maize – linked to the Chicago market. These contracts are offered 
as opportunities to acquire the benchmark contract used worldwide. It is also, 
however, a tool that perpetuates Chicago’s role as price setter and market 
leader. On the other hand, in 2005 CBOT started trading South American 
soybean futures, which ‘provide its customers with a highly correlated price 
risk management tool and a transparent pricing reference based on the South 
American soybean crop’ (CBOT, 2005: 3). This is both an indicator of the 
recognised significance of the South American export of soybean, and a way of 
‘strengthening the CBOT’s role as the global soybean benchmark’ (2005: 3).  
Financialisation is one aspect of an increasingly ‘nonlinear, 
multidimensional, multi-scalar’ economy (Aalbers, 2015: 215), and its 
increasing presence in agriculture indicates the growing complexity and 
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ongoing rescaling experienced by this sector. The development and 
consolidation of exchange markets for derivatives of agricultural products, of 
which soybean is an increasingly dominant element, demonstrates how the 
soybean trade has acquired an undeniably mobile nature that contrasts with 
the rather fixed and grounded nature of its physical production. It is not the 
soybean product or even its use value which is traded in Chicago, but its 
exchange value, which acquires an existence of its own, increasingly detached 
from the real economy and deterritorialised from any particular production 
zone. Soybean contracts are exchanged for cash delivery, that is, without the 
expectation of receiving the actual commodity in return, but simply as a bet on 
the variability of its price. Moreover, the increasing financialisation of this 
sector through the creation and trade of derivatives has given it a multi-scalar 
nature, connecting farmers in the Argentine pampas or the Brazilian Cerrado 
to brokers and investors like pension fund contributors in the US and other 
parts of the Global North. The authority of CBOT in the agricultural futures and 
options market is reflective of a global system with a particular spatial 
configuration – one in which even the highly mobile financial sector has certain 
territorial anchors. Nevertheless, in recent years this has begun to change, as 
South America and China have started to play a more significant role in the 
market for agricultural derivatives. The next section thus explores the 
opportunities for alternative spaces of financial accumulation being proposed 
in the countries of the Southern Cone. 
Towards a Global South price setter mechanism?  
The growing relevance of South American economies in the trade of 
agricultural commodities, and the soybean sector in particular, has led some 
to contemplate the potential for a South American Exchange Market, as an 
alternative to Chicago so as to challenge the price-setting power of the US-
based institution.  
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The first initiative appeared towards the end of the 1990s, when the 
International Trade Secretary of Argentina took an interest in a proposition 
from a civil society institution to create a Futures Market Exchange in the 
Southern Hemisphere based on soybean (interview FIEL, 2014). This interest 
derived from a preoccupation with the high levels of distortion in Chicago 
prices, which consequently impacted on the performance of Argentine 
agricultural commodities, as Chicago effectively imposed prices that did not 
reflect the Argentina’s productive conditions. In total, South America already 
constituted the largest producer and exporter of soybean, which meant that as 
a region it had considerable leverage to propose such an alternative. Such an 
arrangement would entail that Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay would have 
greater control over the governance of the international and domestic price of 
soybean. ROFEX, which at the time was being consolidated as a significant 
institution in commodities exchange, put together a report on the topic which 
expressed their support for the initiative. However, this idea never developed 
further from that initial stage, as general instability and the crisis of 
2001/2002 hit the Argentine economy (interview FIEL, 2014). 
 Similarly, there have been attempts to unify the exchange markets in 
Argentina, by combining the transactions of both ROFEX and MATBA to build 
a stronger alternative to Chicago. According to members of both organisations, 
this would be more efficient in economic terms – due to the economies of scale 
– and the project was thus given serious and formal consideration. Despite 
this, as private institutions, both corporations responded to their own 
shareholders and a lack of common agreement meant that the project was 
ultimately abandoned, though the reasons behind this were not clear 
(interview Bolsa de Cereales, 2014).  
According to its proponents, having a regional market for agricultural futures 
and options would produce a more reliable and accurate price, reflecting the 
realities of production in the Southern Cone. Harvest in the US is at the 
opposite time of year, and as such stocks of soybean are high in South America 
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when they are low in the US The high price established in the Global North to 
spread out the remaining volumes, is then taken by South American producers 
via the flat price, hence forcing farmers to apply numerous discounts and 
adjust this price (Calzada and Dalonso, 2015: 5). Additionally, one interviewee 
pointed to the fear that, in a reconfiguration of price-setting power, it would 
be the purchasing market, namely, China, which will hold that capacity. As 
such, large producers would be in a disadvantaged position in terms of 
governance of trade conditions, making the issue of a common futures market 
a rather urgent one (interview FIEL, 2014).  
There is still a significant amount of support for a South American soybean 
future market, which at one point even manifested itself as a proposal for a 
market for the Southern Hemisphere, including the ‘triangle of soybean’ 
constituted by Brazil, Argentina and China (InfoCampo, 2006).  Recently, 
economists from the ROFEX research institution again highlighted the 
extensive basis of support for a South American soybean future, included that 
of a powerful Paraguayan farmers’ union (Calzada and Dalonso, 2015: 5; La 
Nacion Paraguay, 2015). The ROFEX economists highlighted the relevance of 
an ‘indisputable’ South American price index for soybean that reflects the real 
productive capacity of the region (Calzada and Dalonso, 2015). With regard to 
soybean, and grains more generally, the countries of Mercosur and Bolivia 
have surpassed US levels of cultivated area, production, crushing capacity and 
export, thus creating the basis for the constitution of a viable alternative to the 
CBOT. However, this hypothetical project cannot be pursued without Brazil, 
the largest producer and exporter in the region. According to several 
interviewees, while aware of the proposition, officials from different 
Ministries and members of agribusiness associations have not expressed 
interest in pursuing such a project (interview MAPA, 2014; interview FIESP, 
2014; interview CNA(a), 2014).  
In sum, while so far yielding no tangible results, efforts to create alternative 
spaces for the governance of soybean derivatives market reflect how the 
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geography of financialised agriculture is being challenged. A derivatives 
market in the Southern Hemisphere would reterritorialise the process of price 
formation mechanisms in South America and strengthen the region’s position 
vis-à-vis Chicago and China, the latter of which is emerging as an alternative 
power centre to Chicago.  As such, it would represent a rescaling of the soybean 
complex by directly linking the financial dimension of this industry with the 
geography of production.  The concentration of capital on soybean derivatives 
has been contributing to these reconfigurations, as the markets that emerge as 
stronger alternatives – chiefly South America and China – are those dominated 
by the oilseed. However, futures and options are attractive as investments 
because they can be quickly exchanged for another asset if the former 
experiences a drop in profitability, embodying capital’s capacity for mobility. 
As such, these reconfigurations have the potential of affecting the fixed 
dimension of the soybean economy in the case of a sudden bust of these 
contracts. The financialisation of the soybean trade has had important spatial 
consequences for this productive complex. Through the advent of soybean 
derivatives, profit-making activity has been detached from the actual 
production and sale of this oilseed and deterritoralised from the lands of the 
Southern Cone. Such financial instruments have thus transformed the scalar 
configuration of the soy complex, by forging links between South American 
exporting countries and key global financial centres. Nevertheless, this process 
of rescaling and deterritorialisation has also been countered by the continuing 
dominance of specific territorialised financial hubs, namely the CBOT, in 
setting the price of soybean. In recent years, this territorial power has been 
challenged by several (so far unsuccessful) attempts by Southern Cone 
producers to establish their own regional financial centre and thus 
reterritorialise this economic activity. Overall, the dynamics explored in this 
section embody certain tension between the disembedded nature of 
derivatives markets and the efforts to reterritorialise it in state contexts, 
whether in the US or in South America. The next section will explore how the 
actual production of soybean has also been affected by financialisation.  
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Financialisation of production 
Planting Pools 
In a process that started in the late 1970s and consolidated in the early 
1990s, the Argentine agricultural production matrix experienced a substantial 
transformation. One of the main changes was the emergence of the contractor 
– an individual or firm hired on a temporary basis to provide services, such as 
harvesting or fumigation - as a key actor in the productive system (Piñeiro and 
Villarreal, 2005; Lombardo and Garcia, 2015). New forms of organisation 
emerged, as deregulation of imports allowed the incorporation of new inputs 
and machinery, and contractors gained a prominent role in production. One of 
these new forms was the so-called planting or sowing pools, financial 
operations that group together investment, agricultural management and 
contractors for the production and commercialisation of agricultural 
commodities, most commonly soybean.  
Sowing pools first appeared in the 1990s, as part of several transformations 
taking place in the Argentine countryside which were sparked by new 
legislation passed by the national state. As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
the privatisation of ports and storage facilities in the 1990s contributed to the 
increasing role of transnational companies in agricultural trade, encouraging 
large scale production and resulting in the marginalisation of smaller farmers. 
Moreover, in 1991 a decree was passed that eliminated all agricultural 
regulatory bodies – such as the National Board of Grains and the National 
Board of Meat – making the Argentine agricultural system one of the most 
deregulated in the world (Teubal and Palmisano, 2010: 205). The National 
Boards had been created in the aftermath of the 1929 Wall Street crash and 
their aim was to regulate the agricultural sector by, for example, controlling 
prices in order to support grain or cattle producers (Teubal, 2009: 75). The 
dismantling of these boards meant the elimination of any institutional channel 
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for state intervention in agriculture in Argentina, and the market was left free 
to movements of capital, both national and global.    
Particularly significant for the emergence of planting pools were two 
legislative changes. The first was the liberalisation of conditions for the renting 
of land and the promotion of so-called ‘accidental leasing’, meaning rent 
contracts for the duration of one harvest only. Thus encouraging short-term 
investments that reinforce the role of the contractor as essential in this new 
accumulation process, particularly in the mechanisation of the Argentine 
countryside and the incorporation of advanced technology (Teubal, 2009: 205; 
Lombardo and Garcia, 2015). The second measure was the passing of a law 
that exempted the investor’s profits from income tax (Piñeiro and Villareal, 
2005: 34). The state was fundamental in providing the fiscal and structural 
conditions for the emergence of these short-term operations in the Argentine 
agricultural system.    
According to Piñeiro and Villareal (2005), sowing pools typically include 
three key actors: a legal person - a public limited company, a trust fund, or any 
other legal form - who is responsible for the general management of the 
operation; an individual in charge of acquiring the financial capital, dealing 
with investors and management of the financial transactions; and an 
individual (agricultural engineer or manager) providing the technical 
knowledge to take responsibility for the property’s rent and administration of 
production (2005: 34). These actors work together and offer potential 
investors a cultivation plan and an estimated rate of return at the end of the 
harvest. Production is based on renting - which could cover one or more 
properties - and hiring of services to contractors for each stage of the process.  
This production method relies on economies of scale and temporary 
investment in variable capital for the creation of high profit rates. Fixed capital, 
such as land, machinery, and even storage facilities, is hired for a limited time. 
Capital accumulation is limited to a single harvest, with no long-term 
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commitment that would require more extensive investment. Sowing pools’ 
short-term profitability works as an enabler of mobility, as capital can be 
invested in another crop, or even another activity, after the harvest is finished. 
Such short-term time horizons and high levels of capital mobility are 
characteristic of financial capital. Indeed, several authors give as the key 
feature of sowing pools the fact that these are ‘promotors of short-term 
investment external to the agricultural world’ (Piñeiro and Villareal, 2005: 33) 
which are ultimately integrating the financial sector into Argentina’s 
agricultural system (Teubal and Palmisano, 2010: 208). There is a shared 
understanding that these mechanisms are yet another channel for the 
increasing financialisation of agricultural production.  
The sowing pools hence brought extra-agricultural capitals – external 
investors with no knowledge or specific interest in agriculture – into the 
production process; actors that are generally only concerned with the rate of 
profit rather than with the development of the sector as such. Three main 
forms of capital can be identified: banks, financial institutions, and pension 
funds; new agribusiness companies, involved in production or inputs; and 
isolated investors, such as small and medium savers looking to incorporate 
certain financial risk (Posada and Martinez de Ibarreta, 1998: 123-124). In this 
way, urban capitals are thus incorporated into the countryside, further 
confirming Lefebvre’s idea of the urbanisation of the rural. While initially these 
capitals were mainly domestic, sowing pools have attracted more foreign 
financial capitals, such as El Tejar, which received investment from British 
banks and US stockholders (interview Molinos, 2014; La Nación, 2008b). 
Financing mechanisms for agricultural production are thus rescaled towards 
regional and global levels, to the point that identifying the origins of 
investments into different properties becomes an extremely difficult task. But 
chiefly, this acts as a mechanism to increase deterritorialisation, as the 
liberalisation of the sector contributes to the absence of state authority and 
thus highly mobile financial capital has direct access to productive processes, 
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instead of being intermediated by an institutional market, such as those 
analysed in the previous section. 
These capitals are organised in ad hoc companies controlled by larger 
corporations (Dominguez and Sabatino, 2006: 263), but in general can take 
several legal forms, the trust fund being the most popular, which are supposed 
to have an asset rating as demanded by the National Commission of Values 
(Teubal and Palmisano, 2010: 209). Some of these ad hoc companies or trust 
funds, such as Los Grobos and El Tejar, eventually grew enough to transform 
into large businesses that even attempted to take this commercial format to 
neighbouring countries like Uruguay, Brazil, Paraguay and Bolivia. While it 
could be said that these companies do not constitute planting pools as such 
anymore, namely due to their formal constitution as agribusiness and 
investment companies, the same business principle still drives their activities.  
Sowing pools also enhance rescaling processes from the local to higher 
levels. By working at larger scales and with foreign management, these 
organisations abandon or ignore local networks of input provision, services 
and storage, thus disrupting the local embedding of agricultural production. 
There is damage to the existing commercial and productive systems of 
countryside towns, as local distributors get cut out of the circuit or town 
cooperatives lose the capacity to create economies of scale (Dominguez and 
Sabatino, 2006: 264). Additionally, workforce employment is remarkably low 
in these structures, with only 1.6 hours of work per hectare used for soy 
production in 2011, an average labour demand that is four times lower than a 
decade ago (INTA PRECOP, 2011: 6). This shows the overall low labour 
intensity which characterises production of soy, and hence its transformation 
into a mechanised, capital intensive activity.    
This system remained extremely profitable during the 1990s and 2000s, as 
investors were offered a yearly rate of return of 16% on average 
(Agroconsortium, 2017), but with some funds reaching  profitability levels of 
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around 35 to 40% (Posada and Martinez de Ibarreta, 1998: 129). In 
2008/2009, 40 of the largest sowing pools covered an area between 2 and 2.5 
million hectares, that is, around 10% of the total surface planted with soybean 
(Bertello, 2015a). There is no official information on the size and expansion of 
these investment funds, but estimations by Marcelo Posada and Mariano 
Martinez de Ibarreta in 1998 concluded around 20% of the total agricultural 
planted surface was organised in pools (1998: 123). While more recently there 
has been a decrease in the number of planting pools (Bertello, 2015a), these 
investment funds became a significant mechanism in the creation of profit in 
the soybean sector and, as the information presented suggests, had 
concentrated much of Argentine soybean in their own hands. The short-term 
nature of these arrangements responds to the need for capital to remain 
mobile in order to quickly move to more profitable activities.  
Many agribusiness companies attempted to export this model to 
neighbouring countries, with Los Grobo beginning operations in Brazil and 
Paraguay, and El Tejar producing over a large area in Uruguay for some time. 
In this country, Argentine sowing pools advanced considerably, covering 35% 
of the soybean planted area in the 2009/2010 season (INTA PRECOP, 2011). 
However, the decline in soybean’s international price and the change in the 
Uruguayan state’s policies have contributed to the decline of these structures 
as key actors in the domestic and regional system. An increase in leasing, 
together with a drop in the commodity’s international price, pushed down the 
competitivity of these arrangements, hence reducing the number of operations 
of this kind from 2009 onwards (Bertello, 2015a).  
Rural credit and insurance in Brazil 
Managing risks related to weather and other unforeseen events affecting 
production has always been a central issue in agricultural production. 
Forward contracts – which gradually came to involve the use of intermediaries 
– allowed buyers to hedge against higher prices in the event that some 
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producers failed to deliver the harvest, and helped farmers protect themselves 
from a sudden decrease in prices that would make them incur losses. In 
addition to the existence of futures, requests for increasing liquidity for 
production – crucial for mechanised agriculture, which demands large initial 
capital to cover input costs – resulted in the creation of several financial 
instruments, such as rural credits and rural insurance, as a way of managing 
the risk of a potential problem with the harvest or sudden variations in the 
price of the crop.  
In Brazil, the state has been very involved in the development of agriculture 
and particularly of soybean since the crop began to expand in the 1970s. 
Through the governmental agency EMBRAPA, the state had a strong role in the 
development and expansion of the agricultural frontier by, for example, 
developing cooperation agreements with Japan (interview Nidera Brazil, 
2014). EMBRAPA, the Brazilian Company for Agricultural Research, was 
particularly crucial in developing soybean seed varieties that would adapt first 
to the South of Brazil and later to the more tropical climate of the Cerrado 
(interview Nidera Brazil, 2014; Schlesinger and Noronha, 2006). According to 
an interviewee from Nidera Brazil and former researcher at EMBRAPA, up 
until 1995, very few seed breeding companies would venture into developing 
soybean varieties adaptable to Brazilian climates, namely due to the lack of 
legal protection, hence most of the contributions to soy expansion came from 
the public agency (interview Nidera Brazil, 2014). Besides the research and 
technical sphere, the state also maintained a significant role for itself through 
the provision of rural credits and insurance to protect farmers, particularly in 
the recently incorporated areas, such as the Brazilian Cerrado. In 1964, the 
National System for Rural Credit - SNCR in Portuguese - was created in Brazil, 
and the following year Rural Credit was institutionalised through federal 
legislation. The Banco do Brasil – a mixed entity, 70% of whose shares are 
owned by the Federal Government, while the remainder are traded at the 
BM&F Bovespa – became the main financial institution providing credit at a 
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reduced interest rate that was specifically tailored for agricultural production. 
This is consistent with the state’s strong intervention and funding of this 
economic sector, which, according to a former Brazilian Minister of 
Agriculture, should be one of the three fundamental instruments for an 
agricultural income policy, along with rural insurance and price guarantees 
(interview GV AGRO, 2014).   
However, while the increasing capitalisation of agriculture and the 
expansion of larger farms into new arable land raised demand for rural credit, 
the state became progressively unable to meet these funding requests. In the 
state of Mato Grosso, for example, farms extend well beyond one hundred 
thousand hectares, thus demanding more than what the upper limit of cash the 
SNCR is able to give to a legal individual or association (interview Agroconsult, 
2014). While almost half of the rural credit assigned in 2014 was funded under 
the SNCR framework (interview Agroconsult, 2014), there has been an 
increasing incentive for private companies and alternative sources of funding 
to cover this once state-dominated sphere. Large trading companies have been 
taking on this role, mainly by acting as intermediaries in offering inputs and 
machinery in exchange for a pre-determined volume of commodities after 
harvest (interview Agroconsult, 2014; SNA, 2015; Silva and Rebolo Lapo, 
2012). According to consulting company Agroconsult, around 32% of 
producers now turn to trading companies to deliver this role of financing in 
Brazil, and in states like Mato Grosso this proportion has reached 50% 
(interview Agroconsult, 2014). This kind of operation, known as ‘barter’, offers 
a simpler contract, by reducing intermediaries, and extends the trader’s 
control over the production of soybean itself, as it directly ensures access to 
the oilseed before production actually takes place, thus functioning like a 
future contract. On the other hand, from the perspective of the farmer, this acts 
as an ‘escape valve’ for cash-short producers, by allowing them to cover the 
upfront costs and reduce risks (SNA, 2015).  
5. Financialisation and accumulation: the politics of capital mobility  
 
 
156 
Another measure taken to relieve the state of its financial burden towards 
agriculture was the introduction in 1999 of the Cedula de Produto Rural – CPR 
(Note of Rural Product). This title, offered by the Banco do Brasil but traded in 
the BM&F Bovespa, is a forward contract for the commercalisation of 
agribusiness products with the obligation of payment in product (known as 
Physical CPR) or in monetary value (Financial CPR) (Banco do Brasil, 2016).  
Through this mechanism, the debt acquired by the producer to cover costs of 
inputs or to finance production in general is securitised, meaning it has been 
‘repackaged into interest-bearing securities’ (Jobst, 2008: 48). The 
securitisation of rural credit has served as a device for the progressive 
expansion of private credit and consequent reduction of state financing. What 
used to be provided by the state, is now transformed into a financial product 
that is traded in the exchange market as a new monetary commodity. This in 
turn has opened the possibility for new products to emerge, such as the Letra 
de Credito do Agronegocio - LCA (Credit Bill of Agribusiness) a contract 
created in 2006 and exclusively provided by financial institutions, but that is 
only available as a source of finance for large agribusiness corporations or 
cooperatives, rather than small scale farmers or family agriculture (Bouainain 
et al., 2007: 39). The multiplication of instruments available to finance 
agricultural production, and their increasing securitisation, may on one hand 
seem to contribute liquidity to the productive structure, but on the other hand, 
it increases the mobility of capital, and with that the capacity for capital to flee 
to other sectors when deemed more profitable. These mechanisms therefore 
enhance the concentration of capital in soybean in the short term, but 
accentuate the possibilities for massive disinvestment when the commodity 
boom slows.   
Debates over the last ten years on rural insurance have seen many arguing 
in favour of increasing private participation at the expense of public provision. 
In 2003 the Brazilian government passed a law to subsidise farmers’ insurance 
premiums, as an incentive to increase coverage of the planted area. By ending 
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the monopoly held by the Instituto de Resseguros do Brasil (National Institute 
of Insurance) over agricultural insurance in 2007, the private sector – both 
domestic and international – was allowed to play a greater role, creating a new 
domestic market (Ramalho da Silva, 2014). However, progress has been quite 
limited. The main problem seemed to be a mismatch in the market. According 
to the former President of the Brazilian Rural Society: ‘few rural producers 
have access [to insurance], because the insurance is expensive, but it is 
expensive because the number of clients is small’ (Ramalho da Silva, 2014: 85). 
The federal (national) state’s efforts to expand the reach of insurance have 
been significant: subsidies to insurance premiums increased by 95% from 
2006 to 2007, while the amount provided by the federal government for this 
purpose reached almost $61 million Brazilian Reals (BRL). By 2011, this had 
increased to BRL$400 million. However, as of 2014, only 12% of the planted 
surface was covered by any type of insurance, and in 2012 only 8% of coverage 
was provided by private companies (interview GV AGRO, 2014; Ramalho da 
Silva, 2014: 86).    
While the participation of private international companies has increased in 
the last four years (interview Agroconsult, 2014), state intervention remains 
very strong in the provision of this service or at least the facilitation of the 
market. In the case of soybean, the subsidy given by the state is 60% of the 
premium for regions where the crop forms a crucial source of economic 
growth (PSAN, 2017). Debates within the government persist on whether 
rural credit should be public or private, with many other actors such as the 
Rural Society arguing in favour of the latter (interview MAPA, 2014; interview 
SRB, 2014). Yet the limited expansion of the private sector in this area has 
necessitated continuous and increasing intervention by the state in the form 
of prime subsidies. As such, the Brazilian state acts as a facilitator and enabler 
of the market by incentivising its formation. 
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The banking system in Paraguay 
In Paraguay, the banking system plays a significant role in the agribusiness 
complex through the provision of credit and financial services. However, 
Paraguay’s banking structure has only recently acquired stability and strength, 
as it had been affected by two financial crises, in the mid 1990s and early 
2000s. The first crisis began in 1995 and resulted in an increasing mistrust in 
the national currency and a transformation of deposits into US dollars, which 
made up 64.7% of all deposits in 2000 (Insfrán Pelozo, 2000: 6-7). These crises 
were partly caused by the high degree of informality existing in the financial 
system, in which banks made profits by providing loans to the agro-export 
sector and financing that with credits at fixed rates from the central bank, 
creating a spread.20 In this context, private banks were in competition with 
each other over government funds rather than over private savings (2000: 9).    
As a result, the number of institutions operating in the Paraguayan system 
was reduced substantially, resulting in a smaller, concentrated number of 
banks and financial institutions. In terms of the banking structure, there are 
four identifiable groups: branches of international financial institutions; banks 
that are majority owned by transnational entities; domestic capital banks; and 
one state-managed institution (ABC Color, 2014). Foreign banks make up a 
considerable part of the Paraguayan banking structure, as almost half of 
institutions are foreign or with a majority of foreign capital. The credit 
operations, deposits and assets of international institutions are equivalent to 
domestic bank holdings and assets, and thus global financial actors have a very 
significant presence in the Paraguayan national financial system (Banco 
Central del Paraguay, 2015).  
The banking sector is of vital importance to the agricultural sector, as it is an 
important source of credit for production. In fact, along with loans for 
                                                          
20 A spread is the difference between credit tax rates, in this case, between the one established 
by the Central Bank and that of private institutions.  
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consumer goods, agriculture has been one of the main drivers of growth of the 
banking sector between 2010 and 2014, with an increase of 235% since 2009 
(ABC Color, 2014). In 2014 agricultural loans constituted 22% of the system, 
with 50% of that corresponding to activities linked to the soybean production 
complex (2014), which is the single most important sector in volume of credits 
(Banco Central del Paraguay, 2015).21  
As the Paraguayan banking system is key in the provision of credit to the 
soybean complex – while at the same time linking its own growth to the 
expansion of soybean production – the soy complex is also fundamental as one 
of the main providers of deposits (interview Base IS, 2014). The large amounts 
of profits created through soybean production and trade, enter the banking 
system where there is a preponderant role of Brazilian banks, namely the 
privately owned Itaú and the partially state-owned Banco do Brasil.  
In this case, the financial system, through the banking structure, acts as an 
additional mechanism for the financialisation of production and its profits, and 
reinforces the tendency towards UD. While soybean is produced on 
Paraguayan territory, the profits are deposited in mainly foreign banks, with a 
predominance of Brazilian banks, thus contributing to the financial expansion 
of the global scale and reinforcing uneven patterns in the regional relationship 
between Paraguay and Brazil.  
Conclusion  
The aim of this chapter was to demonstrate the increasing role of 
financialisation in the agricultural economy and examine the manner in which 
capital mobility – facilitated by financialisation – enhances a particular 
                                                          
21 Besides the private sector, there are Public Financial Institutions which increasingly position 
themselves as providers of rural credit, such as the Banco Nacional del Fomento (National 
Bank of Development); Agencia Financiera de Desarrollo (National Agency of Development); 
Credito Agricola de Habilitacion (Agricultural Credit of Authorisation); Fondo Ganadero 
(Livestock Fund) y la Secretaria Nacional de la Vivienda y el Habitat (National Secretary for 
Home and Habitat) (Itau, 2012). However, these represent a very small portion compared to 
the presence of domestic and foreign private banks.  
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geography of the soybean complex that is increasingly multi-scalar, de-
territorialised and uneven. Through the growing presence of financial actors – 
such as banks, hedge funds and trust funds, among others – agribusiness in 
general, but particularly soybean in South America, has been linked to 
mechanisms for the generation of profit that are detached from the real 
economy and characterised by speculation over profit and price fluctuations. 
In the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, agricultural commodities 
emerged as an attractive alternative for financial capital in the search for 
larger profits (Visser et al., 2015).  
This chapter analysed two key aspects of this process: the financialisation of 
trade and of production. The financialisation of trade takes mobility of 
agricultural capital to the logical extreme. The creation and expansion of 
soybean derivatives has expanded the reign of exchange value, as profit is 
made from speculation on commodity price fluctuations. Most of these 
transactions are not actually completed, or the soybean that was theoretically 
traded is never delivered, but they are rather simply bets on their exchange 
value and its behaviour. The tangible characteristics of this high-protein 
oilseed fade into irrelevance as the movements in its price become the basis of 
capital accumulation. The rise of soybean derivatives has also rescaled this 
agro-industrial complex by forging connections between the Southern Cone 
and a variety of global financial centres. Nevertheless, this deterritorialised 
financial activity has been challenged by processes of reterritorialisation, as 
several - thus far unsuccessful - initiatives have been pursued to set up a South 
American Exchange Market that would challenge the hegemony of Chicago.  
Overall, the financialisation of the production and trade of soybean has 
transformed the spatial configuration of this industry. As Buranello explained, 
the soybean complex has become an ‘activity of capital’, such that 
‘relationships of agribusiness are not productive, but overall they are financial’ 
(2016: 13). In all three countries, financialisation has thus contributed to the 
rescaling of the soybean complex into a truly global network and enhanced the 
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potential for a rapid disinvestment in this industry by enhancing the mobility 
of capital. This sector has been rescaled not just through the connection of 
exporters and importers, but through the integration of this industry into 
global financial networks.  
Financial capital and its drivers - short-term profits derived from speculation 
on price movements – have become a key component in the spatial 
organisation of the soybean complex. This has both freed up credit for the 
massive extension of fixed soybean production in the Southern Cone and 
increased the risk of massive disinvestment in the case of a decline in the 
oilseed’s profitability. Financialisation has thus truly accentuated the UD of the 
soy complex by enhancing both dimensions: the enormous concentration of 
capital in specific geographical locations (reterritorialisation), and the 
mobility of capital to flee to more profitable spheres (deterritorialisation). The 
creation of planting pools in Argentina – a process spurred by state 
deregulation – and the increasing role of global financial firms in the 
Paraguayan banking system have accelerated the short-termism, mobility, and 
global nature of the soybean complex. At the same time, the provision of rural 
credit facilities by the Brazilian state and private financial institutions has 
propelled the concentration of soybean capital into huge industrial farms. The 
increasing prevalence of financial capital in this production complex has thus 
boosted both reterritorialisation through the enlargement of fixed agricultural 
production, and deterritorialisation through the mobility of investment.  
This chapter has highlighted the current expression of the mobile quality of 
capital, as the increasing financialisation of trade and production in the 
soybean complex has enhanced the deterritorialisation of profits, allowing the 
rapid movement of capital into this asset, and creating the conditions for its 
rapid retreat. In this sense, the financialisation of agriculture constitutes a key 
element in the contradictory but coexistent forces of re- and 
deterritorialisation, and hence in the seesaw movement of capital. As this 
chapter has shown, for example, the presence of extra-agricultural capitals (p. 
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148) in Argentina has created conditions for new modalities of production, 
namely, in the form of planting pools that incentivise the concentration of land 
and monoculture of soybean. Additionally, these mechanisms create rescaling 
processes, as the produce of local farmers becomes part of global exchange 
markets based in the US, or are able to expand the scale of production due to 
the investment of transnational capitals. 
While expressing the moment of deterritorialisation, these processes are still 
connected to the territoriality of the state. The analysis presented here 
suggests that the state’s participation in governing the financialisation of 
agriculture has enabled the expansion of this phenomenon. The deregulation 
of renting conditions in the Argentine countryside, the state’s subsidies to 
insurance primes in Brazil, and the state’s light-touch intervention in the 
Paraguayan private banking system illustrate the different ways in which the 
states in these countries have stimulated financialisation and, consequently, 
the processes of uneven development that it propels.
   
6. Fiscal strategies and redistribution: the politics of 
taxation 
 
Introduction 
With this chapter, the focus of this thesis moves from the conditions for the 
creation of wealth in the soybean complex, namely the simultaneous 
development of fixed infrastructure and the increasing role of mobile capital, 
to the capacity of the state to regulate these dynamics. As it was more 
extensively explained in the theoretical framework, avoiding the ‘territorial 
trap’ (Agnew, 1994) does not mean ignoring the nation-state, but rather it 
requires one to understand the multiplicity of scales that emerge alongside it. 
Throughout the multi-scalar and sometimes cross-border processes analysed 
in the previous chapters, the state often remained a crucial player in 
facilitating the realisation of moments of deterritorialisation and 
reterritorialisation. Not only does the state co-constitute these dynamics, but 
it can also behave as ‘an institutional mediator of uneven geographical 
development on different spatial scales’ (Brenner, 1998a: 462). In other 
words, processes of globalisation or, in this case, the expansion of the soybean 
complex, are ‘embedded within and dependent upon’ the legal and 
institutional infrastructure provided by the state (Phillips, 2005: 95).   
This chapter and the following chapter develop a country-based analysis of 
states’ capacities for governing the distribution of profits created through the 
soybean complex. Through the study of fiscal and exchange rate policies, this 
thesis will explore the ‘variegated processes of adaptation and transformation’ 
experienced by the Argentinian, Brazilian, and Paraguayan states caused by 
the expansion of industrial agriculture during the latest commodity boom 
(Phillips, 2005: 95). In this sense, these chapters will show how different 
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processes in the global political economy, such as commodity booms, can 
enhance or limit state’s capacity for governance and distribution.  
The expansion of soy production in the context of a global commodity boom 
created a spectrum of possible development pathways for affected countries 
to follow. At one extreme of the spectrum lay the archetypal ‘pink tide’ state 
that would use the extraordinary agricultural revenues to fund programmes 
for social inclusion; while at the other end lay the neoliberal state that would 
facilitate transnational agribusiness elites as they captured the vast majority 
of these revenues (Veltmeyer and Petras, 2014). At the centre of this 
difference is the capacity of the state to accumulate these revenues through 
taxation, and its ability to use them to benefit different sectors of society. In 
the last decade, there has been an upward trend in tax revenue collection in 
the region,22 with tax burdens increasing in average from 15.4% to 19.1% of 
GDP between 2000 and 2011, a significant part of which is explained by an 
increase in proceeds from natural resource exploitation (CEPAL, 2013). By 
looking closely into the design and implementation of the taxation system as a 
mechanism through which distributional conflicts are played out, this chapter 
will analyse the strategies for the capture and redistribution of wealth 
accumulated through agribusiness activities in Argentina, Brazil, and 
Paraguay. 
The resource wealth literature, both in its Economics and Political Science 
traditions, has explored the different ways in which the sudden appearance of 
an extraordinary source of revenues impacts growth, political regimes, and 
conflict in resource rich countries. It has placed a particular emphasis on 
developing countries which, it is argued, are less able and willing to manage 
these resources in the national interest (Karl, 1997, Ross, 1999, Collier, 2007). 
However, these approaches tend not to explore how existing institutional and 
                                                          
22 On average, between 2000 and 2011 fiscal revenues in Latin America increased from 
19.6% to 23.6% of GDP, and tax burden (excluding social security contributions) went from 
12.7% to 15.7% in the same period (CEPAL, 2013: 11-12). 
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political arrangements, such as political regimes, shape the distributional 
conflicts that emerge in response to massive revenues generated by a resource 
boom. Recognising this, recent contributions have analysed how social, 
institutional and political conditions can result in different types of resource 
governance (Rosser, 2006; Nem Singh, 2010, 2013; Haarstad, 2012; Saad-Filho 
and Weeks, 2013; Saylor, 2012, 2014).  
This chapter aims to further develop this approach by incorporating a spatial 
dimension into the analysis. Particularly, it will analyse the design of fiscal 
policies as strategies developed to govern the patterns of UD created by the 
dynamics of capital accumulation in the soybean industry. It will do so by 
analysing how three dimensions – the degree of federalism, the extent to 
which soybean producers are part of elite coalitions, and the (in)existence of 
a state-society compact – determine distributional conflicts that consequently 
affect the design and implementation of tax systems. In turn, these dimensions 
usually embody strategies of de- and reterritorialisation that reflect the role of 
the state operating at different scales. Particularly highlighting their capacity 
in modifying, or reinforcing, the spatial dynamics unfolded by the expansion 
of soybean-fuelled wealth.  
The policies analysed in this and the following chapter reflect the 
contradiction faced by these countries’ governments between supporting the 
renewed state-society relation embedded in the region’s ‘turn to the left’ – 
although reversed in the case of Paraguay – and maintaining the neoliberal 
state-market relations that underpinned the region’s growth model. States are 
pressed to incentivise market expansion based on comparative advantages, in 
this case of the soybean complex, while also addressing popular demands for 
a new social contract and increasing redistribution. In the case of taxation, this 
conundrum is transversed by institutional arrangements framing domestic 
politics, reflected in each of these countries’ fiscal political systems.  
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The following sections will examine each of the selected cases - Argentina, 
Paraguay, and Brazil - and the different outcomes created by the struggles for 
the distribution of soybean revenues. While in Argentina commodity exports 
have been managed within a highly centralised fiscal system, leading to the 
extensive use of fiscal resources for income redistribution, in Paraguay the 
state has been largely co-opted by agribusiness elites, resulting in very limited 
redistribution efforts. Finally, Brazil is marked by a strong federalism that 
restricts the implementation of new taxation mechanisms. This chapter 
concludes that differentiation in national governance models differ is 
influenced by domestic institutional, political, and social conditions, and that 
the availability of large inflows of cash arising from agricultural commodity 
booms – and the patterns of UD that emerge with it - foster the emergence of 
distributional conflicts within such systems. 
Argentina: export-dependent fiscal enlargement 
Argentina has one of the highest tax levels in Latin America, which has 
increased by 10% of GDP since 2000, even surpassing some OECD countries 
(CEPAL, 2013: 14). This contributed to a significant enlargement of its fiscal 
revenue, which went from 25% of GDP in 2000 to 38% in 2011 (2013: 12). In 
the same period as the mentioned fiscal expansion, soybean’s international 
price and its domestic production soared, and tax revenues from the 
commodity’s value chain went from being 1.6% of total Treasury income in 
2000/2001 to representing 8.4% in 2009/2010 (Cohan, 2012). Luciano 
Cohan, estimates that in the 2008-09 harvest the government collected US$9.2 
billion from the soybean value chain, an 830% increase from the 2000-2001 
harvest, and in that same period the sector contributed 7.3% to the country’s 
fiscal collection on average (2012: 78), while total revenue collection in that 
period rose by 86% (CEPALSTAT, 2017). The expansion of the Argentine 
state’s fiscal collection capacity was thus inseparable from the soy boom.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
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While there were nine separate taxes and charges affecting the agricultural 
sector, the main tax instrument, and also the main source of controversy and 
conflict with the agribusiness sector, was the export duty on soy and its by-
products. As of November 2015, the rates of this tax were 35% for grain and 
32% for vegetable oil and other products such as pellets.  
Discretional federalism  
Argentina’s political federalism was defined by Diaz-Cayeros as ‘a 
centralised but asymmetric federation’, due to Buenos Aires’ privileged 
position (Diaz-Cayeros, 2006b). Today, while this imbalance remains, the 
main asymmetry lies between subnational governments23 and the central 
administration. Although subnational states have considerable autonomy in 
taxation, the federal government maintained a dominant position by 
controlling the most relevant sources of tax revenue, such as custom duties. As 
a mechanism for counter-balancing Buenos Aires’ power, in 1934 a fiscal pact 
established a system of revenue-sharing, later made constitutional by the 1994 
constitutional reform. While this was an attempt to formalise and clarify the 
tax-sharing system, the Argentinian federal fiscal structure still remained one 
of the most complex in the region, even being dubbed a ‘labyrinth’ by the 
federal tax agency itself (Diaz-Cayeros, 2006a, Saiegh and Tommasi, 1999).24 
In spite of the attempts to make this labyrinth as formal and rule-based as 
possible, discretionary distribution based on political negotiations still 
prevailed, and the availability of soybean revenues offered new opportunities 
for federal/subnational tensions to arise.  
                                                          
23 While terminology and organisation of subnational political units is different in every 
country, the term ‘subnational state’ will be used for Argentina and Brazil for the purpose of 
this thesis. The case of Paraguay, being a unitary government, requires to make the distinction 
between Departments, subnational governments with very limited authority, and 
municipalities or local governments, which in reality hold more autonomy.  
24 The Federal Commission of Taxes titles the Distribution Diagram as ‘The New Labyrinth of 
Co-Participation’ (CFI, 2017). 
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The significant increase in the federal fiscal collection meant that a larger 
amount of resources were available for distribution among provinces through 
the revenue-sharing mechanism established by the Constitution. However, as 
Diaz-Cayeros points out, the intricate regulations that had been added to the 
system over time had also left enough space to use revenue sharing as a tool 
for alliance building or political bargaining (2006b). As not all taxes are 
shared, or are only partially shared, the rising fiscal collection via non-
shareable taxes (such as export taxes) increases centralisation of the 
resources in the hands of the federal government and, with that, facilitates an 
increase in discretional transfers. Additional to the revenue-sharing system, 
the national executive power has the capacity to designate part of the national 
budget as transfers to the subnational governments, on a discretionary basis. 
According to the Argentine think tank CIPPEC, the distribution of these funds, 
which were estimated to be 23% of the national budget in 2009, was not 
equitable (Diaz Frers, 2010). Some have suggested that subnational states 
whose governments were aligned with the Kirchner governments (2003-
2015) were thus likely to receive additional funds, consequently allowing 
greater social spending (Nogues, 2014).25 This is consistent with findings from 
literature on the role of subnational governments in the configuration of 
Argentine political power at the national level (see Jones et al., 2002; Ardanaz 
et al., 2014; Jones, Meloni and Tomassi, 2012).  In turn, this preferential fiscal 
system has had a significant effect on the electoral results throughout the 
country (Jones, Meloni and Tomassi, 2012).  
As mentioned above, there are nine taxes that apply to agricultural 
production: export rights; gross income; tax on debit and credit; income tax; 
                                                          
25 Estimations from CIPPEC from 2009 found that the subnational states of Formosa, Chubut, 
La Rioja and Santa Cruz, as well as the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires, received the highest 
amount of discretionary transfers from the national budget (Diaz Frers, 2010). While the City 
of Buenos Aires should be excluded (it is assigned a number of centralised purchases, 
expenses and other items), all the other administrative units mentioned were at the time 
governed by politicians that both belonged to Kirchner’s party (Frente por la Victoria) or to 
close factions, and were considered close allies.   
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immovable property tax; road rate; tax on diesel; stamping charges; and social 
charges (Cohan 2012). Of these, subnational governments collect only three 
(gross income, property tax, and charges on stamping), while revenues from 
the more relevant taxes go to the coffers of the central government. 
Municipalities, one level below subnational states, also want ‘a share of the 
cake’, but with more limited capacity to implement taxation, they recur to very 
simple and small mechanisms, such as charging for the parking of grain 
handling trucks in the companies’ parking spaces, for about ARS$ 50 (US$ 
5.14) per truck (interview Nidera, 2014). 
Not only were subnational states excluded from the collection of 
international trade duties – and subject to the central government’s will on 
how to share those resources – but neither did they participate in deciding the 
rate of such taxes. While the constitution establishes that it is the 
responsibility of the national congress to determine export and import taxes, 
this was delegated to the executive power, which in turn has transferred this 
function to the Ministry of Economy (Teubal and Palmisano, 2010). 
Consequently, it eliminated a potential site of bargaining for representatives 
from subnational states that do not share the political leanings of the ruling 
party.  
An exception to this dynamic was the conflict that unfolded in 2008 and 
which brought the national government, at the time presided over by Cristina 
Fernandez de Kirchner, into confrontation with agricultural producers. In 
early 2008, with soy prices rising above US$ 400, Kirchner’s government 
introduced a mobile tax scheme for agricultural export duties. Export taxes 
had been used recurrently throughout Argentina’s history, and the rate on 
soybean exports had been increased to 23.5% by President Eduardo Duhalde, 
as a mechanism to increase revenues in the aftermath of the 2001 economic 
crisis. President Cristina Kirchner extended this tax to other crops and 
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imposed a higher rate, the highest being on soybean, which by November 2007 
reached 35%, at a time when soybean prices peaked at US$ 412 per tonne.26  
In March 2008, the government introduced by decree Resolution N. 125 
stipulating a mobile tax system where the rate of export tax would increase or 
decrease proportional to the international price of the corresponding 
agricultural commodity. This measure was strongly opposed by several 
organisations of the agricultural sector and initiated a conflict that extended 
from March until July 2008. In June 2008, after three months of intense 
confrontation between the associations representing the agricultural 
producers and the Kirchner government, which included numerous 
manifestations as well as road blocks throughout the country, President 
Kirchner announced her decision to put the resolution up for deliberation in 
Congress (Infobae, 2012). After passing the Chamber of Deputies with a very 
small margin, the resolution had to be approved by the Senate, where 
subnational states are equally represented regardless of their size. After 18 
hours of debate, the vote resulted in a tie, with many senators from the ruling 
party voting against the Government’s proposal, partly due to fear of electoral 
retaliation from their own constituents. Finally, the President of the Senate 
decided to vote against the mobile tax scheme, and consequently the national 
government revoked its decision and returned to the pre-existing rates. 
The conflict between the national government and agricultural producers 
over the rise of export taxes briefly transferred to the legislative bodies – 
Congress and Senate – the capacity to directly influence the decision-making 
process for export duties. However, this was just a particular situation, and 
with the resolution of the conflict, capacity for redistribution and control over 
fiscal policy returned to the exclusive control of the executive branch.  
                                                          
26 Collection depends on two main things: the volume of soy produced and traded in the form 
of grains, oil or meal; and the international price of soy, because the amount to be paid is 
calculated according to the value of the transaction. 
6. Fiscal strategies and redistribution: the politics of taxation 
 
 
171 
This discretionary federalism, in which the central government in Buenos 
Aires retains strong control over the implementation of fiscal strategies and 
tax collection, is conducive towards a concentration and centralisation of fiscal 
resources that gives the national government a strong leverage in domestic 
politics. On the one hand, its discretional use of tax receipts creates a particular 
political spatial configuration whereby resources are distributed according to 
political affiliations – that is, more resources go to those departments that are 
governed by the Kirchner’s party. On the other, it both deterritorialises – by 
centralising wealth from the soybean production collected through taxes – and 
reterritorialises, as its redistribution does not follow the same spatial logic as 
that of capital associated with soybean, and by doing so, the national state 
asserts its authority over the subnational administrations where agribusiness 
is prevalent.  
Agribusiness-urban conflict 
There is a considerable diversity among the private actors involved in the 
agribusiness production process. Usually labelled under the general term 
‘rural producers’, agricultural producers in Argentina are grouped together in 
different unions according to property size or production scale. Some of these 
unions have been traditionally opposed to each other. They represent very 
divergent interests, from the Sociedad Rural Argentina (SRA), which unites the 
most conservative sector of large landowners, to the Confederacion 
Intercooperativa Agropecuaria Limitada (CONINAGRO), a federation that 
gathers the agricultural cooperatives. As for the agro-industrial processing 
sector, it is also quite diverse, featuring both domestic and transnational firms 
dedicated to processing grains into oil, animal feed and pellets, as well as 
transnational agricultural traders which sometimes expand their activities 
into grain processing and the trade of grains and its by-products.  
The mobile tax system described before generated a strong reaction and 
initiated what came to be known as the conflict ‘del campo’ – of the 
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countryside. The imposed mechanism of a variable export tax implied that, in 
the case of soy and wheat, if the price of the commodity reached a certain level, 
the rate could go above 60% (see Figure 6.1). The legislation also foresaw the 
payment of subsidies in case of a plunge in international prices, but 
agricultural producers did not trust the government would go through with 
the payments if the situation arrived (interview LCG Consultants, 2014). As 
the president of the Argentine Soybean Chain Association told me: ‘They 
wanted to share the profits but not the losses’ (interview ACSOJA, 2014). This 
conflict saw the productive sector – despite being represented by different 
unions – join together and lead the opposition to this policy. While it was the 
trading companies which effectively paid the tax, the burden of taxation was 
pushed back down the supply chain onto the producers. In fact, while the legal 
name of this fiscal instrument was ‘export rights’, the popular name was 
retenciones, which means ‘withholding’; a reference that according to Teubal 
and Palmisano some economists adopted in an effort to distinguish it from 
other export taxes (2010). Moreover, these authors highlight a differential 
between the amount that producers pay, and the amount effectively received 
by the state. Due to a complex mechanism foreseen in the Customs Code, 
trading companies purchased soybean from producers discounting the export 
tax rate from the final amount, and later paid the fiscal authority directly. In 
this process, traders were able to apply a different price to calculate what 
producers received as payment and consequently what they were meant to 
pay in taxes, and what was actually paid to the state in export taxes. In this 
sense, there was a privatisation of the tax – a portion of what was effectively 
charged as tax to the producer was in fact appropriated by the trading 
company (2010). According to the former President of the National Board of 
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Grains, the amount retained by the exporters reached US$ two billion in 2008 
(Ferrari Etchberry, 2008).  
As Teubal and Palmisano explain, this conflict was not a debate over the 
viability of the agribusiness model, led by soybean, but was instead related to 
‘who and in which proportion appropriated the land revenues resulting from 
the increase in international prices of commodities mainly after 2003’ (2010). 
As a representative from the soy trader NIDERA revealed, even in the years 
following the resolution of the conflict, the relationship between the 
government and agribusiness was underpinned by the understanding that 
agribusinesses were ‘handling a wealth that is not ours … we don’t have a right 
to administer it’ (interview Nidera, 2014). The government considered that, 
as one of the country’s most competitive sectors, with a net inflow of US 
dollars, agricultural production had to contribute to the national budget 
(interview Ministry of Agriculture, 2014). In 2014, the manager of Nidera 
echoed this idea: ‘This afternoon we have a meeting with the Ministry of 
Figure 6.1 Variable rate of export tax applied to soybean according to Resolution 
125. 
 
Source: Ministerio de Economia y Produccion de Argentina, 2008 
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Economy to see how many US dollars they need us to bring in in the next three 
months, and they do not care how or when’ (interview Nidera, 2014).  
From the perspective of the government, the only way to ensure the 
redistribution of these ‘extraordinary profits’ (Teubal and Palmisano, 2010) 
and enforce the payment of tax duties was through a system of retenciones 
(interview former Secretary of Agriculture, 2014). While the motive behind 
this measure was fiscal, it had consequences for the levels of production. 
According to the president of Grupo Los Grobo, an Argentine agro-industrial 
corporation, in 2014 production of agricultural goods had been almost 
stagnant for six years at around 100 million tonnes, however ‘without that 
[state] intervention, today we would be closer to 140 million tonnes’ 
(interview Los Grobo, 2014). Similarly, an agricultural consultant and former 
Argentinian Under-Secretary of Agricultural Economy highlighted that these 
export taxes affected levels of production, with the largest impact on recently 
incorporated lands for cultivation in the North-West of the country. He 
explained:  
In the current conditions [of high soy price], retenciones prevent 
the expansion of the agricultural frontier. Export taxes are always 
bad because they reduce production. If there were high prices and 
no export taxes, there would be soybean even in the plant pots of 
Salta27 (interview CARI, 2014). 
While Resolution 125 was finally repealed, the alliance of producers, 
however, failed to capitalise on the popular support for their campaign, and 
were not able to reinstate a dialogue with the government. The complete break 
in communication between political leaders and the agricultural producers 
characterised the remaining years of the Fernandez de Kirchner 
administration.  
                                                          
27 Salta is a province in the North-West of Argentina where industrial agriculture expanded 
mainly since the early 2000s, driven by soy rising prices. Much of the expansion of the 
agricultural frontier in this area was done through deforestation (Dros, 2004; interview 
Syngenta, 2014; Gordillo, 2016).   
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Export-dependent social spending  
With the exception of the case of Resolution 125 developed above, the 
national government of Argentina developed a commanding capacity to 
impose high rates of taxation in order to fund the state’s expansion, both in 
terms of bureaucracy and social spending. In particular, the soybean complex 
has been a significant source of tax revenue, as it contributed an average of 
7.3% to the total fiscal collection between 2000 and 2009 (Cohan, 2012). As 
most soybean production is destined for international markets, the 
government had the capacity to tax practically the entirety of production 
through export taxes. Different to other traditional Argentinian export 
products, such as wheat and beef, soybean and its by-products are not 
consumed domestically. This avoids what Neil Richardson calls the ‘wage-
goods effect’, by which the expansion of exports of consumed goods produces 
a tightening in local demand and hence a rise in domestic prices (2009). 
Soybean, then, allows the government to promote their export without 
compromising the purchasing capacity of domestic workers. 
Revenue collection from soy export duties increased Argentina’s fiscal 
capacity considerably, allowing the government to extend its efforts in 
addressing income inequality and poverty. According to Richardson, this was 
also key in building a multi-class coalition to support them electorally (2009). 
Through an expansion of social expenditures and particularly direct cash 
transfers, Argentina became a ‘champion’ of income inequality reduction, with 
very impressive results in extreme poverty reduction, and hence re-building 
the state-society nexus broken during the 1990s (Lustig, 2011; Riggirozzi, 
2010). Besides spending on education, health and social assistance, the 
Argentine government has also had a policy of subsidies to public services, 
particularly transport and energy, which increased considerably after 2006, 
reaching 4% of GDP in 2014 (Puig and Salinardi, 2015).  
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The need to solve a creeping fiscal imbalance was identified by the economic 
team that was appointed to the Ministry of Economy in December 2007, led by 
Martin Lousteau.  There was an attempt to pursue a counter-cyclical policy, 
with the double objective of lowering the burden of subsidies and slowing 
down the economy as inflation was reaching 20% (interview LCG Consultant, 
2014). Public expenditure had been increasing since the 2001 crisis, reaching 
a surge of 40% in nominal terms from 2006 to 2007 (interview LCG 
Consultant, 2014).28 A growth in tax revenues was necessary to maintain the 
levels of expenditure. The government put forward other arguments, such as 
controlling domestic prices, but the consensus among different actors was that 
the main motive behind the controversial measure, Resolution 125, was the 
generation of further fiscal resources (interview ACOSJA, 2014; interview LCG 
Consultant, 2014; interview FIEL, 2014). This system of promoting soy exports 
in order to expand fiscal collection and hence the state’s capacity for social 
spending was dubbed by Richardson as ‘export oriented populism’ 
(Richardson, 2009). There was a clear electoral drive behind this surge, argues 
the author, as social expenditure increased in the months leading up to the 
2007 presidential election, when Cristina Kirchner won in the first round with 
45% of the vote, and the increase in soybean export taxes followed in an 
attempt to fund this expenditure surge (2009: 243). Kirchner’s party went on 
to maintain leadership in the legislative elections in 2009 and Cristina was re-
elected as President in 2011 with 54.4% of votes. However, an over-reliance 
on revenues from commodities exports might present serious difficulties in a 
post-boom context, as it runs the risks of being macro-economically 
unsustainable (Lustig, 2011). 
In sum, Argentina’s highly centralised federal system has allowed the central 
government to capture revenues at the expense of subnational states and 
agribusiness elites. This has in turn expanded the state’s fiscal capacity to 
                                                          
28 The National Institute for Statistics and Census (INDEC for its initials in Spanish) was 
intervened by the Government in 2007, and no official data is available on social expenditure, 
inflation or other indicators after 2006 (See The Economist, 2012).  
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strengthen the state-society contract through social expenditure and reap the 
consequent electoral rewards. Through the design and implementation of a 
fiscal policy largely dependent on exports of soybean, the Argentine national 
government intervened in the redistribution of the wealth created by the 
soybean sector and attempted to govern the spatial dynamics created by this 
capital. Such strategy aimed at supporting a certain political arrangement – 
both in terms of subnational and national politics, through discretional 
federalism and the enlargement of social expenditure – and also consolidated 
the UD within the agribusiness sector, namely by consolidating the power and 
profit accumulated by large traders in detriment of local producers.  
Brazil: fragmented federalism or the ‘federalist trap’ 
Compared to Argentina’s political system, federalism in Brazil is 
characterised by more autonomy and greater power held by subnational 
states, with the attendant power struggles that emerge from this. 
Distributional conflicts, both among subnational states and with the federal 
government have resulted in one of the most complicated fiscal structures in 
the region, whereby the location of (dis)incentives and compensations 
responds more to historical struggles than conscious policy decisions.  
Brazil collects tax revenue on a similar or even larger volume than the 
average OECD country. This is done through over eighty-five different taxes 
imposed at the municipal, state and federal levels (Higgins and Pereira, 2013). 
Overall, in 2013 the Brazilian government collected tax revenues equivalent to 
35.6% of GDP - the highest in Latin America. As for fiscal pressure on 
agribusiness, there are 44 taxes and charges on agricultural products, which 
account for 34% of the final cost of food (EMBRAPA, 2004). There is no unique 
Value Added Tax (VAT) applied on the final product, but rather municipal, 
state and federal rates are applied at point of origin, thus compounding each 
other and creating a ‘cascading effect’ (Higgins and Pereira, 2013). This has an 
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impact on both the distribution of income among different sectors of society, 
as well as between states and the federal government.  
Fragile fiscal federalism 
While there have been several attempts by the federal government to 
centralise its fiscal authority, subnational states have managed to hold on to 
this capacity and maintain a ‘highly peripheralised fiscal arrangement’ (Diaz-
Cayeros, 2006a). This is a salient point of contrast with Argentina, where the 
central government has managed to concentrate large fiscal capacity, which is 
linked to historical processes of state building. This particular feature sets the 
scene for many of the debates and conflicts around the taxation of the soybean 
sector.  
Of the 44 taxes that are applied on agricultural products, three are of 
particular importance. Profit participation contribution (PIS) and social 
security financing contribution (Cofins) are both federal taxes with a 
significant impact on the domestic price of food. The third tax, on the 
circulation of goods and services (ICMS), is the most problematic because it is 
enforced and collected by the subnational states, as a kind of state VAT. The 
rate is determined by each state and varies depending on the type of product 
or service, making it one of the most complex elements of the Brazilian fiscal 
system.  
Given that ICMS is administered by subnational state governments and does 
not reach the federal coffers, soybean’s contribution through this tax is a 
function of the geographical distribution of production throughout the 
country. In other words, states with a higher concentration of soy production 
will hence be capable of capturing more revenue, reinforcing geographical 
imbalances. Soybean was the main contributor to tax revenues among 
agricultural products for the South and Centre-West regions, accounting for 
36.3% and 56.4% of the regional collection respectively in 2004 (EMBRAPA, 
2004). Revenue collection in the economically poorer states in the North and 
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North-East is much smaller, contributing to geographical differentiation in 
levels of social provision, and thus poverty and inequality.  
An additional element that exacerbates the complexities of this system is the 
‘Kandir Law’,29 which eliminates the imposition of the ICMS on exports of 
primary products and certain semi-elaborated industrial products 
(EMBRAPA, 2004, Varsano, 2013). The existing ICMS, modified in the 1988 
Constitution, favoured the circulation and export of industrialised goods while 
it maintained taxation over capital and non-processed goods, which, according 
to Varsano, had negative consequences on growth and the balance of 
payments (2013). The author argues that with the implementation of the Plan 
Real in 1992, the exchange rate became the anchor of inflation control, which 
resulted in a negative balance of payments and low growth rates after 1996. 
To reverse this, policy makers were looking to incentivise exports without 
altering the currency (2013: 7). This complementary law, proposed by Senator 
Antonio Kandir, lifted all charges and duties on exports of unprocessed 
agricultural commodities, which incentivised the export of grains to the 
detriment of industrialised by-products such as oil, meal and flour. As prices 
for these goods were set at the international level, producers suffered the 
discount imposed by the tax and would prioritise the domestic market where 
they could transfer the cost of tax onto consumers.  
The Kandir Law facilitated exports of grains without punishing the producer, 
and consequently favouring the national balance of payments, but meant a loss 
in the subnational governments’ capacity for revenue collection. Unlike 
Argentina’s population, Brazilians consume close to 50% of soybean 
domestically, and the Kandir Law only left this amount susceptible of being 
taxed, the other half of production destined to export markets (CONAB, 2016; 
UN Statistics Division, 2017). As compensation, the federal government 
committed to pay an ‘income insurance’ that would help states in the first 
                                                          
29 The Kandir Law was a complementary legislation to ICMS passed in 1997 and which takes 
its name after Brazilian Congressman Antonio Kandir, who proposed the amendment.  
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transition period of implementation (Varsano, 2013). When this period ended, 
transfers from the federal government continued over time, hence in reality 
creating a federal subsidy for grains exports, though its significance has been 
decreasing with time. The total amount paid in insurance by the Brazilian 
central government in 2012 was US$517,000, a significant reduction from the 
US$1 billion spent in 2003 (Varsano, 2013).30 While this subsidy has receded 
with time, other policies for income insurance have been developed so as to 
protect producers from different shocks (see Chapter 7).  
The complexity of the Brazilian fiscal system reflected the main 
distributional conflict: the subnational struggle over resources. While this is 
not exclusive to soybean, this commodity is a good example of how 
subnational states’ interests can be conflicting with each other and with the 
federal state, which in turn leads to power struggles over the appropriation of 
revenues. A representative of ABIOVE, the Brazilian Association of Vegetable 
Oil Industries, explained:  
If you have a soybean crushing plant in São Paulo, and you want to 
bring soybean from Mato Grosso [to process], you have to pay the 
ICMS. Even if you are going to export meal and oil. (…) It does not 
make sense to continue to pay taxes so you will move your business 
there to where the primary goods are. So you will process the raw 
material in the same [subnational] state, and export meal and oil 
from there. (…) A way of correcting this would be to not have a tax 
on the movement of soy, just have a tax on the final profit of the 
export of oil or meal. But the [subnational] states say that if that is 
done, two things will happen: one, businesses will move to larger 
states, and second, they will be left without resources (interview 
ABIOVE, 2014). 
As tax capacity largely remains with the subnational state, a strong 
imbalance is created between states with extensive industrial and agricultural 
productions, and poorer states particularly in the North-East. In fact, the ICMS 
has sparked the emergence of fiscal wars between local governments, 
                                                          
30 Estimations based on exchange rate of April 4th 2016 between Brazilian Real and US dollar 
(BRL/USD 3.675). 
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generating a tendency for a ‘race to the bottom’ within the country itself as 
subnational states offer increasingly lower taxes in a bid to attract investments 
(interview Barral Consultants, 2014). While this has not yet been the case for 
soybean, it does illustrate the pernicious dynamics of the fragmented fiscal 
structure.  
Business and rural elites 
There is a stark contrast between the disorganised nature of Brazil’s complex 
federal fiscal system and the high level of organisation of Brazilian 
agribusiness elites, who have succeeded, both at the subnational and federal 
level, in attaining a large degree of influence over political decisions and 
cultivating a powerful position vis-à-vis the Brazilian government. This 
‘globally connected and locally grounded’ elite (Turzi, 2012b) developed the 
capacity to build an alliance with the federal state, which has been reflected in 
their representation both in government positions as well as in Congress 
(Hopewell, 2014).  
In the last decades, as agricultural production in Brazil consolidated into a 
large-scale agro-industrial model, domestic agribusiness capital increased its 
power and political influence (Hopewell, 2014). Several groups emerged to 
represent their interests, organising by sector and in far-reaching associations. 
One of the most influential groups has been the National Confederation for 
Agriculture and Livestock Production (CNA), created in the 1950s to defend 
the interests of milk and meat producers, and which developed into a more 
significant role in the 1990s with the modernisation and liberalisation of 
Brazilian agricultural production. The CNA unites the Agricultural Federations 
of all states and smaller unions grouped by municipality, and runs an extensive 
network of research and support for all producers, as well as working very 
closely with the national Congress. Probably the most obvious indication of the 
CNA’s power was the appointment of Katia Abreu, CNA president, as Minister 
of Agriculture, Livestock and Provision in 2014. This was not the first 
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appointment of an individual from the agribusiness sector, as Lula’s cabinet 
during 2003 and 2010 also contained representatives from private industry 
(Hopewell, 2014). However, it was notable insofar as Abreu was considered a 
symbol of the emerging Brazilian agribusiness elite geared towards export 
markets and their potential for further expansion. 
In the legislative branch, agribusiness interests are represented by the 
Parliamentary Front of Agriculture and Livestock (FPA). This alliance, 
commonly known as Bancada Ruralista (Rural Bench) was established in 1995 
and has since represented rural interests in both the Senate and the Congress. 
The group consists of more than 200 members from diverse political 
affiliations, some of whom are agro-industrial producers themselves. 
Agribusiness elites not only work closely with political elites, but are also 
highly integrated into the political establishment, with large rural producers 
occupying key decision-making positions. As previously mentioned, Katia 
Abreu and Blairo Maggi are two of the most prominent examples of the overlap 
of private and public interests (Turzi, 2012b). This dynamic offers a new 
dimension to the federal conflict, as the confrontation between elites from 
agricultural and industrial states takes on a new form in Brasilia.  
Distribution and the social compact  
Much of Brazil’s large public expenditure has taken the form of cash transfers 
that, along with other fiscal policies, have produced significant results in 
fighting poverty and inequality (Higgins and Pereira, 2013).  Data from 2009 
showed that social spending as a percentage of GDP in direct cash and food 
transfers was 5%, similar to spending on education (5.4%) and health (5.3%) 
(2013). The analysis conducted by Sean Higgins and Claudiney Pereira (2013) 
determined that while direct transfers reduce inequality and poverty 
significantly, this is usually tempered by other taxes and the effectiveness of 
these programs is well below OECD levels. However, transfers have some 
impact on these indicators, namely due to the large reach of the programmes.  
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More so than in Argentina and Paraguay, it is difficult to determine the extent 
to which soybean, or the overall agricultural sector, contributed to this. This is 
mainly due to the different taxation capacities, and the instrument that most 
significantly levies soybean, ICMS, is held by subnational states. As a result, a 
large part of the soybean profit collected through taxes ends up in the hands 
of subnational states, particularly those where the production of soybean is 
located. In Mato Grosso, for example, soybean constitutes 50% of the 
subnational state’s collection from ICMS (Noticias Agricolas, 2016). These 
regions have expanded their economic capacities as a result of the 
consolidation of industrial agriculture and this fiscal arrangement thus 
contributed little to redistribution towards poorer areas like the North-East. 
Total tax revenues as a share of GDP in 2013 surpassed 35%, and data from 
2009 shows that social spending was 16% of GDP and accrued to almost 25% 
when including contributory pensions, not far from the 21% average of OECD 
countries (Amaral et al., 2015; Lustig, 2011; OECD.Stat, 2017). One of the most 
important items in the federal government’s social expenditures, and a central 
pillar of Brazil’s state-society pact, were the direct cash transfer programs 
which account for 4.1% of GDP (Lustig, 2011). The impact of conditional cash 
transfers (CCT) on reducing inequality and poverty is striking, with the Gini 
Index falling by 4.7% from 1995 to 2004 (Soares et al., 2010). Being the 
flagship policy of the Partido dos Travalhadores’ (PT) government, Bolsa 
Familia and other CCT programs became a core component of Brazil’s social 
compact. Given that most of soybean’s fiscal contribution went through ICMS, 
which was levied by subnational states, it is unlikely that revenues from the 
production and trading of soy have had an important role in sustaining the 
social compact.  
At the subnational level, the different productive structures and diverse rates 
of ICMS tax partly explain the significant variation in budget sizes among 
subnational states. Revenue collection through ICMS and hence the availability 
of fiscal resources ranged from US$110 million in the northern state of 
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Roraima, or US$ 244 per capita, to almost US$25 billion, or US$ 605,881 per 
capita, in the industrial state of São Paulo. Even soy producing states like Mato 
Grosso and Mato Grosso do Sul remained behind the industrial powers of São 
Paulo and Minas Gerais in terms of tax collection (IPEA, 2017). The latter 
benefited from having larger populations and hosting manufacturing 
industries, which translated in fiscal income more significant than that 
provided by soybean via ICMS.  
While extensive social expenditure and CCT programmes were a progressive 
component of the Brazilian social compact, it is also important to point out that 
Brazil had one of the highest VATs in the region, with an average of 20.5% 
(CEPAL, 2013) – a regressive form of taxation, as it is levied on an individual’s 
consumption regardless of income. Moreover, as noted earlier, the complex 
system of multiple levels of VAT created a cascading effect that impacts 
directly upon food prices. Considering that soy is a product consumed mainly 
by the poor (unlike in Argentina) (Oliveira, 2015), but with a rising place in all 
Brazilian households’ consumption, taxation of its production had a doubly 
regressive effect on distribution. As mentioned earlier, EMBRAPA has 
estimated that the multiple taxes applied to agricultural products made up 
34% of the final price of food (EMBRAPA, 2004). 
Overall, during the governments of Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff there 
was a strong state-society nexus in Brazil that involved a request for 
reciprocity from the federal government in terms of redistributive policies. 
However, the participation of soybean production in this structure was limited 
by the country’s highly fragmented federalism, which restrained the taxation 
capacity of the central government through the ICMS and through the Kandir 
Law. The efforts by subnational states to retain fiscal autonomy and maintain 
production within their own borders expresses how soybean became a 
significant source of power for states in regions in the Centre-West of the 
country.  
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Brazil’s fiscal policies regarding soybean and agribusiness in general were 
marked by a very complex political and administrative configuration distinct 
for strong fiscal autonomy of regional states. As it was described in Chapter 4, 
the expansion of the soybean agro-industry in Brazil created new spatial 
dynamics at the domestic level in Brazil, particularly by bringing to the core of 
Brazil’s economic system regions that had been historically marginalised. The 
intra-regional fiscal struggles described in this section reflect the efforts from 
large soybean producing subnational states to maintain the control over the 
wealth created within their regions and build leverage against industrial states 
like São Paulo. On the other hand, these conflicts and bureaucratic conditions 
limit the capacity of the national state to govern the emerging patterns of UD 
by enlarging social expenditure even more.   
Paraguay: state co-optation by rural and urban elites 
Paraguay is a very small state with one of the lowest levels of fiscal collection 
in the region, as well as one of the worst performances in terms of economic 
inequality and poverty reduction (Higgins et al., 2013). Argentina and 
Paraguay are located at the two extremes of the taxation spectrum in this 
regard. While in the former case the tax burden on the soy production chain 
represents an important cost on the final product, in the latter taxes are almost 
non-existent and producers obtain very high profitability. According to the 
President of the Paraguayan Chamber of Oilseed Processors and Exporters 
(CAPPRO), the profit margins of soybean producers in Paraguay are almost 
100%, while their contribution to fiscal revenue is ‘negligible’ (interview 
CAPPRO, 2014).  
Most of Paraguay’s tax collection relies on the Value Added Tax (VAT), worth 
almost 34% of collected revenues, or 6% of the country’s GDP (Higgins and 
Pereira, 2013). Agricultural production, while one of the most important 
economic activities, is subject to very low taxes. These consist of the tax on 
agriculture and cattle rent (IRAGRO, for its initials in Spanish), agricultural 
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VAT and property tax. IRAGRO was introduced in 2014 to replace its 
predecessor, IMAGRO, which was widely criticised for allowing large land 
owners to avoid a more burdensome rate by declaring their properties in 
separate and smaller tracts of land (Zárate A., 2011: 14). However, this reform 
did not modify the meagre 10% rate imposed on large producers’ profits, most 
of whom, unlike in Argentina, are landowners and cultivate their own 
properties (interview UGP(c), 2014).  
Unitary system with weak decentralisation 
The 1992 democratic constitution of Paraguay established a unitary and 
decentralised state as an attempt to dismantle the power that had been 
concentrated in the national government during the authoritarian Stroessner 
regime (1954-1989). This reform divided the country into seventeen 
departments, but gave them no financial autonomy.31 Only in 1998 was 
legislation passed that decreed the distribution of royalties to departments, 
from the hydro-electrical dams Yaciretá and Itaipu (Nickson and Lambert, 
2002). As for tax revenues, almost all remain in the control of the central 
government, the main exception being administration of property taxes - 
urban and rural - which was transferred to municipalities in the 1992 
constitution (World Bank, 2007: 5).  
Revenues from property tax in Paraguay are some of the lowest in the region, 
only amounting to 0.4% of GDP, compared with the average of 0.8% for Latin 
American countries (World Bank, 2007). Of this percentage, 0.2% is collected 
in the capital, Asunción, and the remaining 0.2% is from municipalities in the 
interior. Of this 0.2% levied in the interior, only 20% was contributed by rural 
lands, which means that tax paid by agricultural properties accrued to just 
0.04% of GDP (World Bank, 2007). Furthermore, the municipalities are only 
                                                          
31 As a unitary system, Paraguay does not have any autonomous subnational states, like 
Argentina and Brazil. Departments in Paraguay are administrative units dependent on the 
central government.   
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entitled to 70% of the revenue collected, while the remaining amount is 
distributed between the departmental government and poorer areas.  
In addition to the limited resources held by departmental governments, 
Nickson and Lambert point to the decentralisation framework in Paraguay as 
a source of power for national ministries, which use this to expand their 
dominance over other levels of government (2002). The lack of capacity of 
departments and municipalities to decide property tax (legislation remains 
defined by the central government) and the absence of debate over any kind 
of revenue sharing system are evidence of the limited autonomy of local 
government vis-à-vis the central administration.   
The rule of agribusiness elites 
With the exception of the years 2008-2012, when the country briefly joined 
‘the left turn’ in Latin America, Paraguayan politics has been dominated by the 
Colorado Party, a conservative, right-wing party that had been in power for 61 
years before the election of the left-wing alliance candidate Fernando Lugo in 
2008. This political elite has allowed the agribusiness sector to benefit from 
low fiscal pressure as well as the lax application of labour and environmental 
legislation consequently favouring the expansion of soy production on these 
conditions (Palau et al., 2016). Paraguayan political leaders have made use of 
the state’s capacity and resources to favour agribusiness, with an explicit 
encouragement of soy production since the 1990s (Nickson and Lambert, 
2002). In fact, President Horacio Cartes who assumed office in 2013 is known 
to have personal investments in the cattle, soy, tobacco and financial sectors 
(interview Base IS, 2014; Nickson and Lambert, 2002; Palau et al., 2016). The 
state agencies in charge of ensuring the distribution of land, such as INDERT, 
have been accused of corruption several times and were considered to be in 
alliance with large farmers and the agribusiness lobby (interview Base IS, 
2014). In February 2012, a few months before Lugo’s impeachment, the 
aforementioned agency was taken over by the government after suspicions 
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that properties that were allocated to small peasants were actually sold to 
soybean producers (Paraguay.com, 2012; Medina, 2012). Later, during the 
Cartes government, INDERT lost its redistributive purpose, and it practically 
stopped assigning land to small subsistence farmers (Alderete, 2015).  
As previously mentioned, the first interruption to the six decade-long rule of 
this political-business elite nexus was the 2008 election of Fernando Lugo. The 
former bishop attempted to challenge some of the authoritarian and right-
wing policies that had dominated Paraguay by shedding light on the extremely 
unequal distribution of land, the complete lack of environmental control, and 
the need for further taxation on agricultural and cattle production (interview 
Base IS, 2014; Cerna Villagra and Solis Delgadillo, 2012; Lambert, 2012). 
However, with a Congress controlled by the opposition and the pressure of 
powerful lobby groups, some of his proposed measures were never passed. 
According to academic Ignacio Gonzalez Bozzolasco, Lugo’s policies 
‘threatened, though in a minor way, the basis of the oligarchic domination, the 
interests of the sectors that maintain it and even the imaginary that sustains 
it’ (2013: 78).  
On 15 June 2012, an eviction of 70 peasants and their families who were 
illegally occupying land in the department of Curuguaty ended in a massacre 
that cost the life of 11 farmers and six policemen. This event sparked a political 
trial against Fernando Lugo and in only 48 hours the then President was 
accused, judged, and impeached. While the process formally followed the 
constitution, the haste with which it was carried out generated uproar, not 
only in Paraguay but also in neighbouring countries. With many countries 
doubting the democratic nature of the impeachment process, Paraguay was 
consequently suspended from the regional bloc MERCOSUR. As Gonzalez 
Bozzolasco pointed out, it was not by chance that the event that led to the 
impeachment of Lugo was a rural conflict (2013), given how his efforts in 
bringing the agrarian reform to the foreground found constant challenge from 
the Colorado Party and agribusiness elites. 
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Agricultural lobby groups perceived the election of Lugo as ‘punishment’ for 
the Colorado Party; directors of the Paraguayan Chamber of Oilseed Exporters 
and the Chamber of Processors argued that once the party ‘learned its lesson’, 
the best thing Congress could do was ‘to get rid of’ the democratically elected 
former bishop and his ‘redistributive policies’ (interview CAPPRO, 2014; 
interview CAPECO, 2014). Lugo’s successor, Federico Franco, quickly took 
measures which benefitted agribusiness elites, such as nullifying regulations 
on crop fumigations, publicly opposing any export tax on products like 
soybean, and naming a former president of an agrochemical company as the 
head of the National Service of Seeds and Vegetables Quality and Safety 
(Gonzalez Bozzolasco, 2013). These examples reinforce the claim that 
democratic institutions in Paraguay have been co-opted by private interests, 
both domestic and international (Turzi, 2012b).  
An absent social contract 
Fiscal pressure in Paraguay is among the lowest in the region, even if it 
experienced a sustained growth in the years following 2005 (Zárate A., 2011). 
The structure of fiscal revenues reveals a high dependence on indirect taxes, 
particularly VAT, and a remarkably low participation of the agricultural sector 
in revenue collection.  
While it is not possible to determine here whether the Paraguayan fiscal 
system in its totality is regressive relative to other countries, there are a 
number of elements that indicate its lack of progressiveness in the distribution 
of the fiscal burden. Total fiscal revenues and government spending are less 
than 20% of GDP (Paraguay, 2015), a figure closer to countries like Mexico and 
Peru where the size of the public sector is smaller, and around half of the 
equivalent figures for Argentina and Brazil (Lustig, 2011). In 2014, 
agricultural producers contributed roughly US$110 million to the Treasury 
(Paraguay 2015; Technology, 2014), while total state revenues that year 
amounted to US$4,170 million. In other words, agricultural producers 
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contributed only 2.5% of the total revenue collection (Paraguay, 2015), and in 
particular IRAGRO collected only 1.4% of the total (ABC Color, 2015b). A 
recently published report from research institution Base IS established that 
the total tax contributions of the agriculture and cattle sector in 2014 allowed 
the government to fund only three days of state functioning (Palau et al., 
2016). Moreover, this calculation does not take into account the money 
received by producers from the state in subsidies, particularly with regards to 
the price of diesel.     
While increasingly dependent on agriculture – which by 2010 represented 
more than 20% of total GDP (World Bank, 2015) Paraguay’s fiscal pressure on 
this sector remains remarkably low, and as a member of a research institution 
told me, soybean production in particular simply ‘does not contribute to the 
economy’ in terms of fiscal resources or spill-over effects on value-added 
industry (interview IPIE, 2014). One indication of this state of affairs is the fact 
that soy producers pay more to the US-based agricultural input supplier 
Monsanto in royalties than they do to the state in taxes (interview Base IS, 
2014).  
The incapacity or unwillingness of the state to tax the most successful 
economic activity in the country has reduced the fiscal space for poverty 
reduction policies through social spending, consistent with Paraguay’s poor 
performance in social indicators, as the country had the highest poverty and 
inequality in the region (Higgins et al., 2013). Yet this lack of revenue 
collection seems to be an expression of the non-existence of a complex fiscal 
pact between state and society, or what we might call an absent social contract. 
The high concentration of land ownership and the lack of efforts towards its 
redistribution (Palau et al., 2016; Alderete, 2012), as well as the reduced social 
spending and the conservative macroeconomic policies (see Chapter 7), hint 
at the limits of the redistributive efforts of the Paraguayan state after Lugo’s 
presidency. In summary, this non-existent contract and the centralised nature 
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of the state has granted agribusiness elites great influence over fiscal policy 
(Rodriguez and Villalba, 2015). 
The different dimensions of Paraguayan fiscal policy explored in this section 
have shown the large influence exercised by agribusiness elites, closely linked 
to a centralised government that runs a much reduced public spending budget, 
a sign of an almost absent social contract between state and society. Paraguay 
is, in this sense, on the opposite side of Argentina regarding natural resources 
taxation, and hence not enforcing redistribution of the profit generated by the 
soybean industry. Contrary to this, the fiscal structure of the Paraguayan state 
seems to be designed so as to incentivise further production while at the same 
time laying most of the fiscal pressure on the consumers, through the VAT. As 
such, not only is fiscal policy not used to manage the impact of the seesaw 
movement of capital, but it reproduces the imbalances and patterns of UD 
embedded in the expansion of soybean capital. The contrasts between an 
industrialised, homogenous countryside and the urban space, where many 
displaced farmers and peasants move – thus creating even further disparities 
in the social and economic landscape of the country – is additionally 
pronounced with these policies. Not only at the national level, but also 
regionally, the described fiscal strategy reinforces Paraguay’s situation of 
underdevelopment as a provider of produce in its natural form, sent to be 
further processed in its neighbouring countries.   
Conclusion 
This chapter analysed tax systems in the Southern Cone as one of the policy 
instruments available to the state for the management of dynamics of UD 
emerging from the expansion of soybean capital. It was argued that the design 
and implementation of these fiscal structures mediate the distributional 
conflicts that arise from an increase in soybean revenues both from exports 
and domestic sales. The availability of revenues proceeding from natural 
resource exploitation in the context of a global commodity boom can either 
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reinforce patterns of UD or be used for the amelioration of its effects. National 
states have the ability to either remain absent from these processes, or 
intervene, through a number of policies, in order to govern the political 
economy of agribusiness. This chapter has focused on the use of fiscal policy 
as an instrument for governing the distribution of wealth created through the 
soybean complex, and more specifically to understand how political regimes, 
power struggles among elites, and the state-society nexus play out in this 
distributive effort.  
The three cases analysed - Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay - differ as to the 
manner in which federal institutions, business and political elites, and social 
compacts interact and play out. Argentina is the case where tensions over the 
distribution of soy revenues are most evident. There, a very centralised federal 
system based on discretionary transfers and the rupture between agribusiness 
elites and the state allowed the government to extend the social compact with 
the objective of supporting its electoral goals and establish what Richardson 
has termed ‘export-oriented populism’ (Richardson, 2009). Argentina is the 
case in which the state has most clearly intervened to alter the spatial patterns 
created by capital expansion, but it is not evident that the depth of the 
unevenness has been reverted. While the Brazilian fiscal pact is similar to 
Argentina in terms of levels of tax revenues and social expenditure, Brazil’s 
very strong federal dynamic produces a quite different result. Brazilian 
subnational states hold extensive authority in the levying of taxes which 
creates tensions across states as well as with the federal government. 
Moreover, the capacity of the national state to address geographical 
imbalances is limited by the extensive prerogatives held by Brazilian states. In 
Paraguay the situation is quite different, as a unitary system and a weak social 
compact put rural elites in a strong position to impose and even co-opt the 
national authorities in the executive power and Congress.  
The emergence of the post-neoliberal state in Latin America was marked by 
a re-definition of state-society and state-market relations. The latter entailed 
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a more active involvement of the state in the economy, while the former 
required the state to expand its social duties and re-build a connection with 
society through the increased provision of social goods. As taxation constitutes 
one of the state’s main tools for strengthening its capacity for social spending, 
as well as to incentivise or de-incentivise economic activities, this chapter 
aimed at understanding how and to what extent fiscal strategies served as a 
resource to govern the uneven dynamics created by capital accumulation in 
the soybean complex. While the capacity with which each of these countries 
has addressed said dynamics is framed by the existing political regimes, this 
chapter has shown how different strategies pursued by these countries reflect 
varieties of governance of uneven development. In Argentina, while stronger 
state intervention in defining taxes and their distribution expanded the social 
contract, it also provided the conditions for the expansion of soybean and the 
retraction of other crops and sectors. The governments of Lula da Silva and 
Dilma Rousseff in Brazil were also committed to expanding the state-society 
nexus, but demands from subnational states and federalist institutions 
constrained this capacity and in turn created new uneven patterns across 
regions of Brazil. Finally, Paraguay represents the early retreat of the 
postneoliberal state, whereby the state’s role is linked to the enhancement of 
the capital accumulation process of the soybean complex and consequently the 
heightening of uneven development dynamics.  
The empirical analysis presented here has highlighted the role of domestic 
institutional, political, and social conditions in the formulation and 
implementation of such policies, and how these have in turn influenced the 
redefinition of the state in Latin America in the twenty first century.  This 
chapter presented how there are varieties of resource taxation, thus showing, 
first, the capacity of the state to intervene in the governance of agribusiness 
and the UD of soybean; and second, the diversity in the approaches taken by 
the different states affected by the same process. While confronted with 
similar dynamics of expansion of soybean revenues, the analysis presented 
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shows how different states developed varying capacities and interests in 
governing the distribution of the commodity boom’s proceeds.  The next 
chapter will further explore these strategies by analysing macroeconomic 
policies, more specifically exchange rate policies, which have also been under-
analysed by resource curse literature.   
  
   
7. Macroeconomic policy and redistribution: the politics 
of currency 
 
Introduction 
As soybean production and exports have come to represent an increasingly 
important portion of the total trade and economic activity of the three 
countries in question, each state has had to adapt its economic policies in order 
to manage the large inflows of US dollars resulting from the significant 
increase in value and volume of their exports. This chapter’s focus on 
macroeconomic strategies, and especially on exchange rate policy, sheds light 
on how markets and states interact and co-constitute each other in space. 
Currencies and exchange rates (re)produce the borders of the national 
economy, and in that sense, act as reterritorialising mechanisms for 
reaffirming the state’s authority over movement of capital within and across 
the nation-state. While state intervention in processes of uneven geographical 
development does not necessarily imply that states are able or willing to tame 
or eliminate these dynamics, it does demonstrate that states can alter or even 
deepen them. As such, the key aim of this chapter is to better understand the 
politics of state management of UD, with specific attention to macroeconomic 
policy.  
This chapter continues to explore the role of the state in Argentina, Brazil, 
and Paraguay as well as its capacity in correcting the allocation of wealth 
created by the soybean sector. While the previous chapter focused on the 
manner in which fiscal policies can have redistributive impacts on a 
multiplicity of scales, and thus mitigate or facilitate UD, this chapter explores 
the politics of macroeconomic policy, and how these economic variables can 
have an impact on the distribution of wealth. The purpose of this chapter is to 
further analyse the role of the state in governing processes of UD created by 
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the consolidation of capital accumulation based on soybean production, by 
looking into policies that act as to deterritorialise or reterritorialise capital 
flows. In particular, this chapter will chiefly examine exchange rate policy as a 
central tool in these strategies. 
This chapter will address how soybean’s spatio-temporal complex has 
created patterns of uneven development through the large inflow of foreign 
currency derived from these commodity exports. These inflows, in turn, create 
new dynamics in the macroeconomic balance of national economies, for 
example, by appreciating the national currency and impacting negatively upon 
other productive sectors. The state’s capacity and strategy in reaffirming its 
authority within these transnational processes of capital accumulation has 
been different for each of the countries studied in this thesis. This chapter will 
argue that Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay deploy different strategies to 
govern the soybean complex and the dynamics that emerge from its expansion, 
while also being limited by various factors. Consistent with the findings in the 
previous chapter, the analysis of macroeconomic policies exposes the 
contradictions and tensions that confront states when they attempt to govern 
the effects of the soybean complex, while also maintaining neoliberal state-
market relations.  
This chapter will explore the macroeconomic policies implemented during 
the soybean boom and the way in which they have influenced and been 
influenced by, the expansion of this sector. It will focus in particular on 
exchange rate policies and their role as mechanisms for redistribution, while 
also exploring how other aspects of the macroeconomic framework, such as 
inflation, the current account balance, and public debt affect the reallocation 
of profits. First, this chapter will analyse the policies implemented in Argentina 
to manage the exchange rate and control the foreign currency market, as a 
mechanism to transfer profits from the soybean sector to other sectors of the 
economy and to the state coffers, as well as its impact on other indicators 
affecting redistribution such as inflation. The following section covers the 
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evolution and fluctuations of the Brazilian macro-economy, as well as the 
implications for the sectoral alliances supporting the PT government, namely, 
formal and informal workers. The fourth section then analyses the Paraguayan 
case and examines how efforts to achieve macroeconomic stability have 
further enhanced processes of UD. The chapter will conclude by explaining 
how the politics of currency management can act as governance mechanisms 
of UD, and how the framework developed by each country is consistent with 
the redistributive effects of tax policies described in the previous chapter.  
Argentina’s exchange rate policy: exchange rate controls, overvalued 
currency and the ‘soy dollar’ 
In 1998, and as a result of the policies conducted during the 1990s, Argentina 
entered an ‘unprecedented crisis’ that affected the entire Argentine economy, 
producing a drop in industrial activity and a fall in GDP of 7.2% (Azpiazu and 
Schorr, 2010: 149). The crisis brought down the government in 2001 in an 
event that represented a significant cleavage in the political, social, and 
economic history of the country. These events were the dramatic expression 
of the problems that the neoliberal model had been fostering in Argentina 
society for decades. The arrival in power of Nestor Kirchner in 2002 initiated 
a new period of growth and reconstitution of the social safety net that had been 
disarmed by the preceding accumulation regime. This change was interpreted 
as the end of neoliberalism in the Argentina – a turn to the left that broke with 
many of the prior policies (see Chapter 2). However, as it has been suggested 
throughout this thesis, there were very significant continuities as well. Cristina 
Kirchner’s government has been much praised for its achievement of 
significant growth levels during her administration by renowned economists 
such as Paul Krugman (Krugman, 2012). This favourable economic 
performance, which was an important driver behind her electoral success 
(Weisbrot, 2011), was sustained mainly thanks to the large expansion of 
exports. These played a key role in both the provision of fiscal revenues, as was 
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detailed in the previous chapter, and the inward flows of foreign currency, 
which will be examined more closely in this chapter.  
The 1990s in Argentina saw the culmination of neoliberal reforms that were 
initiated in 1976 during the final military government (Varesi, 2010). In terms 
of macroeconomic stability, the main feature of this decade was the 
establishment by law of a parity between the US dollar and the Argentine peso, 
which was the centrepiece of a series of reforms that aimed at controlling 
inflation by depoliticising monetary policy (Galiani, Heymann and Tommasi, 
2003). This ‘convertibility model’ led to an acute dependence on debt, as such 
an overvalued currency could not be maintained and resulted in the 
aggravation of the country’s balance of payments, as exports lost 
competitiveness on the global market. As Figure 7.1 shows, until 2002, the 
Argentine current account balance held a sustained deficit. The Argentine 
Figure 7.1 Current account balance (% of GDP), Argentina, 1976-2015  
 
Source: World Bank, 2017. 
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agricultural sector – historically very export-oriented – was negatively 
affected by this situation, especially as changes in production meant an 
increasing dependence on costly inputs, and as their revenue fell, the sector’s 
indebtedness increased greatly during this period.  
On the first days of January 2002, after the massive protests that erupted in 
December 2001 and ended with the resignation of the President and his entire 
government, creating an institutional crisis, the Argentine Congress repealed 
the convertibility law, which had been valid for over 10 years. The post-
convertibility model that emerged in the following years, gave rise to, 
according to Gaston Varesi, six significant policies: devaluation of the national 
currency; implementation of export taxes; the ‘asymmetric pesification of the 
debt’; the bailout of the financial sector; default; and a price freeze on service 
tariffs (Varesi, 2010: 146). Two of these policies were of particular importance 
for agriculture production and had a significant impact on the dynamism that 
characterised it in the following decades. The first one is the pesification of 
debt. This meant that all debts in US dollars would be paid in pesos at a rate of 
US$ 1 to ARS$ 1 (Argentine peso), while the fixed exchange rate had already 
been abandoned with the repeal of the convertibility law. The second 
important policy was the devaluation of the currency, which, for the 
agriculture sector, meant that local production was more competitive on the 
global market. As a result, devaluation and pesification of debts allowed 
producers to expand their exports, and hence their revenues, while paying a 
reduced debt. Consequently, heavily indebted agricultural producers managed 
to liquidate their debts (interview Los Grobo, 2014).  When in 2003 the 
international price of commodities started its upward trend, the sector 
experienced a newfound dynamism that turned it into one of the main drivers 
of growth in the national economy.  
With the disassembling of the convertibility model, the agricultural sector 
was, in a way, unlocked from the constraining, debt-ridden monetary system 
and a new dynamism was re-established. This of course happened in tandem 
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with the structural productive changes and more importantly, with the 
increase in the international price of all commodities. The depreciation of the 
Argentine currency lifted that limitation to profitability that the convertibility 
model had imposed on the sector (Varesi, 2010: 112). As such, it represented 
a shift from a deliberately overvalued currency, which was more beneficial to 
the financial and industrial sector, to a deliberately undervalued one, through 
a managed floating system, which was largely advantageous to the export 
sectors, and to agribusiness in particular. While the post-convertibility model 
was presented as an alternative to the neoliberal state by the Kirchner 
government, it was ostensibly more concerned with issues of industrial 
development and national growth. In opposition to the free flow of capitals 
that had characterised the previous era, the new model enabled the expansion 
and accumulation of capital in the agricultural sector and more specifically in 
soy production. It was a key element in the UD’s dynamic of concentration and 
inflow of capital.  
The monetary policy that best defined the post-convertibility or post-
neoliberal macroeconomic model was the establishment of a ‘stable and 
competitive real exchange rate’ (SCRER) (Frenkel and Rapetti, 2007; Amico, 
2008: 85). This meant sustaining a high exchange rate for the dollar, initially 
floating within a nominal band of ARS$2.85 - $3.1 per dollar, as reflected in 
Figure 7.2,32 which made Argentine exports cheaper – and hence more 
competitive –  in international markets (Frenkel and Rapetti, 2007: 7; Rivera-
Quiñones, 2014: 69).33 Maintaining a high SCRER was the cornerstone of the 
post-neoliberal macroeconomic model and a key instrument in the 
redistribution of resources across economic sectors.  More specifically, the 
                                                          
32 As it was mentioned in Chapter 6 and will be further explained in the following section, due 
to irregularities in the calculation of the Consumer’s Price Index since 2007, data from the 
Argentine National Statistics Institute (INDEC) was deemed unreliable by the IMF and other 
international institutions. As a result, there is no official calculation of the Real Exchange Rate 
(RER) for this period (see The Economist, 2012). 
33 For a detailed account of monetary and exchange rate policy after the abandonment of the 
convertibility regime, see Frenkel and Rapetti, 2007.  
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SCRER or ‘high dollar’ policy provided the exporting sector with financial 
support that radically increased its dynamism, as shown by the increase of 
121% in exports between 2002 and 2007 (Varesi, 2010: 146). As shown in 
previous chapters, products of the soybean chain represent almost a third of 
the overall exports from Argentina, and are as such the single largest group of 
export products. In short, it can be argued that the ‘high dollar’ policy was a 
soybean policy.  
The main instruments for the maintenance of the high exchange rate were 
financial sterilisations, export taxes, and low interest rates. In order to ensure 
an expensive US dollar, the Central Bank was forced to buy dollars from the 
domestic currency market, lowering its circulation, thus demanding increased 
monetary supply and, by injecting liquidity to the market, it risked an increase 
in prices. To keep inflation at bay, the Central Bank released a number of credit 
notes and debt bonds in order to neutralise these effects and ensure monetary 
Figure 7.2 Official Exchange Rate (Local Currency Unit per US$), Argentina, 1992-
2015 
 
Source: World Bank, 2017 
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stability (Redrado, 2011: 18). These instruments reached a maximum of ARS 
$60 billion in stock in 2007 and 70% of these titles were held by financial 
institutions domestically (2011: 18). The aim of this mechanism was to absorb 
the ‘excess’ monetary expansion by generating debt, which cost the state an 
increase of public debt of over US$ 6 billion (Damill, Frenkel and Rapetti, 2005: 
218). On the other hand, low interest rates were maintained as a double 
mechanism of controlling inflation and limiting the inflow of international 
capitals that could alter the balance of the currency exchange rate (Redrado, 
2011; Rivera-Quiñones, 2014).34  
As for the third instrument, it was explained in the previous chapter that 
export taxes were reintroduced with the 2001 crisis and increased throughout 
the following governments of Nestor Kirchner and Cristina Fernandez de 
Kirchner. Of all exports, soybean in particular had the highest tax rate– 35% 
for beans and 32% for processed products – which further enhanced their key 
role in the country’s fiscal and macroeconomic policy. While according to a 
former Secretary of Economic Policy, the export taxes responded to a fiscal 
issue – meaning, finding sufficient tax income to finance public expenditure - 
rather than to provide a supply of dollars (interview LCG Consultant, 2014), as 
a result of this measure Argentina became the country with the fourth highest 
foreign exchange reserves in Latin America (IMF, 2012 cited in Rivera-
Quiñones, 2014: 71). Whether intended or not, the soybean complex became 
the single most important contributor of foreign exchange to the Argentine 
economy, bringing in almost US$ 18 billion in 2010 (Rivera-Quiñones, 2014: 
75).  
The combination of the high dollar policies, an expanded export sector, and 
sizeable export taxes provided the government with a dual capacity. Firstly, 
                                                          
34 After reaching a peak in 2002, and after the nominal exchange rate was stabilised, interest 
rates of credit notes remained relatively low. This prevented the flow of international capitals 
that could overvalue the peso and hence alter the SCRER. For a more detailed explanation of 
the functioning of the SCRER, see Frenkel and Rapetti, 2008.  
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the fiscal resources enabled the expansion of social expenditure – which has 
been addressed in the previous chapter. Secondly, the state was able to pursue 
an industrial policy of productive expansion. The recovery of industrial 
capacity, as well as increasing levels of employment, was a fundamental piece 
of the post-neoliberal state’s political base. Argentina had entered into a 
recession in 1998 that contributed to a decline in several productive and socio-
economic indicators as a result of the limitations imposed by a disequilibrium 
in the balance of payments (Amico, 2008: 88). Unemployment and 
underemployment levels were at 17.4% and 15.6% respectively in 2001, and 
manufacturing value-added dropped by 17% in real terms between 1997 and 
2001 (Grinberg and Starosta, 2014: 261). According to Frenkel and Rapetti 
(2007), the SCRER favoured the correction of the balance of payment deficit, 
which allowed the stimulation of other sectors. The export sector 
consequently played a significant role in the regeneration of the economy. As 
one interviewee, an official at the Ministry of Agriculture during the Kirchner 
administration, put it:  
The agricultural sector is the most competitive [economic sector] 
and produces US dollars. (…) The Argentine society needs goods 
that can only be acquired with US dollars, and the only [sector] that 
generates US dollars is food. The automotive sector does not 
generate any foreign currency. When industries are joint ventures 
or for motives of scale they move to neighbour countries, the 
foreign currency goes abroad (interview, Ministry of Agriculture 
Argentina, 2014). 
The underlying dynamic is a contradictory movement between the 
compensation of forces of UD while at the same time facilitating a 
reinforcement of these. On the one hand, a competitive exchange rate creates 
clear opportunities for the expansion of the export sector, and given the 
domestic and international circumstances especially so for soybean 
production, creating an inflow of investments and concentration of capital 
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around this particular activity. As Grinberg and Starosta35 put it, the 
devaluation and new currency exchange regime not only enabled the 
expansion of commodity exports, but it also ‘removed what during the 
convertibility regime had constituted a specific barrier for the extensive and 
intensive application of capital in the primary sector’ (2014: 265). With an 
undervalued currency, the post-neoliberal regime enabled the expansion of 
capital accumulation in the agricultural sector, as producers and landowners 
increased their profits, which was followed by increasing investment in this 
economic activity, allowing agriculture to become more capital intensive. In 
other words, it created the conditions for the intensive concentration and 
centralization of capital necessary for the process of accumulation (Smith, 
2010). 
On the other hand, the monetary and financial circumstances that are created 
in this movement are acted upon by the government as a way of redistributing 
part of this inflow towards other sectors, such as industry. As such, an 
undervalued peso acts as a mechanism of distribution from the agro-export 
sector towards industry, mainly as a way of financing the import of capital 
goods inputs needed for production. For example, Rivera-Quiñones analyses 
the year 2010, when increase in imports of capital goods and capital goods 
replacements demanded a total of US$ 7.2 billion to cover these costs; and that 
year’s contributions in foreign exchange from the soybean complex were 
sufficient to cover 58% of that amount (2014: 75). This analysis leads the 
author to suggest that the liquidation of earnings in foreign currency by the 
agricultural sector was ‘the foremost contributing factor’ to the 67.3% output 
increase by the industrial sector in the years 2004-2010 (2014: 74). In other 
                                                          
35 The work by Grinberg and Starosta (2014) offers an analysis of ground rent distribution in 
Brazil and Argentina. The authors argue that the progressive governments in these countries 
transferred resources through the appropriation of the ground rent from the agro-industrial 
sector to the industrial bourgeoisie, as a condition for their hold of power. This chapter draws 
on the data elaborated by the authors, namely the role of currency variations and inflation. 
However, this is used to show the impact of macroeconomic policies, rather than assuming the 
thesis proposed by Grinberg and Starosta on the role of ground rent.  
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words, the US dollars exchanged by agricultural producers were used to 
finance the imports of capital goods and industrial spare parts that allowed the 
industrial sector’s increased output. By intervening in the money supply and 
the foreign currency market, the Argentine government was capable of 
reterritorialising part of the capital flow created through soybean exports and 
redirecting it towards the domestic industrial sector.  
This redistribution of profits from the agricultural to the industrial sector 
could be perceived as detrimental to transnational agribusiness corporations 
and large commodity traders. However, these measures continued to enhance 
the concentration of capital in fewer powerful companies. For example, in 
crushing and oil production, 11% of the companies accounted for 51% of the 
crushing activity, while in overall exports, the top five companies dominated 
66% of the total volume of exports, with only ten operating almost the totality 
of the exports (MECON, 2011). Instead, the government created a conflict with 
agricultural producers, whom, as mentioned before, were the final payers of 
the export tax. Besides transferring that cost to the producers – and also 
keeping part of that cost (see Chapter 6) -  transnational traders were also 
supported by the government through the Capital and Infrastructure 
Investment law, as they received 23% of the subsidies granted under that 
legislation (Rivera-Quiñones, 2014: 80). This legislation, passed in 2004, 
provided a number of fiscal incentives to both large companies and small and 
medium enterprises looking to invest in capital goods or to expand their own 
productive infrastructure. In other words, the law supported the enlargement 
of built environment necessary for the expansion of production and capital 
accumulation. According to Daniel Azpiazu and Martin Schorr, several of the 
main companies benefitting from this scheme were oriented towards exports, 
and this included soy processing industries like Molinos Rio de la Plata, Cargill, 
and Louis Dreyfus (2010: 278). 
In October 2011, after the presidential elections in which Cristina Fernandez 
de Kirchner was re-elected in the first round, an additional control on the US 
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dollar market was imposed. The so-called ‘dollar clamp’ prevented the free 
purchase of US dollars in the foreign currency market, instead making it 
conditional upon the fiscal agency’s approval (La Nación, 2016). Given the lack 
of trust in the domestic currency – due to a history of repeated cycles of 
hyperinflation – Argentinians have generally relied on the US currency as a 
saving mechanism. This clamp thus had the aim of reducing capital flight and 
preventing the drainage of the country’s foreign currency reserves. However, 
this created a black market for the dollar and a parallel exchange rate, known 
locally as the ‘blue dollar’. In May 2012 the difference between the official 
exchange rate and the unofficial one was 35% (Blanco, 2012) and this 
tendency continued to increase, as a year later the blue dollar rate was almost 
twice the official rate (The Economist, 2013). 
These fluctuations affected the expectations of the agricultural sector, 
especially that of producers. All their operations were priced in Argentine 
pesos at the official exchange rate of the day, thus creating uncertainty among 
producers and a sense of being negatively affected by this policy. As the chief 
economist from the Buenos Aires Grain Exchange explained:  
The problem is the exchange rate. The producer access the ARS 
$8.5 [official exchange rate] minus the 35% [of export tax] making 
it around $5 something. The blue [dollar] is around ARS $15. These 
gaps affect expectations. (…) They affect the producer’s decisions. 
(…) Every time that there are expectations that are not associated 
to a climate of stability, each person takes their own decisions 
about what to do (interview Bolsa de Cereales, 2014). 
For agricultural producers, the existence of two parallel ‘dollars’, an official 
and an unofficial (or ‘blue’) one, represented a monetary loss, as they were 
required by authorities to exchange the profits from the harvest into Argentine 
pesos at the official rate. In this context, a possible further devaluation of the 
currency to close the gap with the black market would mean a potential 
increase in profits for producers. Given these speculations, many started 
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considering whether or not to sell produce at a certain time, with the 
expectation that the exchange rate would be modified in the future.   
A key component that made this decision possible – to sell or not – was the 
existence of silo bags. Silo bags are reinforced plastic bags for grain storage 
that allowed the farmers to enlarge their stocking capacity without making 
investments in large structures or depending on a third party. This made them 
an important element in the growth of the agricultural industry (interview 
Bolsa de Cereales, 2014; INTA, 2014). But they also became an instrument of 
resistance and a source of leverage agricultural producers could yield against 
the government. In this context, it meant that producers could withhold 
production when they were uncertain of the value of the dollar and hence of 
their own produce. The silo bag became a symbol of resistance from the 
farmers, an obstacle to the efforts by the government to reterritorialise soy 
profits, as it questioned the state’s authority imposed via exchange controls.  
The use of these storage facilities meant ‘a guarantee of US dollars’ for many 
producers (interview Molinos, 2014). Silo bags allowed producers to retain 
and store a significant amount of the harvest for up to two years. As long as 
producers held soybean, they held the capacity to acquire US dollars, though 
they remained inevitably attached to the official exchange rate. In a context of 
a double exchange rate, the producer ‘does not have anything to invest in, they 
do not have an incentive to sell soybeans’ (interview Molinos, 2014). Though 
in some occasions, this meant producers sold their production at a lower price 
than at the moment of harvest, effectively reducing their profit margins 
(interview Molinos, 2014). According to Hélyette Geman, only 6% of the crop 
had been given to crushing plants and exporters in January 2014, a clear drop 
with the 11% and 25% levels sent by the same time in 2013 and 2012 
respectively (Geman, 2015: 17). 
Eventually, soybean and its sale and liquidation into pesos became ‘an 
obsession’ for the government, with producers feeling pressured by the fiscal 
7. Macroeconomic policy and redistribution: the politics of currency 
 
 
208 
agency into selling their stock as well as by threats and vandalism directed 
against the silo bags. These storage facilities became a site of struggle 
themselves and a symbol of how important soybean had become to the 
Argentine government. The phrase Haga Patria: corte un silobolsa – which can 
be translated as ‘Help your nation: cut a silo bag’ was written as graffiti in 
Cordoba, one of the largest soybean producing provinces in Argentina. There, 
many silo bags were cut, thus releasing the grains and spoiling the production 
(Bertello, 2014a; 2015b). Failure to control the liquidation of production 
evidenced the limits to the governance of the soybean-based capital 
accumulation process the government had helped unlock.  
In this struggle over the control and distribution of resources, soybean 
became, figuratively, a currency in itself: the dólar soja (soy dollar) was part 
of the everyday debate on the state of the economy, and practically had its own 
exchange price (Dalto, 2015; Bolsa de Cereales, 2010: 4). The soy dollar was 
determined mainly by the international price of the commodity, the level of 
export taxes, and the official exchange rate. Based on this ‘price’, producers 
determined the levels of production for the following season, which could 
mean a decrease in fiscal collection for the state. The different stages of 
devaluation of the Argentine peso meant that soybean prices in this currency 
increased by a larger proportion than the price of soybean futures in CBOT in 
US dollars (Geman, 2015: 17). Overall, soybean remained a stronger and more 
stable asset than the Argentine currency, as part of its further transformation 
from a commodity into its exchange value. Not only does the exchange value 
overcome the use value, but the grain itself becomes a container and a 
guarantee over fluctuations in the Argentine peso.  
This case raises an important question: Is the management of the foreign 
currency market an effort to re-balance the unevenness created by capital 
accumulation? Or, in the theoretical terms set out in this thesis, is the state 
counter-acting UD or actually reinforcing it? On the one hand, efforts towards 
redistribution to other sectors are a way of alleviating the imbalances created 
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by UD; but on the other hand, these same policies promote a concentration of 
capital and investment in a few companies and in soybean as the dominant 
crop. Additionally, this is done in a model in which agriculture serves the role 
of provider of foreign currency, rather than provider of food. The period after 
the collapse of the convertibility system led to a macroeconomic regime that 
was largely sustained by a high and stable exchange rate and the expansion of 
the export sector, dominated by soybean and favoured by the elevated 
international prices. This regime reinforced the processes of centralisation 
and concentration of capital in the soybean complex, in order to redistribute 
profits to other sectors and provide macroeconomic stability for the country.  
The endless Argentine disease: inflation and redistribution  
Exchange rate policy in the context of an economy dependent on primary 
goods exports and industrial input imports affects levels of inflation, which is 
an important measure of redistribution. While the SCRER allowed the 
government to promote exports and distribute incentives to other sectors, it 
also created the conditions for the increase of inflation, and this post-
neoliberal regime was marked by the tension between maintaining the SCRER 
and controlling inflation.  
After the 2001 crisis and consequent default and devaluation of the national 
currency, the Argentine economy started registering signs of recovery, which 
was accompanied by increasing levels of inflation. In January 2007, when 
inflation was reaching 2.1%, the Argentine government decided to intervene 
in the affairs of the National Statistics Agency (INDEC), under the justification 
that the inflation figures were being manipulated in order to benefit foreign 
debt creditors, and dismissed the authorities responsible for the Consumer 
Price Index. There was a new methodology implemented, which created great 
discontent and overall expanded mistrust over the official rates of inflation. 
The discrediting of these figures came from academic and journalistic sources 
– even from international organisations, with the IMF censuring the country in 
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2013 due to its lack of reliable data (Rastello and Katz, 2013). Private 
alternatives to this index started to emerge, thus generating parallel inflation 
indexes. One of the most well-known was developed by economist Alberto 
Cavallo, based at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), who created a 
new price index based on online prices. His estimations – as well as other 
private analyses – show a large mismatch with the official figures which 
increased over the years. According to Cavallo, between 2007 and 2011 the 
official price index increased by 35%, while private estimations showed a rise 
by 100% (Cavallo, 2013: 158). 
Inflation becomes a redistributive issue due to its impact on people’s 
purchasing capacity and consequently raises the question over whether real 
wages are accompanying this trend or not. Maintaining control over levels of 
inflation, however, creates a tension with the macroeconomic objective of 
maintaining a competitive exchange rate. A high US dollar, or devaluated peso, 
can push prices upwards as imports become more expensive and provoke 
monetary expansion, which increases liquidity in the market and encourages 
consumption.  As far as the connection between inflation and the 
developments of the soybean activity and the policies surrounding it, two 
important factors emerge. On the one hand, devaluation affects real wages and 
hence, a policy that overall benefited the exporting sector is regarded to be 
detrimental to the domestic population, particularly the working class. As 
Amico (2008) argues, devaluation of the currency was meant to adjust the 
imbalance of the balance of payments, with the effect of constraining and 
limiting imports. Domestic production and consumption was reduced, pushing 
towards a decrease in the real wages of workers (Amico, 2008: 84). This is 
what many accused Roberto Lavagna, Minister of Economy between 2002 and 
2005, of implying when he declared that Argentina’s exit from the 
convertibility regime in 2002 was ‘the most successful case of devaluation in 
the world’ (Pagina 12, 2003). From this approach, the high dollar model - ‘real 
exchange rate high and stable’ - as the cornerstone of the post-neoliberal state 
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in Argentina creates an equilibrium in which redistribution based on real wage 
is incompatible with the expansion of accumulation.   
On the other hand, as Neil Richardson explains, the imposition of export 
taxes, particularly on soybean during Nestor Kirchner’s government, was 
fundamental in maintaining an electoral alliance with both the industrial 
sector and the working classes. According to the author, since soybean is not 
consumed domestically, its promotion as an export product through 
devaluation would not affect the prices of the population’s food basket. At the 
same time, fiscal funds collected through the imposed taxes allowed the 
Kirchner government to broker deals with businesses, offer subsidies to more 
domestically relevant sectors such as beef and maize, and overall control the 
pressures over inflation (Richardson, 2009: 242).   
However, the argument over inflation control becomes less credible when 
compared to the evolution of the privately measured consumer prices. In 
February 2008, INDEC was putting inflation at 8.4% while private forecasts 
suggested inflation to be somewhere between 18% and 24% (Credit Suisse, 
2008: 61). Around this time, a new Minister of Economy was appointed, Martin 
Lousteau. According to a former official, the principal aim of his tenure was ‘to 
normalise INDEC and the price index. (…) Why? Because if you want to do anti-
inflationary policy, you need to know the real levels of inflation’ (interview 
LCG Consultant, 2014). In this post-election context,36 there were ‘real interest 
rates absurdly low, an anchored exchange rate and nominal wages growing by 
25%, 30%’ (interview LCG Consultant, 2014). The macroeconomic objective 
was then to slow down the economy and lower subsidies as a way of 
controlling inflation. However, internal struggles determined that the best way 
to address these issues was to increase fiscal contributions that would allow 
the government to continue with its expanded subsidy policy without putting 
more pressure on the price level. The main target for expanding fiscal capacity 
                                                          
36 Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner won the presidential election in October 2007, taking over 
from her husband, Nestor Kirchner on December 10th 2007.  
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was thus the agricultural exports, which was attempted through the executive 
order 125 (see Chapter 7). 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the export taxes did not affect only 
soybean, but also a number of other crops with much more importance for the 
domestic consumer such as corn, wheat and sunflower, which are also 
connected to the cattle industry. The government attempted to implement 
export quotas for these products and other measures to limit the rise in prices, 
but by 2014, annual inflation was estimated at 38,5% (Infobae, 2015). This 
was also partly due to the fact that many wheat and sunflower producers 
moved into the production of soybean, where profit margins were larger. For 
these products, Neil Richardson’s analysis falls short, since they end up 
affecting the worker’s basic food basket, and hence the government faced a 
trade-off between fiscal collection and inflation of food prices.  
While it exceeds the scope of this research to determine the economic role of 
soybean expansion in the variation of the inflation rate throughout this period, 
it is possible to point to the emerging contradictions between redistribution, 
capital accumulation and governance in this economic context. It is, in a way, 
a reflection of the patterns of UD created by the accumulation process and, yet 
again, of the state’s limitations in its capacity to exercise governance and to 
avoid trade-offs between the expansion of fiscal collection and the 
maintenance of SCRER, on the one hand, and keeping inflation at bay, on the 
other.   
Brazil  
 While changes in the exchange rate and exchange rate policy in Brazil have 
not been as drastic as in Argentina, the macroeconomic balance of the Brazilian 
economy has been affected by changes in domestic politics and in the global 
political economy. After the introduction of the Brazilian Real (BRL) in 1994, 
and a significant devaluation in 1998, it is possible to segment the evolution of 
the currency in three periods: until 2004 there is a progressive devaluation; 
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from 2004 to 2011, there is an upward pressure on the BRL; while from 2012 
onwards the currency once again experiences a period of depreciation. The 
context of these changes point to speculative inflows of capital betting on the 
Brazilian currency. This was partly due to expectations of appreciation of the 
currency in a context of rising international commodity prices.  
This section will first analyse the different strategies implemented by the 
Brazilian government – first during the two terms of President Lula da Silva, 
and the first term of President Dilma Rousseff, both politicians being from the 
Workers’ Party (PT) – followed by an examination of inflation levels and 
external debt and the co-relation between these indicators and the expansion 
of the soybean complex in the Brazilian economy. Overall, this section shows 
how openness to capital flows limits the state’s capacity for reterritorialization 
of certain capital flows and its ability to manage the emerging UD patterns.   
Exchange rate policy: between inflation targeting and cross-border capital 
control  
Similar to Argentina, and to many other Latin American countries, issues 
related to inflation and stability of the currency have been a long-time concern 
for Brazil. In 1998, the Brazilian economy entered a currency and debt crisis, 
with large states declaring a moratorium on the service of their debts with the 
Federal Government. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, President of Brazil from 
1995 to 2002, was forced to take on credit from the International Monetary 
Fund to cope with this crisis, and abandon the framework he had implemented 
as Minister of Finance of Brazil in 1994, the Plan Real. The Plan Real had been 
particularly beneficial to the agricultural sector, which had seen public 
financing reinvigorated after 1994, having been ‘sanitised’ and encouraging 
investment in machinery and equipment (interview CNA(a), 2014). After a 
crisis in the financial capacity of the sector in 1995-1996, the debts of 
agricultural producers were restructured and the government assigned 
specific resources to rural credit in order to incentivise technological 
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improvements in production (Sainz and Calcagno, 1999: 59).37 However, the 
exchange rate targeting regime was changed to an inflation targeting 
mechanism, due to IMF conditionalities, and the currency was devalued.  
After its devaluation in 1998, the BRL stayed at purchasing parity until 2001-
2 when again, due to anticipatory financial movements, the currency 
depreciated by 15%, signalling a new currency crisis in late 2002 (de Paiva 
Abreu and Werneck, 2008; Grinberg and Starosta, 2014: 253).38 This occurred 
in a context of very low commodity prices and increasing concern from 
business elites and international financial organisations over the rising 
popularity of the Workers’ Party candidate, Lula da Silva, who was leading the 
polls for the presidential elections. These worries, however, were appeased by 
Lula himself who, before the elections, read to the press the ‘Letter to the 
Brazilian people’ in which he committed to maintain Cardoso’s 
macroeconomic policies, sending a reassuring signal to the international 
markets (Oliveira, 2006; Maxwell, 2003). In addition, once elected, Lula went 
further than his predecessor by increasing the budget surplus in order to pay 
the increasing debt services (Grinberg and Starosta, 2014: 255; Maxwell, 
2003), as well as preserving Central Bank independence, capital mobility and 
a flexible exchange rate, and his backing of the agro-export sector (Morais and 
Saad-Filho, 2011: 32). However, this orthodox macroeconomic approach 
resulted in a loss of support from the Workers’ Party’s traditional basis, such 
as unionised formal workers, creating a governance challenge for the Lula 
administration (2011). 
                                                          
37 Not all sectors benefitted equally, however. The sectors that gained most were those 
oriented towards export markets, such as coffee and soybean (Sainz and Calcagno, 1999). The 
production of goods consumed in the domestic market, while favoured by credit conditions, 
suffered a drop in their prices. This resulted in agriculture gaining the moniker of the ‘green 
anchor’ of the Plan Real, as it became an important aspect of the stabilisation period and the 
reduction of inflation levels (Coelho, 1997).   
38 For a detailed account of the 1998 devaluation and following 2002 crisis, see de Paiva Abreu 
and Werneck, 2008.  
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Overall, during his first term as president, Lula’s administration increased 
the economy’s openness to international inflows and outflows of capital, while 
shifting its focus from exchange rate control to inflation targeting. These 
measures were meant to send positive signs to financial actors by assuring the 
continuation of capital mobility and access to and from the global economy. 
Throughout 2004-2008, the Brazilian economy grew at an annual average of 
7% while industrial value added grew by 5% (Grinberg and Starosta, 2014: 
255). All these elements contributed to a balance of payments surplus, which 
reached 14 billion US dollars in 2005, such that Brazil’s reserve accumulation 
expanded from 16% of its external debt in 2002 to 30% in 2005 (World Bank, 
2017). Yet the Brazilian government seemed to struggle to balance global 
forces of deterritorialisation and domestic demands for macroeconomic 
equilibrium, requiring tighter control over the economy. On one hand, 
openness towards large volumes of capital flows and the increasing success 
from the agro-exporting sector were the results of its market-friendly policies; 
while on the other these dynamics started to increase the value of the domestic 
currency and inflation, thereby putting in danger the government’s alliance 
with domestic capitals and regional elites, whose support depended on the 
performance of the economy and the existence of a dynamic domestic market 
(Morais and Saad-Filho, 2011: 33).  
After his re-election in 2006, and under pressure from certain groups, Lula 
decided to shift economic policy towards a neo-developmentalist approach, 
through the appointment of heterodox economists and by enlarging the 
capacity and role of the National Bank of Development (BNDES). The Brazilian 
economy had expanded in previous years partly due to the increasing role of 
agricultural exports fuelled by rising international prices. In this context of 
agro-export boom and openness to capital flows together with high interest 
rates, an increasing volume of ‘hot money’ entered the country, mainly through 
the foreign exchange derivatives market (Gallagher and Prates, 2016; 
Grinberg and Starosta, 2014: 251). This inflow of international capital into the 
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country’s national accounts consequently generated an appreciation of the 
exchange rate and, in neo-developmentalist terms, entailed a decline in 
competitivity of the industrial sector (Actis, 2015: 121). Again, we see how the 
dynamics of UD play out, as global capital mobility enabled the accumulation 
of financial capital in Brazil, incentivised by positive growth rates reflecting 
the agro-export boom, and consequently creating unevenness in the 
performance of the agricultural and industrial sector.  
As a result of these processes, the Brazilian currency continuously 
appreciated until 2013, and by 2008 the degree of overvaluation reached 93% 
(Grinberg and Starosta, 2014: 256). This was accompanied by an increasing 
current account deficit, which reached over 100 billion US dollars in 2014 
(World Development Indicators). The co-existence of both phenomena was 
possible due to the sustained inflow of foreign capitals, which exercised an 
upward pressure on the BRL (Deutsche Bank, 2011: 4), and the performance 
of the agricultural and primary sectors in export markets, particularly soy and 
iron ore, thanks to the high international commodity prices (Doval and Actis, 
2016: 5). The currency appreciation (alongside the general expansion of 
Brazil’s economic activity) contributed to rising state fiscal revenues through 
import taxes - an opposite mechanism to that experienced by Argentina, which 
had a devalued currency and export taxes (Grinberg and Starosta, 2014: 256). 
In this context, and as a reflection of the policy shift explained above, the 
BNDES became a key player in the pursuit of a neo-developmentalist agenda 
as one of the main providers of credit (Saad-Filho and Morais, 2011; Actis, 
2015). Of the bank’s total outlays between 2001 and 2009, almost 50% were 
oriented towards industry (Actis, 2015: 124), which suggests a transfer of 
resources towards this sector.  
Although this movement in the exchange rate benefitted the state’s coffers, 
the Brazilian government tried to correct this tendency by tightening 
regulations on cross-border financial flows, particularly on bets on the BRL 
and short-term positions on the foreign exchange derivatives market 
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(Gallagher and Prates, 2016). A continually overvalued currency affected the 
competitiveness of Brazilian capitals internationally, and the government 
sought to bring stability to the currency exchange market. The use of exchange 
rate and capital controls as a mechanism for reterritorialisation and the 
reaffirmation of the state’s control over these developments resulted from the 
reduced policy options available, due to the contradictory imperative of both 
assuring macroeconomic stability at the domestic level, while maintaining 
access to global financial markets.  
According to Gallagher and Prates (2016), the government’s willingness to 
impose certain restrictions on cross-border financial flows was derived from 
the export sector’s preference for avoiding strong movements in the currency 
over access to global capital flows. This consideration seems to be confirmed 
by the preoccupation expressed by the agribusiness sector around currency 
fluctuations. As an interviewee from the Confederation of Agriculture and 
Livestock (CNA) told me: 
It is necessary from the public power a guarantee of income, 
because there is no clear policy of income guarantee. We have some 
instruments, but not a policy. Any currency variation affects 
directly the rentability of the producer who ends up paying. (…) We 
are highly dependent on imports of chemical products, of inputs, 
such as potash (…) If the real is overvalued I might win in the first 
moment because my product is more competitive in the market, 
but in a second moment that goes against my own interest 
(interview CNA(a), 2014). 
As opposed to the Argentine case, where soybean and agricultural exports in 
general have had a significant impact on the exchange rate; in Brazil it is capital 
inflows which seemed to play a determining role in the fluctuation of the 
exchange rate. This difference arises not only from the economic structures, 
but also due to Argentina’s lack of access to international financial markets 
following its default in 2002.  
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By 2013, the effectiveness of regulations on capital flows and foreign 
exchange derivatives waned, showing, according to Gallagher and Prates, an 
uneven result depending on the phase of the cycle they were applied to (2016: 
93). In other words, regulations would have been more effective during the 
boom and lacked effectiveness in the bust period, when they were actually 
implemented. In an unregulated domestic context, capital inflows - motivated 
by profits in an appreciated asset, the BRL - further fuelled overvaluation. 
When the government decided to impose certain limitations to these 
movements, or reterritorialise the currency exchange market, a withdrawal of 
global capital flows pushed the BRL towards depreciation (Gallagher and 
Prates, 2016: 93). This time difference, between the implementation of 
regulations and the dynamic of international financial capital, showed both the 
effects of the mobile nature of financial capital, as it affected the Brazilian 
currency and with that the different productive sectors, as well as the limits of 
state capacity to regulate processes of UD when a certain level of economic 
openness is taken for granted.  
 Depreciation, however, was beneficial to agricultural exports, which had 
expanded owing to these variations (similar to Argentina). In its Agricultural 
Outlook report, the Federation of Industries of São Paulo (FIESP), one of the 
most important industrial lobbies, suggested that maintaining a devalued BRL, 
which would further benefit agricultural exports, could provide 
macroeconomic stability to the rest of the economy. As such, their argument is 
similar to that of Grinberg and Starosta, in that the expansion of agricultural 
exports is seen as a source of wealth for the rest of the economy, potentially 
transferring resources to the industrial sector. Brazilian industry has ‘always 
lived under the government’s protection’ (interview CEBRI(a), 2014) and a 
transfer of income into this sector from agricultural exports could sustain such 
policy.  
As one of the main contributors to the GDP and foreign currency reserves, 
the soybean complex is inextricably linked to these processes described above. 
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However, this is not always a direct relation, or a simple Dutch Disease 
situation, where the inflow of foreign currency into the country, as a result of 
an increase in primary sector exports, results in an appreciation of the 
currency with adverse effects on manufacturing production. Expectations of 
increasing performance of the agro-exporting sector seemed to have played a 
role in the fluctuations that the BRL has experienced in the last 15 years. Even 
though their economic relevance has been decreasing, industrial elites remain 
a very powerful component of the political and economic scenario of Brazil. 
The use of macroeconomic policy for redistributive purposes is then limited 
by a number of factors including the demands from different domestic 
economic elites, the inflow of capitals entering the country and the 
institutional capacity of the Brazilian state to balance these forces while 
maintaining a stable exchange rate.  
Inflation targeting and soybean expansion  
As mentioned in the analysis of the Argentine case, inflation is a 
redistributive issue that has been a highly significant grievance for Latin 
American economies. Fluctuations in domestic currencies impact levels of 
inflation, either via more expensive imports, whether consumption goods or 
inputs for the domestic productive sector, or due to the contraction or 
expansion of consumption. Inflation targeting as a mechanism of the Brazilian 
macroeconomic policy was introduced in 1999, as a nominal anchor to replace 
exchange rate targeting policy. As previously mentioned, this was a result of 
initial currency crises that followed the implementation of the Plan Real and 
of the IMF’s conditions. The target was determined by the National Monetary 
Council, which was constituted by the Central Bank of Brazil, the Ministry of 
Finance and the Ministry of Planning. While failing to reach the specified 
target, inflation in Brazil remained within the upper tolerance limits set by the 
Council throughout most of the 2000s, with the exception of 2003-2004 and 
2015 (Banco Central do Brasil, 2016; Serrano and Summa, 2012). In their 
analysis, Franklin Serrano and Ricardo Summa (2012) suggest that levels of 
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inflation in Brazil were more responsive to cost factors than to changes in 
aggregate demand. These, in turn, were affected by changes in the exchange 
rate as well as international prices.39  
In the agricultural sector, exchange rate fluctuations affected production 
costs which were later translated into domestic prices. As mentioned above, 
soybean production is highly dependent on the import of agro-chemicals and 
macro-elements such as phosphorus and potash. For example, a study by 
EMBRAPA which focused on the State of Paraná, one of the largest soybean 
producers, found that between February 2002 and July 2011, the nominal 
price of fertilizers increased by 115%, 25% more than the increase in the 
soybean price (Hirakuri and Lazzarotto, 2011: 37). As a result, producers that 
are more dependent on imports and relatively less dependent on exports are 
hurt more by a weak Real.  
Being an open economy, goods in Brazil were influenced by rising 
international prices, exercising an upward pressure on inflation in Brazil. Any 
variation in the appreciation or depreciation of the currency thus affected both 
Brazilian soybean producers’ own production costs as well as the 
competitivity of their produce abroad, consequently altering domestic prices. 
Unlike Argentina or Paraguay, soybean production has a strong domestic 
demand in Brazil, as more than half of production of soybean is processed into 
oil and soy meal, of which 60% and 45% respectively are consumed 
domestically (ABIOVE, 2017).  
Finally, it is worth noting that inflation in Brazil has also been affected by the 
advance of soybean in other countries. Several policies implemented by the 
Argentine government – namely, high export taxes and export quotas, 
                                                          
39 There was a number of monitored goods and services whose price was linked to a price 
index heavily influenced by the exchange rate. Additionally, as an open economy, Brazil 
internalised international prices in commodities, which inevitably created an upward 
pressure on domestic prices. For a full analysis of inflation in Brazil during the 2000s, see 
Arestis et al., 2011; Serrano and Summa, 2012.  
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analysed in the previous chapter – incentivised the production of soybean to 
the detriment of others, such as wheat. This not only affected the Argentinian 
population, but also, in this case, that of Brazil. This is because Argentina is the 
main supplier of wheat to its MERCOSUR neighbour. This became a very 
‘sensitive issue for Brazil’, due to the government’s struggles to maintain a 
controlled level of inflation while suffering a shortening of supply in one of its 
staple food products (interview Ministry of Development Brazil, 2014). In 
2007, Argentina’s exports of wheat to Brazil constituted over 80% of the 
latter’s imports of that product, while in 2014 that proportion was down to 
30% (INTrade BID, 2017). As a result, Brazil was forced to loosen its extra-
block import taxes – a measure previously discussed with Argentina - in order 
to compensate the shortage in Argentinian exports (interview FIEL, 2014; 
interview Ministry of Development Brazil, 2014).    
Overall, inflation was closely affected by fluctuations in the exchange rate, 
which in turn responded to conditions in the financial market and the 
behaviour of capital flows (Arestis et al., 2011: 135). Once again, the state’s 
capacity for regulation of UD is limited by the presence of capital mobility, 
which acts as a ‘veto power’ over regulatory policies implemented at the 
national level (Gallagher and Prates, 2016: 85).  
The expansion of foreign debt and macroeconomic instability  
According to calculations by government agency EMBRAPA, soybean exports 
play an essential role in the provision of foreign currency reserves available 
for the payment of debt and to balance the Brazilian public accounts. In 2010, 
profits from the soybean complex were equivalent to almost 85% of the 
national balance of payments credit. Considering its annual levels of growth, 
and the fact that it represents over 10% of the totality of Brazilian exports, this 
sector has remained essential to Brazil’s current account balance (Hirakuri 
and Lazzarotto, 2011: 39; ABIOVE, 2017).  
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Towards the end of his first term as President, the strict deficit and inflation 
control implemented by Lula’s administration allowed the government to 
repay in advance the IMF loan taken during the Cardoso presidency to help 
manage the 2002 currency crisis (BBC, 2005). This was obviously taken as a 
positive sign of the orthodox policies that were continued from the Cardoso 
presidency and an evidence of the strength of the macroeconomic indicators 
of the country. However, the imbalances that the Brazilian economy began to 
suffer after 2006, as described above, with a creeping public deficit and 
increasing currency volatility, were also reflected in increasing public debt, as 
shown in Figure 7.3. During her first term as President of Brazil, Dilma’s 
objectives of reducing country risk and inflation were not achieved, and at the 
beginning of her second term in 2014 there was growing discontent with the 
performance of the economy, added to eruption of corruption scandals (Doval 
and Actis, 2016).  
Figure 7.3 External debt stocks, total (DOD, current US$), Brazil, 1992-2015 
 
Source: World Bank, 2017 
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In their most recent Agricultural Outlook, FIESP pointed to ‘the chaos of 
public expenditure promoted by the government of Dilma Rousseff’ as the 
main driver of the ‘explosive trajectory of the public debt’ (FIESP, 2016: 14). 
This organization, like many other elite industrial groups, supported Dilma’s 
rival – right-wing candidate Aecio Neves – in the latest presidential election. 
There was a rising discontent due to the PT’s support for public expenditure 
and redistribution while foreign direct investment was falling along with GDP 
growth (World Bank, 2017).    
The trust of the industrial elite in the government had been decreasing, and 
they were generally opposed to the re-election of Dilma Rousseff in 2014. The 
condition for the reestablishment of such confidence was - according to one 
interviewee from FIESP - ‘on accomplishment of the [macroeconomic] 
objectives of fiscal surplus, inflation, etc. From there, everything else will 
settle’ (interview FIESP, 2014). ‘Everything else’, in this context, suggests 
expanding investment in fixed capital and overall support from industrial 
elites, which proved to be essential in Dilma’s continuation as President of 
Brazil until her impeachment in September 2016.40 
Overall, the soybean complex in Brazil has grown in the last 15 years to 
become a key sector for the growth and macroeconomic stability of the 
country.  As one a member of the Brazilian Agribusiness Association (ABAG) 
put it: ‘Soybean saves[d] Brazil’s life’ (interview ABAG, 2014). Openness to 
global capital flows, however, have limited the state’s ability to recur to 
exchange rate policy as a reterritorialisation and redistribution strategy and 
hence to manage dynamics of UD. The macroeconomic policies described here 
suggest a shift in power from industrial elites to the agribusiness sector. 
                                                          
40 In September 2016, elected president Dilma Rousseff was impeached by Congress over 
disregard of the federal budget. Several industrial associations, including FIESP and the CNI 
(National Confederation of Industries) publicly supported the trial and decision to impeach 
President Rousseff (See Neto, Nogueira and Oliveira, 2016). 
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Nevertheless, the recent events in the political scene of Brazil indicate that 
manufacturing remains a very powerful political and economic actor.  
There seems to be a shift in power from industrial to agribusiness elites, 
which might be reflected in the macroeconomic policies, but as recent events 
on the political scene of Brazil have shown, these remain a very powerful 
political and economic actor.   
Paraguay 
Of the three cases analysed in this thesis, Paraguay is clearly the smallest 
economy and also the most dependent on agricultural resources and soybean 
in particular. This dependency is registered both in terms of exports and GDP. 
Soybean represents 88% of agricultural exports, which in turn accounted for 
almost 40% of total exports in 2011 and 2012 (Trepowski et al., 2014: 20), 
while the agricultural sector, mainly dominated by soybean after 2007, 
represented around 26% of the country’s GDP in 2010 (Palau et al., 2012: 7). 
Moreover, GDP growth rates follow almost exactly the performance of the 
export sector, further emphasising the clear the link between the two. As such, 
Paraguay is not only dependent on soybean, but also dependent on the 
external market – it is an agro-exporting economy.  
Exchange rate and fiscal responsibility  
Similar to its larger neighbours, Paraguay suffered a profound economic 
crisis at the end of the 1990s, with negative GDP figures between 1998 and 
2002 (World Bank, 2017). In the following decade, the country’s growth 
regained a positive track and gradually stabilised its macroeconomic 
indicators (Trepowski et al., 2014). In fact, the country’s macroeconomic 
performance has been praised by international organisations. In a visit to the 
country in 2015, IMF Deputy Managing Director, Mitsuhiro Furusawa, 
declared:   
7. Macroeconomic policy and redistribution: the politics of currency 
 
 
225 
Paraguay’s robust performance is underpinned by sound 
macroeconomic fundamentals. Public debt is moderate, inflation is 
low, the external current account is close to balance, and official 
reserve holdings are ample. These sound fundamentals are the 
bedrock of macroeconomic stability in a volatile environment. 
They ensure that Paraguay has buffers to absorb adverse shocks 
and provide confidence to households, entrepreneurs, and 
financial investors (IMF, 2015). 
Likewise, business associations linked to the agribusiness sector have 
expressed their satisfaction with the macroeconomic stability offered in the 
country and how this has created a welcoming environment for foreign 
investment. A member of the Paraguayan Chamber of Oilseed and Cereal 
Processors highlighted the ‘macroeconomic ordering’ achieved in the last 
decade, as well as the efforts by the previous government in their first days in 
office to assure fiscal responsibility and the sound conduct of monetary policy 
(interview CAPPRO, 2014). Similarly, an interviewee from the Chamber of 
Oilseed Exporters said: ‘What Paraguay has is a very important 
macroeconomic stability. Even if we also had a Bolivarian government, we 
knew how to fix our problem and adjust our errors in the precise moment’ 
(interview CAPECO, 2014). The mention of the ‘Bolivarian government’ refers 
to the presidency of Fernando Lugo, which was discussed in the previous 
chapter, as it was cut short by an impeachment trial in 2012. While Lugo 
attempted to implement some redistributive policies, he did not compromise 
the overall basis of the Paraguayan economy. However, the use of such 
terminology suggests that it was perceived in the agribusiness elite as a threat 
to macroeconomic stability, the openness of the Paraguayan economy, and the 
conditions of growth and expansion of the oilseed export sector. 
The key instruments in the achievement of this macroeconomic stability 
have been the Fiscal Responsibility Law and inflation targeting. The Fiscal 
Responsibility Law was approved by Congress in the first days of President 
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Cartes government, in October 2013, a project strongly supported by the 
President himself (ABC Color, 2013a; 2013b). The aim of this legislation was 
to ‘assure the sustainability of public finances in the mid-term, (…) preserving 
the equilibrium between income and public expenditure’ (Poder Legislativo 
del Paraguay, 2013). This meant a legal constraint on the government’s ability 
to increase public expenditure, as it established that budget deficits could not 
exceed 1% of the annual GDP. The only caveat to this regulation would be cases 
of ‘national emergency, international crisis that could seriously affect the 
national economy or a drop in the internal economic activity’ at which point 
the limit could be increased to 3% of GDP (2013).  
This legislation, while praised by international organisations and domestic 
business associations, placed a very strict constraint on the state’s capacity to 
foster development of public infrastructure, provision of public services, etc. 
That is, it represented a very clear preference for the provision of a stable and 
reliable macroeconomic environment to attract foreign investments over the 
capacity for the state to play an active role in the improvement of socio-
economic conditions of its population. Opposition groups, especially the leftist 
Frente Guasu, criticised the legislation for being ‘a penalty’ on poorer sections 
of the population (ABC, 2013a). In addition to its social implications, from a 
more orthodox point of view, this fiscal limitation also affected the state’s 
capacity for public investment to increase private capital’s rate of return, and 
hence, Paraguay’s attractiveness to FDI (Fernandez Valdovinos and Monge 
Naranjo, 2004: 43). 
This stability, however, emerged mostly after 2013, with the passing of the 
Law and the implementation of Inflation Targeting in 2011. In previous years, 
the Paraguayan economy showed signs of volatility, with a current account 
deficit of 2% of GDP in 2012 after five years of surplus, though with large 
variations throughout those years; GDP growth experienced quite stark 
variations particularly from 2008 onwards; and finally, there was an 
increasing appreciation in real terms of the Guaraní, the Paraguayan currency, 
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from 2005 onwards (World Bank, 2017). While identifying the sources of that 
instability goes beyond the scope of this thesis, two points can be made that 
would suggest the nature of this volatility. On the one hand, a closer look at 
Paraguay’s balance of payments indicates that investment income has been 
consistently negative, suggesting that FDI and other investments have been 
steadily leaving the country, hence contributing to the debit in the national 
account. On the other hand, trade of goods has been in surplus, even superior 
to the capital account, thus reinforcing the suggestion that exports – and 
particularly soybean – play a significant role in the current economic stability 
and growth of Paraguay (Banco Central Del Paraguay, 2017).  
This link between soybean and natural resources exports in general becomes 
clear when comparing the performance of exports and that of the GDP from 
2000 onwards, as it shows in Figure 7.4. The growth of the Paraguayan 
economy is very dependent on the agricultural sector: ‘in good years for 
agriculture, [the economy] grows, (…) in bad years it goes down’ (interview 
Figure 7.4 Annual GDP growth and annual growth of exports of goods and 
services, Paraguay, 2000-2016 
 
Source: World Bank, 2017 
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CAPECO, 2014). In 2011, for example, the Paraguayan economy grew by 4%, 
driven mainly by services and the primary sector, each representing 65% and 
25% of that growth (Banco Central Del Paraguay, 2011: 22).  
A question emerging from this correlation between natural resources 
exports and GDP growth is whether Paraguay has been affected by the Dutch 
Disease, and how has the state attempted to govern this phenomenon. This 
aforementioned correlation implies that there is a large inflow of foreign 
currency entering the country as a result of natural resources exports. In the 
first six months of 2011, Paraguay exported soybean grain with a value of US$ 
1.2 billion, making it the main source of foreign currency for Paraguay (Banco 
Central Del Paraguay, 2011: 25). Soybean remained the principal provider of 
US dollars throughout the analysed period, along with an increasing 
participation of energy exports from the two hydro-electric dams, Itaipú and 
Yaciretá (Banco Central Del Paraguay, 2011). This high dependence on exports 
from natural resources would result, according to the Dutch Disease thesis, in 
an overvaluation of the local currency and a negative impact on other export 
sectors.  
Indeed, from 2008 onwards, there was an increased appreciation of the 
domestic currency (Figure 7.5). Adding to this argument, a study by the Centre 
of Analysis and Diffusion of the Paraguayan Economy showed a high 
correlation between terms of trade and the Guaraní as, according to the 
author’s calculations, an increase by 10% in the terms of trade corresponds to 
an appreciation of the Paraguayan currency by 6.7% (Arias, 2013: 13). 
Additionally, Arias (2013) explores others symptoms of Dutch Disease, 
namely, the de-industrialisation of Paraguay’s already historically small 
domestic industry and a consequent expansion of the services sector. 
7. Macroeconomic policy and redistribution: the politics of currency 
 
 
229 
The volatility described before led the Central Bank to intervene in the 
foreign currency market in 2013 as a way to govern the increasing volatility in 
the nominal exchange rate (Banco Central Del Paraguay, 2013: 48). While in 
the cases of Argentina and Brazil we saw an attempt to transfer resources from 
agriculture to industrial sector – or, as Grinberg and Starosta call it, an 
appropriation of the ground rent - in Paraguay the industrial sector is clearly 
in decline. This was also expressed in the struggle over the tax structure 
developed in the previous chapter, as industrial business associations for the 
processing of oilseeds highlighted the extremely high profit rates of the 
soybean production and demanding some balance in the tax pressure. In this 
sense, it can be suggested that a reason that the appreciation of the exchange 
rate does not become an important point of contention in Paraguay is due to 
the lack of a consolidated industrial sector. This removes the need to transfer 
Figure 7.5 Real effective exchange rate, Paraguay, 2000-2016 
 
Source: World Bank, 2017 
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resources from the agricultural sector to industrial development, since there 
is no significant industry to protect.  
Finally, while overall inflation has had a downward trend since 2003, there 
has still been quite a significant inter-annual variation in price levels. Most of 
the Central Bank reports point to the prices of agricultural commodities as one 
of the main reasons behind these variations (Banco Central Del Paraguay, 
2011; 2013; 2014). Notwithstanding, in 2011, the government incorporated 
the Inflation Targeting mechanism as a tool to limit price variations and also 
to send a sign to external markets in terms of tackling macroeconomic 
instability. Setting an inflation target not only acts as a tool for keeping 
consumer prices under a certain level, but it also serves as a more flexible 
mechanism for the control of the exchange rate than having a pegged or fixed 
currency.  
Overall, while there is a clear correlation between the volatility of the 
Paraguay economy and the high dependency on natural resources, and 
particularly soybean – a commodity that has experienced significant price 
volatility in the last 15 years – economic actors in the country seem to connect 
this instability to another factor: the weather. As one interviewee pointed:  
What does affect us, and it is a factor that unfortunately we cannot 
control, is the climate issue (…) What are we doing about it? 
Research, not only in biotechnology but all kind of technology 
available worldwide at the moment (…) But the weather is main 
factor that still weakens the Paraguayan economy (interview 
CAPECO, 2014). 
As such, there is a failure to see dependency on agriculture, and the volatility 
that has recently characterised the global market of these commodities, as the 
main source of limitation of the economy. This is an expression of what Smith 
calls the ‘ideology of nature’, by which people enmeshed in capitalist relations 
often conceive of nature as external, autonomous, and independent of society, 
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as well as universal (Smith, 2010: 11). By determining the failure as being 
‘weather-dependent’, there is no questioning of the current structure of the 
economy and the possible consequences of the ‘bust’ phase of the economic 
cycle, leaving capital flows to determine the geographic, social, and economic 
patterns that will characterise the country. The configurations of UD that are 
already being played out in the country can be further enhanced by this 
decision of the state to limit its own capacity for its governance.  
In this sense, Paraguay’s approach to redistribution through macroeconomic 
policy is consistent with that presented in the previous chapter. The primary 
sector, dominated by soybean production, imposes itself as the main 
beneficiary of the capital accumulation process that emerged with the latest 
commodity boom and of the self-imposed role of the state as a facilitator of the 
inflow of foreign capital. Through the maintenance of a floating exchange rate 
and the imposition of very restrictive fiscal responsibility regulation, the 
Paraguayan state hence sets itself limitations on its own capacity for 
redistribution, either across productive sectors or from one section of the 
population to another.   
Conclusion  
This chapter analysed the different macroeconomic policies that were 
designed by Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay in relation to the availability of 
foreign currency that resulted from the boom in soybean exports. Different to 
the design of tax structures, macroeconomic instruments were also affected by 
the expansion of liquidity in US dollars, and this chapter has shown the impact 
of the soybean boom on indicators affecting the national economies involved. 
However, the existence of variation among the different economies shows that 
the Dutch Disease is not inevitable, but rather that the states have different 
strategies at hand to address the imbalances that arise from the large in-flows 
of capital. 
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In Argentina, the devaluation that followed the 2001 crisis and the 
consequent increase in price competitiveness of the agro-industrial sector was 
very significant in the recovery of the economy. The Kirchner governments 
eventually developed a strategy of Competitive Exchange Rate that would 
ensure a considerable in-flow of foreign currency – essential for a country that 
was isolated from international financial markets – while not damaging 
domestic industry excessively. This occurred in a political context in which the 
government directly intervened with the official statistical agency, resulting in 
the improper measurement of inflation. Inflation increased considerably 
during those years, cancelling out the efforts towards redistribution that could 
have been achieved through taxation.  
The Brazilian government’s capacity to influence macroeconomic indicators 
was far more limited, as a result of pressure from both international 
institutions and domestic elites. By setting inflation targets and modifying 
regulations on capital controls, the BRL was subject to several pressures. Both 
industrial and agricultural elites were keen on maintaining a stable currency 
but this proved difficult in the last decade. Similarly, inflation targets were 
always in the upper margins set by the Council during the successive 
governments of Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff, leading to increasing 
pressure from domestic elites to reduce inflation by tightening the budget and 
returning to more orthodox macroeconomic policies. 
Finally, in Paraguay, the lack of state intervention and the imposition of 
macroeconomic targets further reinforced the inequalities and structures of 
UD that have been heightened by the advancement of soybean. In this sense, 
the Paraguayan macroeconomic approach is consistent with its fiscal strategy 
of benefitting the dominant soybean sector and limiting its own capacity for 
redistribution in one of the most unequal countries on the continent.  
This chapter has demonstrated how, first, the countries studied have 
developed different strategies to govern the uneven dynamics created by new 
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processes of capital accumulation linked to the soybean complex, and second, 
how these strategies have been defined by the diverse limitations each state 
faced. In the case of Argentina, the state’s capacity to govern the impact of 
soybean’s expansion was limited by the contradiction between keeping 
inflation at bay and stimulating the industrial sector, on the one hand, and the 
need to maintain a competitive exchange rate that sustained soybean exports 
and fiscal income, on the other. For Brazil, the economy’s exposure to global 
capital flows restricted the state’s capacity to reterritorialise the capital 
accumulated through the soybean complex, even if the inflow of currency 
stimulated by this sector contributed to the payment of foreign debt. Finally, 
in Paraguay, the depoliticisation of macroeconomic policies through a self-
imposed fiscal responsibility legislation limited the capacity of the state and 
hence reduced its participation in the enhancement of soybean’s capital 
accumulation process and the dynamics of uneven development that emerge 
as a result. Continuing the analysis developed in the previous chapter, the 
study of the macroeconomic policies in these countries demonstrates how the 
state in Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay reaffirmed its authority over the 
dynamics of uneven development that emerge from the mobility and fixity of 
capital in the soybean complex in a variety of ways.  
The analysis presented here suggests the existence of different varieties of 
resource governance through politics of currency. The cases demonstrate not 
only the different policies implemented, but also different levels of state’s 
capacity in governing these dynamics. Part of this capacity is linked to the 
exposure of national economies to international financial capitals and IOs. 
Moreover, the different strategies deployed to govern the patterns of UD 
created by the soybean boom were not always directed at limiting these 
effects, but also to enhance differentiation and equalisation in order to achieve 
government objectives.  
 
   
8. Conclusion 
In 2015 and 2016, a wave of floods affected several regions of Argentina, 
mainly in Cordoba, one of the provinces that constitutes the pampas. The area 
was declared a ‘zone of emergency or disaster’ in 2016 (Agrovoz, 2016). Not 
only were these events calamitous for the affected farms, but several rural 
populations were also seriously impacted, as people had to be evacuated due 
to towns ‘sinking’ under the pressure of rising water levels (La Voz, 2016). 
This unsurprisingly resulted in severe economic losses, equivalent to 4% of 
the region’s Gross Geographic Product, or around US$ 777 million (Telam, 
2016).41 These floods, it has been suggested, have been exacerbated by years 
of soybean monocropping, which has reduced the soil’s capacity to absorb 
water (Pagina 12, 2016). The following year, the Financial Times declared 
soybean to be ‘the crop of the century’ (Meyer et al., 2017). The oilseed’s 
protein content, its malleability for use in industrial goods, and the sustained 
demand from China have propelled soybean production worldwide, with the 
US, Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay leading this supply. The article highlights 
how this demand, which is likely to increase in the future, has promoted the 
expansion of production and the emergence of an ‘international conveyor’s 
belt’ of soybean (ibid).  
These two phenomena – the creation of vast monetary wealth and profound 
transformations in geography – cannot be theoretically separated or 
compartmentalised, but must rather be understood as equally constitutive of 
the spatial political economy of commodity booms. Floods in the Argentine 
pampas and million-dollar investments in China are connected by the 
development of this global agro-industrial complex. This thesis has 
consistently emphasised that these ostensibly unrelated processes should be 
                                                          
41 The Gross Geographic Product is the equivalent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
applied to the subnational states in Argentina.  
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conceptualised as different sides of the same patterns of UD; they are 
simultaneously part of the geography of the soybean complex.     
The effects and consequences of the expansion of this complex are multi-
dimensional and multi-scalar. The growth of soybean production interweaves 
processes of political economy at a range of scales, from the everyday to the 
long cycles of macroeconomic regimes (Blyth and Matthijs, 2017). 
Underpinning these environmental, social, political, and economic dimensions 
is the process of capital accumulation and the (re)production of nature and 
space. This thesis has provided insight into these processes by examining the 
soybean complex in South America and the mechanisms for the creation and 
distribution of wealth in Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. 
This concluding chapter presents a summary of the main findings of this 
thesis, namely on the spatio-temporal structure of the soybean complex, and 
the varieties of governance identified in Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, the 
original contributions, and finally the limits and prospects for future research 
that are implicit in this work.   
The governance of soybean’s expansion in South America 
This thesis set out to unpack the key mechanisms in the expansion of profit 
created in the context of a commodity boom and the strategies developed to 
govern it. It first addressed the shortcomings of literature on Latin America 
that examined the role of commodity cycles in the region’s development. As a 
response to these limitations, this thesis proposed a spatial approached based 
on Neil Smith’s theory of UD, with consideration of questions of scale and 
strategies of de- and reterritorialisation, to study the case of the soybean 
complex in South America. The empirical analysis developed here first 
explored the politics of capital fixity and mobility, that is, how the development 
of fixed capital or infrastructure (Chapter 4) and the increased mobility of 
capital, through financialisation (Chapter 5), have enhanced the profitability 
of the soybean complex and created patterns of UD in the process. This section 
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of the thesis aimed at understanding the way spatial configurations are both 
determined by and determine the political economy of soybean, and to 
delineate some of the features of the spatio-temporal structure of the soybean 
complex. The second part of the thesis focused on the Argentine, Brazilian, and 
Paraguayan states’ capacities to govern and distribute the wealth created 
through the soybean sector. To do so, Chapters 6 and 7 focused on policies of 
taxation and exchange rate policies respectively, in order to analyse the extent 
to which the countries involved had been able – and willing – to use these 
mechanisms to govern the soybean complex.  
Soybean spatio-temporal structure 
This thesis proposed a theoretical approach that highlighted the spatial 
nature of processes of political economy, as developed in Chapter 3. One of the 
central underpinning propositions of this project has been the 
conceptualisation of space as relational. This means that space is not simply a 
container where economic, political, and social relations take place, but rather 
‘an embodiment and a medium of social life itself’ (Soja, 1989: 120). Space is 
constructed and at the same time constructs social interactions. In the context 
of the capitalist system, this is reflected in the emergence of specific 
geographies of capitalism, determined by the dominant processes of 
accumulation. With this conceptual framework in mind, the expansion and 
consolidation of the soybean complex in South America in the context of a 
commodity boom was studied as a spatio-temporal matrix, a construction of 
social spaces where accumulation takes place (Jessop, 2000).  
This spatial configuration emerged as a result of capital’s dual need for fixity 
and mobility. For the creation of wealth, capital requires the existence of built 
structures – such as factories, roads, etc. – as well as the capacity to move 
quickly to another area or sector when profit rates fall. The duality gives rise 
to a process that Smith calls the seesaw movement of capital. There is a 
moment of growth, of the inflow of capital, followed by one of devaluation, as 
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capitals move to other sectors and regions. The soybean complex and its 
continuous expansion, even when international prices have been dropping, 
indicates that we are still observing the first phase of this process. However, 
patterns of UD created by dynamics associated with the complex have 
emerged at different scales. As such, this thesis analysed the process through 
which the built environment was expanded, enhanced by capital mobility, and 
investment was drawn into the sector, enlarging both profits and imbalances.  
In Chapter 4, this thesis analysed the built environment that is key in the 
configuration of the soybean complex. In particular, three cases of 
infrastructure development were examined: the Gran Rosario commodity hub, 
in Argentina; the highway BR-163, connecting the South and North-West of 
Brazil; and the barge fleet of Paraguay and the Paraguay-Paraná waterway.   
The ‘commodity hub’ established in the area of Gran Rosario, Argentina, is 
the centre for the processing, logistics coordination, and transport of around 
80% of Argentine soybean production. One of the most efficient agricultural 
hubs in the world, this complex system of ports, industrial installations, roads, 
and storage facilities is an 80km zone for the concentration and centralisation 
of agribusiness capital and a key logistical centre for the functioning of the 
regional soybean complex. Second, this chapter explored the implications of 
the re-pavement of the BR-163 road, a soybean corridor in the centre of Brazil. 
This highway connects the largest soy-producing state in Brazil, Mato Grosso, 
with Santarem, a port on the shores of the Amazon River where transnational 
agricultural trader Cargill owns a terminal to transport the commodity 
through the river to international ports in Northern Brazil. This project has, on 
one hand, facilitated and reduced the cost of transporting soybean from the 
South and Centre of Brazil to international markets; and, on the other, it has 
created the conditions for the further expansion of the soybean planted 
surface – and likely propelled further deforestation. Third, the chapter 
explored how the Paraguay-Paraná waterway has been transformed into a 
channel for regional trade in which soybean plays a significant role. It is for the 
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purpose of transporting this specific commodity that Paraguay has developed 
the third largest barge fleet in the world.  
These three examples demonstrate the different ways in which physical 
infrastructure has transformed the existing geography and created a spatial 
architecture specific to soybean. Infrastructure has done so in three ways. 
First, infrastructure has created new scales, by transforming local dynamics 
into spaces for global processes; or by altering the hierarchy of scales, for 
example by bringing regions to the forefront of economic power, as in the case 
of Mato Grosso in Brazil. Second, infrastructure has created new spaces for 
economic expansion, either through making new areas available for 
production or by increasing the capacity to transport and process larger 
volumes. Third, the emergence of these infrastructures and the dynamics of 
capital accumulation they entail have affected other areas of social interaction. 
Socio-economically, some of these zones have created new conditions of 
marginalisation and criminality, as in the case of Rosario. Environmentally, 
they have affected the relationship between society and nature by 
transforming and producing nature (Smith, 2010), observable through the 
deforestation of the Brazilian cerrado and the dredging of the rivers in the La 
Plata basin.  
While an analysis of the construction of logistical hubs, highways, and 
waterways provides insight into the ways in which the fixed capacity of capital 
is realised, Chapter 5 studies the manner in which financial capital has 
pervaded agro-industry and hence heightened the profitability of the sector by 
infusing it with mobile capital. This chapter identified how derivatives markets 
based on soybean have expanded rapidly, both globally and regionally. It also 
highlighted the emergence of smaller markets based in South America, vying 
to enhance the region’s capacity to set the international price of agricultural 
commodities, in a way that reflects their participation in the real economy. On 
the other hand, the increasing participation of global financial firms in the 
provision of liquidity for production increases the vulnerability of the sector, 
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by promoting the pursuit of short-term profits and threatening to shift to other 
sectors in following productive cycles.  
Similar to the effects of fixed capital, the increasing presence of mobile 
capital has re-scaled soybean trade and production through different 
mechanisms. For example, through the mobility of soybean-based derivatives 
– such as the ‘South American soybean’ contract sold on the CBOT – the oilseed 
becomes an asset that is rarely materialised through the purchase of the actual 
crop, but is rather used to realise quick profits at global scales of accumulation. 
Through the penetration of global financial capital directly into production, 
evidenced by international hedge funds’ investment in planting pools in 
Argentina, farmers in South America are exposed to the volatility of global 
financial markets and become vulnerable to the seesaw movement of capital, 
as investments can quickly retreat and relocate to more profitable areas. 
Overall, the increasing presence of financial capital has boosted both processes 
of deterritorialisation, as capital can quickly move from one sector to another, 
and reterritorialisation, as financial capital has incentivised the concentration 
and centralisation of capital in large-scale farms.  
In sum, the infrastructure projects and mechanisms for the financialisation 
of agriculture described above explain how the geography of soybean in South 
America both expresses the profitability of this commodity in the context of a 
global boom, and acts as a condition for the further expansion of this 
productive complex. By looking both at the construction of the built 
environment and the consolidation of capital mobility through the increasing 
presence of financial capital, this thesis was able to map the extension of the 
spatio-temporal matrix of the soybean complex in South America. In this sense, 
this thesis unpacked the spatial dynamics involved in the creation of wealth 
during commodity booms. Firstly, by identifying the mechanisms for the 
physical expansion of the soybean space, this thesis examined how enormous 
fixed investment in and physical transformation of the landscape has allowed 
for the integration of local, national, regional, and global scales of capital 
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accumulation. Secondly, the increasing mobility of capital – achieved through 
the increasing financialisation of trade and production – has allowed the rapid 
injection of liquidity into the sector, incentivising enlargement of production 
and faster turn-around times. Furthermore, financialisation has connected the 
economic activities involved in the production and trade of soybean at 
different scales, for example, futures based on soybean produced in South 
America are sold in the Chicago Board of Trade, or banks in Europe have direct 
investments on production of the oilseed in Argentina, thus integrating scales. 
Taken together, the creation of these mammoth built environments and 
intangible financial instruments – representative of the fixity and mobility of 
capital –  have transformed the soybean complex into a truly multi-scalar 
phenomenon, in which capital accumulation is reliant on processes at a range 
of spatial scales and geographical locations.   
These spatial transformations, and the accompanying social, economic, and 
political relations embedded in that space, are the result of what Smith (2010) 
dubbed the ‘seesaw movement of capital’. This is understood as the impact that 
capital’s contradictory tendencies of equalisation and differentiation create in 
space. This seesaw movement can be better conceptualised as processes of 
reterritorialisation and deterritorialisation (Brenner, 1998a), understood as 
strategies for grounding or diffusing authority, which is linked to the 
establishment of fixed capital or the heightening of capital mobility. As such, 
capital’s search for profitability creates the conditions for the emergence of 
particular spatial configurations, that is, geographies for production of wealth 
beyond the national economic space. In this case, we see across the borders of 
Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay – and increasingly neighbouring countries, 
such as Uruguay and Bolivia – the expansion and consolidation of a specific 
geography of the soybean boom.  
 The following part of the thesis, which will be summarised next, 
demonstrates the emergence of varieties of resource governance that have 
emerged in the context of the commodity boom.  
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Varieties of resource governance: Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay 
The second section of the thesis presented a country-based analysis of two 
policies which influence how – and to what extent - wealth created through the 
spatial political economy of soybean was distributed. Chapters 6 and 7 
analysed the politics of taxation and the politics of exchange rates, 
respectively, to demonstrate different state capacities in the governance of 
commodity booms. As a result, we can identify three varieties of resource 
governance in the cases studied.  
In Argentina, the expansion of soybean and the attempts by the government 
to manage its development have resulted in very public struggles between 
different sectors. The conflict between the Argentine government led by 
Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner and agricultural producers – which reached its 
climax in July 2008 – very clearly demonstrates the power struggles that 
emerge as the result of the availability of vast resources. In terms of tax 
policies, Argentina is the only country of the three analysed here that has 
implemented export taxes on several commodities, the highest of which was 
placed upon soybean. This is due in part to the social contract which the 
government had built its support upon, which was based on the provision of 
social welfare programmes and large subsidies. In this context, soybean 
emerged as the most important source of fiscal resources for the state, which 
eventually led to an intense conflict between the productive sector and the 
government over the rates of export taxes.  
Argentina’s macroeconomic strategy was largely marked by the same 
dynamic, namely the need for the Argentine government to control inflation 
and promote the industrial sector, while maintaining the competitiveness of 
exports so as to sustain high social spending. The contradictory objectives of, 
on one hand, maintaining a competitive currency that would maintain revenue 
from soybean exports, and, on the other hand, controlling inflation for 
electoral purposes, were reflected in the government’s limited capacity to 
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meet either objective. Both in terms of fiscal and macroeconomic policy, the 
strategies put forward by the Argentine government did not always have the 
expected effects. While the objectives might have been considered as to 
ameliorate the impact of UD, to some extent these policies heightened this 
process. In order to increase the state’s capacity to collect revenues, and hence 
expand social expenditure, these policies also exacerbated the processes of 
equalisation and differentiation created by the soybean complex.    
 Brazil constitutes a very complex case, due to the nature of its economic, 
political, and bureaucratic structures. In order to conceptualise the attempts 
by the highly federal Brazilian state to govern and redistribute the profits 
created through soybean, it is crucial to understand the limited capacity of the 
federal government to impose its authority upon sub-national states. In this 
case, soybean has effectively shifted the balance of domestic power in Brazil. 
States in the Centre-West of the country have emerged on the national political 
scene and consequently become immersed in struggles with traditionally 
dominant regions such as São Paulo. In terms of taxation, the federal state had 
limited capacity for enacting a tax on soybean at the national level. This was 
due to two factors: first, the capacity for subnational states to impose their own 
tax systems; and second, the Kandir Law, passed in 1996, eliminated all taxes 
on grain exports. Hence, the Brazilian state’s capacity for redistribution was 
limited by domestic conditions, namely its federalist structure, and the elites’ 
influence over trade legislation. In the case of macroeconomic policy, the state 
was similarly limited in enacting a framework that might benefit 
redistribution. Throughout the two terms of President Lula da Silva and the 
presidency of Dilma Rousseff, Brazil developed a hybrid strategy that Esteban 
Actis termed ‘heterodox neo-developmentalism’ (2011) or ‘liberal neo-
developmentalism’ by Cornel Ban (2013). Elites played an important role in 
the design of the macroeconomic framework, but also external forces, namely 
foreign capital, acted as a deterrent for a more interventionist state attempting 
to govern the effects of UD. Overall, Brazilian governance of the soybean 
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complex reflects some of the tensions between developmental efforts, 
globalisation, and conflicting interests among domestic elites, creating 
patterns of UD across scales.  
Finally, Paraguay’s approach to governing the soybean commodity boom has 
been to limit all attempts to manage or intervene in the capitalist process of 
accumulation. As Chapter 6 describes, the only attempt to govern the patterns 
of UD emerging from the advancement of soybean was pursued by President 
Fernando Lugo. During his presidency, the former bishop showed some efforts 
to address issues of environmental protection and land redistribution for 
peasants. However, his rapid impeachment showed the significance of 
domestic elites in rejecting all attempts to pursue any kind of redistribution. 
Both the tax structure and the macroeconomic framework reflected a state 
that responds to business demands and a soybean sector largely dominated by 
Brazilian interests. While soybean has become one of the most important 
economic sectors in Paraguay, a country largely dependent on exports of this 
commodity, there has been very little ‘spillover effect’ for the large majority of 
the population. The expansion of this economic activity has greatly 
contributed to the increasing inequality that exists in this country. In this case, 
the effects of UD and the seesaw movement of capital are evidenced in 
Paraguay’s socio-economic, geographic, and environmental configuration. The 
commodity boom in Paraguay has simultaneously created incredible growth 
while also enhancing inequality, showcasing the limits to state’s capacity in 
governing these processes.    
By analysing the fiscal and macroeconomic policies implemented in three 
countries where the soybean productive complex has extended the furthest, 
this thesis offered an insight into how – and to what extent – national states 
design policies to effectively distribute wealth created through economic 
booms. The analysis of these strategies showed the different approaches 
pursued by states in their efforts to govern the processes of UD. Tax structures 
– or lack thereof – can act as a mechanism to transfer resources from the sector 
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at the centre of the commodity boom to other sectors, or, they can further 
deepen the asymmetries created by the dynamics of capital. Similarly, 
exchange rate policies can either ameliorate or deepen the imbalances created 
by the large amount of foreign currency entering these economies through the 
export of soybean in a commodity boom context. The analysis of these policies 
provided an insight into state’s capacity for rebalancing the distribution of 
wealth.  
Overall, this thesis presented an analysis of how the development of built 
capital –through the construction of physical infrastructure – and its mobility 
– through the increasing financialisation of agribusiness – have created a 
specific spatial configuration of the soybean boom in South America, and 
facilitated the creation and expansion of wealth in this region. Moreover, this 
thesis has studied the ways in which states, by facilitating the 
deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation of capital, have attempted to 
govern this sector and the tremendous wealth created through it. This was 
achieved both by enhancing capital’s capacity for fixity and mobility, and by 
developing policy strategies that ameliorated or deepened (or both 
simultaneously) the emerging patterns of UD.  
Original contributions  
The in-depth analysis of the creation and distribution of wealth from the 
soybean boom in South America developed in this thesis has provided a 
number of contributions to the fields of Latin American Studies and the IPE of 
Development.  
With a few exceptions (Turzi, 2011; Oliveira and Hecht, 2016; Wesz Jr., 2016; 
Craviotti, 2016), most academic and policy analyses of the expansion of 
soybean production in South America have focused on a single country. 
Whether exploring the emergence of social movements (Garcia Lopez and 
Arizpe, 2010; Lapegna, 2016; Leguizamon, 2016), production and farming 
dynamics (Teubal et al., 2005; Mier and Gimenez Cacho, 2016; Vennet et al., 
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2016), or environmental issues (Fearnside, 2001; Greenpeace, 2006), many 
analyses of this phenomenon have compartmentalised the social, 
environmental, and economic dynamics within the territorial borders of the 
nation-state. This thesis contributes to this literature by offering an analysis 
that examines the multi-scalar dynamics at play. By exploring the different 
dimensions of infrastructure development and capital mobility across the 
region, and by providing cross-country analysis, this thesis provides a more 
comprehensive account of the soybean complex and in this sense a deeper 
insight into the processes underpinning more specific issues, such as loss of 
bio-diversity in the Brazilian cerrado, land-conflicts in Paraguay, or the social 
consequences of pesticide use in Argentina.   
Moreover, the study of policies at the national level complements the 
analysis of the soybean complex and provides a unique comparative analysis 
of the impact of the different governance strategies over soybean production. 
Such an analysis is crucial for exploring the ways in which the expansion of 
circuits of capital accumulation during commodity booms impacts upon the 
affected countries; as well as the different impacts these processes have on 
state capacities. This is of particular relevance to the field of Latin American 
Studies, as it addresses the transformations of the state in the region – 
expressed in analyses of the ‘pink-tide’, the ‘post-neoliberal state’ or the ‘neo-
extractivist model’ - and the role of the recent commodity boom in these 
transformations.  
This thesis’ main contribution, however, is to the IPE of development. The 
concept of uneven development addresses the imbalances that capitalism 
engenders in both physical and economic geographies, which is of crucial 
importance for any study of development, understood in a broad sense as the 
accomplishment of certain improvements in standards of living. The concepts 
developed by Smith thus connect the spatial processes of capital accumulation 
with debates on development. Furthermore, this framework highlights the fact 
that the socio-spatial transformations created by capital accumulation cannot 
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be limited to an analysis of national levels of economic performance. The 
multi-scalar nature of these dynamics suggests that the study of development 
should also focus on processes and groups that are ‘linked by particular sets of 
material and social circumstances that cut across territorial boundaries’ 
(Payne and Phillips, 2010: 180). Patterns of UD do not know political borders, 
but rather emerge within and across the limits of the nation-state, and at a 
multiplicity of scales.  
While highlighting the multi-scalarity of processes in political economy, this 
thesis also draws connections between long-term cycles in the global political 
economy, such as commodity supercycles, and the transformations these 
processes provoke in affected states. In this sense, this research has focused 
on the ‘macro-foundations’ of the global political economy, which allows for a 
conceptualisation of the manner in which seemingly discrete economic and 
political events are connected ‘across time and space’ (Blyth and Matthijs, 
2017: 205). By analysing the expansion of the soybean complex in South 
American, this thesis addressed the ‘structural changes in production, trade 
and the global distribution of wealth and power’ enmeshed in the latest 
commodity boom, which has been largely ignored by IPE (Margulis, 2017: 11).  
By situating this study of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay within the field of 
IPE, this thesis avoids the division of social science disciplines according to 
geographical boundaries. Instead, this research emphasises the empirical and 
theoretical richness of this case for issues at the core of IPE, such as questions 
of commodity booms, asset bubbles, the governance of natural resources, and 
the embeddedness of state/market relations. By doing so, this thesis breaks 
with the identification of the study of countries and regions outside Western 
advanced economies with ‘development studies’, and accentuates the need for 
a ‘globalised conception of development’ (Payne and Phillips, 2010: 181), and 
a globalised understanding of IPE.    
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More specifically, this thesis has also contributed to the theory of UD by 
incorporating the state into the analysis of the seesaw movement of capital. 
While Smith’s framework has focused on examining the different ways in 
which the tendencies of differentiation and equalisation have created 
geographies of capital at different scales (Smith, 2010), the role of the state as 
a mediator in these processes is largely absent. This thesis demonstrates that 
the state has the capacity to both ameliorate, or enhance the patterns of UD 
that emerge from the seesaw movement of capital. In this sense, this research 
aims to challenge the view that states, particularly in the Global South, are 
merely passive recipients of the consequences that follow large in-flows of 
capital during commodity booms – a trap that the resource curse literature has 
tended to fall into.  
Finally, this thesis has demonstrated the value of incorporating the spatial 
dimension into analyses of political economy processes. Understanding space 
as a relational concept, that is, as generated by social interactions, can shed 
light on dynamics of wealth creation and distribution, the role of the state, and 
the emergence of alternative scales for the organisation of the economy. This 
thesis has provided a unique demonstration that the ‘spatial turn’ experienced 
in other social sciences can contribute to the discipline of IPE by highlighting 
the importance of seeing geography and space not as purely natural 
phenomena, but as expressions of transformations in the capitalist economy.  
Limits and prospects 
This thesis has addressed a number of gaps in the literature on Latin 
American Studies, Agrarian Studies, and the IPE of development. However, as 
with all social enquiry, the processes and dynamics explored in this thesis 
generate new questions and possible avenues for future research.  
To study the production and trade of soybean in three different countries, 
covering a very extensive geographical area, presented a significant challenge, 
given the limited amount of time and resources available for this research. 
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While this thesis highlighted several processes that have been overlooked, 
such as the development of infrastructure, the empirical analysis of the spatio-
temporal matrix of the soybean complex can be further enriched by analysing 
other manifestations of the fixed environment. For example, the role of storage 
facilities, such as the use of silo-bags, can affect the capacity to expand 
production, thus potentially changing patterns of supply, as well as the 
capacity to retain or store production for longer periods of time, as was 
mentioned in the case of Argentina. The relevance of this dimension is not be 
limited to soybean. Recently, a report by British think tank Chatham House 
highlighted the growing risks of trade chokepoints for global food security, 
signalling the increasing importance of transport infrastructure and logistics 
for the global political economy (Bailey and Wellesley, 2017). 
While soybean was one of the main commodities that experienced a very 
significant rise in volumes of production and trade fuelled by growing demand 
and rapid increases in price, a spatial analysis of the governance of the creation 
and distribution of wealth can be expanded to other commodities with 
significant impacts on the political economy of different regions. Future 
analysis could, for example, focus on the palm oil complex, which has been 
particularly relevant for South-East Asia, West Africa, and the tropical regions 
of Latin America; as well as corn, coconut, and many others. 
Besides the empirical analysis of other flex crops, further research is needed 
on the links between the commodity boom and state transformation in Latin 
America. This could be achieved by expanding the scope of case studies, as well 
as analysing in more depth the socio-economic implications of an expanded 
primary exports growth model. As mentioned in Chapter 2, while much of the 
literature on the neo-extractivist model points to the redistributive impact of 
royalties and export taxes, more empirical research is needed to provide 
substantive evidence of this. This is particularly relevant in a context in which 
the ‘pink tide’ that characterised the region since the mid-2000s appears to be 
receding.  
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Finally, the theoretical approach developed here can provide insight into an 
additional area of study that has not been fully explored in this thesis, namely 
the manner in which processes of UD, specifically linked to dynamics such as 
the commodity boom, produce nature. In order to understand the current and 
dramatic global geographical transformations, and their implications for 
governance, development, and power relations in the global political economy, 
IPE should continue to expand its research agenda beyond the binary notion 
of society and nature as independent. Jason W. Moore proposes that capitalism 
should be understood as ‘a way of organizing nature’ (Moore, 2015) and, in 
this sense, it is important to explore the different ways in which the global 
economy and nature co-constitute one another.  
This thesis argued that capital’s search for profit in the context of an asset 
price bubble has created a geography of soybean that crosses the borders of 
several countries of the Southern Cone, and which has in turn enabled the 
further expansion of the profits in this sector. Through the simultaneous 
development of fixed structures and the promotion of capital mobility – 
enhanced by state strategies of reterritorialisation and deterritorialisation – 
the geography of the region has adopted a very particular configuration that 
responds to the demands of soybean capital. In this process, the soybean boom 
has created patterns of UD at different scales – from the local and national to 
the regional and global – while also creating new scalarities in the process. 
However, the processes examined in this thesis are representative of one 
moment in the seesaw movement of capital:  the boom, during which capital 
floods into those areas and sectors where profitability is highest. It remains to 
be seen the larger effects of the totality of the process of UD, when a decline in 
profitability and international prices of soybean provoke capital to flee to 
other regions and other assets. Perhaps only then will we see the full extent of 
the plunder that Soylandia has generated.  
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2014 
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Argentina 
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Director of Finance  
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2014 
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NIDERA  
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President ACSOJA  
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2014 
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NIDERA  Anonymised NIDERA    Industrial Director 
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2014 
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CAF Anonymised 
CAF - Development Bank of Latin 
America 
Representative Director in 
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Minister of Foreign Affairs 
of Paraguay 
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ELYPSIS Anonymised ELYPSIS - Consultant Company Senior Economist 
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2014 
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Bolsa de 
Cereales 
Anonymised 
Bolsa de Cereales (Buenos Aires 
Grains Exchange) 
Chief Economist 
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2014 
Buenos Aires, 
Argentina 
Former 
Secretary of 
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Anonymised UBATEC 
President UBATEC- Former 
Secretary of Agriculture, 
Cattle and Fishing 2009-
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2014 
Buenos Aires, 
Argentina 
Molinos Anonymised Molinos Rio de la Plata, S.A. 
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Research Manager 
8 October 
2014 
Buenos Aires, 
Argentina 
AAPRESID Anonymised 
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Former President of 
AAPRESID - Co-founder of 
Argentinian seed company 
Don Mario 
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2014 
Buenos Aires, 
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LDC Anonymised Louis Dreyfus Commodities 
Regional Manager LD 
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2014 
Buenos Aires, 
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LCG 
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Anonymised LCG Consultancy Company 
Former Secretary of 
Political Economy (2007-
2008) Argentina 
19 
December 
2014 
Buenos Aires, 
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Reference Name Organisation Position Date Place 
ABAG Anonymised 
ABAG - Brazilian Agribusiness 
Association 
Director 
04 November 
2014 
São Paulo, Brazil 
FGV Anonymised 
GV AGRO - Getulio Vargas 
Foundation, Centre for Agribusiness 
Studies 
Professor  
06 November 
2014 
São Paulo, Brazil 
ABIOVE Anonymised 
ABIOVE - Brazilian Association of 
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Manager - Economist 
07 November 
2014 
São Paulo, Brazil 
NIDERA 
Brazil 
Anonymised NIDERA Sementes Brazil 
Pesquisa Soja (Soybean 
Research) 
07 November 
2014 
Skype 
 EMBRAPA Anonymised 
EMBRAPA International Relations 
Secretariat / Ministry of 
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Supply 
Analyst / Director of Coffee 
Department 
10 November 
2014 
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SPA Anonymised. 
Ministry of Economy, Secretary of 
Economic Policy, Brazil 
Secretary-Adjoint of 
Agricultural and 
Environmental Policy 
10 November 
2014 
Brasilia, Brazil 
SPE Anonymised 
Ministry of Economy, Secretary of 
Economic Policy, Brazil 
Consultant - Secretary of 
Political Economy 
10 November 
2014 
Brasilia, Brazil 
IICA Anonymised 
IICA - Inter-American Institute for 
Cooperation in Agriculture 
Project International 
Specialist Southern Region 
11 November 
2014 
Brasilia, Brazil 
MAPA(a) Anonymised 
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock 
and Food Supply (MAPA)- 
Secretariat of Agricultural Policy 
Advisor 
11 November 
2014 
Brasilia, Brazil 
MAPA(b) Anonymised 
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock 
and Food Supply (MAPA)- 
Secretariat of Agricultural Policy 
General Coordinator of 
Cereal and Annual Crops 
11 November 
2014 
Brasilia, Brazil 
Barral 
Consultants 
Welber Barral 
Barral M Jorge Consultants on 
International Trade and 
Government Relations 
Former Secretary of 
Foreign Trade of Brazil   
Arbitrator in Permanent 
Court of Revision of 
Mercosur and the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) 
11 November 
2014 
Brasilia, Brazil 
APROSOJA Anonymised 
APROSOJA Brasil - Brazilian 
Soybean Producers Association 
Technical Advisor 
13 November 
2014 
Brasilia, Brazil 
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Reference Name Organisation Position Date Place 
CNA(a) Anonymised 
CNA - Brazilian Confederation of 
Agriculture and Livestock 
Technical Advisor - 
Technical Department 
13 November 
2014 
Brasilia, Brazil 
CNA(b) Anonymised 
 CNA - Brazilian Confederation of 
Agriculture and Livestock 
Head - International 
Relations 
13 November 
2014 
Brasilia, Brazil 
Ministry of 
Development 
Brazil 
Anonymised 
Ministry of Development, Industry 
and Foreign Trade -  Department of 
International Negotiations  
Foreign Trade Analyst - 
General Coordinator 
(MERCOSUR and ALADI) 
14 November 
2014 
Brasilia, Brazil 
CPDA(a) Anonymised 
Federal Rural University of Rio de 
Janeiro (UFRRJ)- Graduate Program 
in Development, Agriculture and 
Society (CPDA) 
Professor  
17 November 
2014 
Rio de Janeiro, 
Brazil 
CPDA(b) Anonymised 
Federal Rural University of Rio de 
Janeiro (UFRRJ)- Graduate Program 
in Development, Agriculture and 
Society (CPDA) 
Researcher 
19 November 
2014 
Rio de Janeiro, 
Brazil 
CEBRI(a) Anonymised 
CEBRI (Brazilian Centre for 
International Relations) 
Former Ambassador to 
Argentina 
19 November 
2014 
Rio de Janeiro, 
Brazil 
CEBRI(b) Anonymised 
CEBRI (Brazilian Centre for 
International Relations) 
Project Coordinator 
19 November 
2014 
Rio de Janeiro, 
Brazil 
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Agroconsult 
Anonymised 
Anonymised 
AGROCONSULT - Consultant 
Company 
Analyst 
25 November 
2014 
São Paulo, Brazil 
GV AGRO 
Roberto 
Rodrigues 
Getulio Vargas Centre for 
Agribusiness Studies (GV AGRO) 
Coordinator GV AGRO 
Former Minister of 
Agriculture of Brazil (2003-
2006) 
25 November 
2014 
São Paulo, Brazil 
FIESP Anonymised 
Federation of Industries of the State 
of Sao Paulo (FIESP) 
Manager – Department of 
Agribusiness 
27 November 
2014 
São Paulo, Brazil 
SRB Anonymised Rural Society of Brazil (SRB) Former President of SRB 
27 November 
2014 
São Paulo, Brazil 
 
Paraguay 
Reference Name Organisation Position Date Place 
UGP(a) Anonymised 
UGP (Union of Production Trade 
Unions of Paraguay) 
Manager 
13 October 
2014 
Asuncion, 
Paraguay 
UGP(b) Anonymised 
UGP (Union of Production Trade 
Unions of Paraguay) 
Consultant; former Min. of 
Agriculture and 
Environment of Paraguay 
13 October 
2014 
Asuncion, 
Paraguay 
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UGP(c) Anonymised 
UGP (Union of Production Trade 
Unions of Paraguay) 
President of UGP 
13 October 
2014 
Asuncion, 
Paraguay 
IPIE Anonymised 
IPIE (Paraguayan Institute of 
Economic Research) 
Researcher 
14 October 
2014 
Asuncion, 
Paraguay 
CAPPRO Anonymised 
CAPPRO (Chamber of Industries 
and Exporters of Cereals and 
Oilseeds of Paraguay) 
President  
15 October 
2014 
Asuncion, 
Paraguay 
BASE IS Anonymised BASE IS (Social Research Institute) Researcher 
15 October 
2014 
Asuncion, 
Paraguay 
CAPECO Anonymised 
CAPECO (Paraguayan Grains and 
Oilseeds Traders Associations) 
International Trade 
Consultant 
16 October 
2014 
Asuncion, 
Paraguay 
MERCOSUR Anonymised 
TPR MERCOSUR (Permanent 
Tribunal of Revision) 
Secretary of Tribunal - 
Head of Mission 
16 October 
2014 
Asuncion, 
Paraguay 
 
 
 
  
 
290 
Uruguay 
Reference Name Organisation Position Date Place 
UAG Anonymised UAG (Union Agriculture Group) Operations Manager 
10 December 
2014 
Montevideo, 
Uruguay 
ADP Anonymised 
ADP (Agribusiness company 
associated to Grupo Los Grobo) 
Director 
10 December 
2014 
Montevideo, 
Uruguay 
 GPS UY Anonymised 
GPS - Group of Producing Countries 
from the Southern Cone 
Steering Committee GPS 
10 December 
2014 
Montevideo, 
Uruguay 
 
